State v. Kvasnicka
| Decision Date | 27 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 26176.,26176. |
| Citation | 829 N.W.2d 123,2013 S.D. 25 |
| Parties | STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Tammy Jean KVASNICKA, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Marty J. Jackley, Attorney General, Ann C. Meyer, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.
Nicole J. Laughlin, Marcus Walton of Minnehaha County, Public Defender's Office, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorney for defendant and appellant.
[¶ 1.] Tammy Kvasnicka was convicted by a jury of first-degree manslaughter by means of a dangerous weapon, vehicular homicide, vehicular battery, and driving under the influence (DUI). Kvasnicka was acquitted of two charges of first-degree manslaughter while engaged in the commission of a felony. In her appeal to this Court, Kvasnicka argues that the language “while engaged in the commission of a felony” was prejudicial when referring to the charge of DUI in a first-degree manslaughter trial. Kvasnicka also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling her objections to the admissibility of Officer Brian Crozier's testimony.
[¶ 2.] On July 9, 2010, Kvasnicka celebrated her birthday by having several alcoholic drinks at a friend's house and at downtown bars in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. In the early morning hours on July 10, Kvasnicka left the downtown area in her Dodge Intrepid.
[¶ 3.] At approximately 2:00 a.m., Kvasnicka was traveling southbound in the northbound lane on Interstate 229 when she struck a vehicle carrying five people. The front seat passenger suffered a serious injury to his arm and a back seat passenger died at the scene. Kvasnicka was not seriously injured in the collision.
[¶ 4.] At the hospital, Kvasnicka was read her Miranda rights and placed under arrest. Her blood was drawn at 3:44 a.m., which reflected a blood alcohol content between 0.225 and 0.219. Following a second drawing at 4:47 a.m., Kvasnicka's blood alcohol content was between 0.204 and 0.200.
[¶ 5.] On the evening of July 10, Kvasnicka was questioned at the Sioux Falls Police Department. After being read her Miranda rights, Kvasnicka admitted that on the previous evening she consumed several alcoholic drinks and smoked marijuana prior to the collision.
[¶ 6.] A grand jury indicted Kvasnicka with seven counts: count one—manslaughter in the first-degree while engaged in the commission of a felony, driving while under the influence of alcohol, class C felony, in violation of SDCL 22–16–15(1); count two—manslaughter while engaged in the commission of a felony, driving while having .08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood, class C felony, in violation of SDCL 22–16–15(1); count three—manslaughter in the first-degree by means of a dangerous weapon, class C felony, in violation of SDCL 22–16–15(3); count four—vehicular homicide, class 3 felony, in violation of SDCL 22–16–41; count five—vehicular battery, class 4 felony, in violation of SDCL 22–18–36; count six—driving while under the influence of any alcoholic beverage, marijuana, or any controlled drug or substance, class 1 misdemeanor, in violation of SDCL 32–23–1; count seven—driving while having .08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood, class 1 misdemeanor, in violation of SDCL 32–23–1. The State also filed two part II informations because Kvasnicka had been previously convicted in 2006 of two DUI charges and one second-degree burglary charge.
[¶ 7.] Kvasnicka filed a motion to dismiss counts one and two on the grounds that DUI is not a felony offense as required by SDCL 22–16–15(1). Kvasnicka also sought to dismiss count three on the basis that an automobile should not be considered a dangerous weapon for purposes of SDCL 22–16–15(3). The motions were denied.
[¶ 8.] Prior to trial, Kvasnicka again moved to dismiss counts one, two, and three predicated upon the same grounds as her previous motion. The trial court denied the motion but granted Kvasnicka a standing objection as to those counts. The case proceeded to a jury trial.
[¶ 9.] At trial, the State offered the expert testimony of Officer Crozier, who was trained in accident reconstruction.1 Before Officer Crozier was allowed to testify further, Kvasnicka objected to his testimony. A bench conference was held. Kvasnicka objected to Officer Crozier's kinetic energy testimony on the grounds of foundation and relevancy.
[¶ 10.] The trial court found that Officer Crozier's testimony was relevant because it provided information to the jury to demonstrate the force of the impact and to show that Kvasnicka's Dodge Intrepid was being used as a dangerous weapon at the time of the collision. As to foundation, the trial court found that Officer Crozier “did provide quite a bit of information about his education and background in accident reconstruction, as well as teaching crash investigations at the police academy in Pierre.” 2
[¶ 11.] Following voir dire of Officer Crozier, Kvasnicka again objected to the testimony on the grounds of relevance, foundation, and prejudice. The trial court overruled Kvasnicka's relevancy objection incorporating its previous ruling. Further, the court determined that “the officer has clearly articulated the basis for his calculations and he also articulated that he found the[ ] other references—Jerry Rice, the crossbow and the firearm—to be comparison tools, so [the court] will allow the testimony.” 3 In front of the jury, Officer Crozier opined that the kinetic energy of a 2001 Dodge Intrepid traveling at 65 miles per hour would be 436,583 foot-pounds and that it would take the simultaneous firing of nine-hundred-two 40–caliber Glock pistols at the same target to achieve the same amount of kinetic energy that Kvasnicka's Dodge Intrepid would exert at 65 miles per hour.
[¶ 12.] At the close of evidence, Kvasnicka moved for judgment of acquittal relying on the same arguments she made in her motions to dismiss. See supra ¶¶ 7–8. The trial court denied her motion based on its previous rationale as to the motions to dismiss. The case was then submitted to the jury.
[¶ 13.] During jury deliberations, the jury presented four questions to the trial court. Three of the questions related to whether a DUI charge is a felony. Specifically, the jurors asked, “Is it a felony to drive under the influence?” The second question was “Is it a felony to drive while having a blood alcohol level of a .08 or higher?” The jurors also asked “Is a DWI that results in a death a felony?”
[¶ 14.] After arguing that the juror's questions demonstrated confusion as to whether or not the DUI was a felony, Kvasnicka moved for mistrial. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial relying on her rationales from Kvasnicka's previous motions to dismiss and motion for judgment of acquittal. Following this ruling, the court advised the jury to read the instructions as a whole and rely upon the instructions as provided. Neither the State nor Kvasnicka objected to this instruction.
[¶ 15.] The jury found Kvasnicka not guilty of the two counts of manslaughter in the first-degree while engaged in the commission of a felony and guilty of manslaughter in the first-degree by means of a dangerous weapon, vehicular homicide, vehicular battery, and DUI. She admitted to both part II informations. Kvasnicka was sentenced to 70 years in prison with 18 years suspended on the manslaughter in the first-degree by means of a dangerous weapon charge. She was also sentenced to 25 years in prison for vehicular homicide, 15 years for vehicular battery, and 2 years for felony DUI, all to run concurrent with the manslaughter charge.4
[¶ 16.] Kvasnicka appeals and raises the following issues:
1. Whether the language “while engaged in the commission of a felony” under SDCL 22–16–15(1) is prejudicial when referring to the crime of driving under the influence.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the expert testimony of Officer Brian Crozier regarding the kinetic energy of Kvasnicka's vehicle.
[¶ 17.] This Court reviews “the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Miranda, 2009 S.D. 105, ¶ 14, 776 N.W.2d 77, 81 (quoting State v. Williams, 2008 S.D. 29, ¶ 23, 748 N.W.2d 435, 442). Additionally, this Court reviews the trial court's “denial of a motion for mistrial under the abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Dillon, 2010 S.D. 72, ¶ 28, 788 N.W.2d 360, 369. “We will affirm a trial court's denial of a mistrial unless we find abuse of discretion resulting in clear prejudice.” Id. “Error is prejudicial when, in all probability ... it produced some effect upon the final result and affected rights of the party assigning it.” Id. (quoting State v. Fool Bull, 2009 S.D. 36, ¶ 34, 766 N.W.2d 159, 167). Abuse of discretion is defined as “a fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices, a decision, which, on full consideration, is arbitrary or unreasonable.” State v. Lemler, 2009 S.D. 86, ¶ 40, 774 N.W.2d 272, 286 (quoting Burley v. Kytec Innovative Sports Equip., Inc., 2007 S.D. 82, ¶ 12, 737 N.W.2d 397, 402).
[¶ 18.] Additionally, “the trial court has broad discretion concerning the qualification of experts and the admission of expert testimony.” State v. Running Bird, 2002 S.D. 86, ¶ 38, 649 N.W.2d 609, 617 (quoting State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151, 156 (S.D.1985)). “We review a trial court's ‘decision to admit or deny an expert's testimony under the abuse of discretion standard.’ ” Lemler, 2009 S.D. 86, ¶ 18, 774 N.W.2d at 278 (quoting Burley, 2007 S.D. 82, ¶ 12, 737 N.W.2d at 402). ...
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