State v. Kyle A.
| Citation | 212 Conn.App. 239,274 A.3d 896 |
| Decision Date | 03 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | AC 43377 |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. KYLE A. |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Julia K. Conlin, assigned counsel, with whom were James Sexton, assigned counsel, and, on the brief, Emily Graner Sexton, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Rocco A. Chiarenza, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Margaret E. Kelley, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Elgo, Suarez and Sullivan, Js.
The defendant, Kyle A., appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (1), criminal mischief in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-115 (a) (1), threatening in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62 (a) (2) (A), criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes § 53a-223, tampering with a witness in violation of General Statutes § 53a-151, and attempt to commit criminal violation of a protective order in violation of
General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-223.1 The defendant's appellate claims pertain solely to his burglary conviction. The defendant claims that, because the state did not present sufficient evidence that he committed the burglary offense, he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal with respect to that offense. Alternatively, the defendant claims that, because the court's instruction concerning the burglary offense constituted plain error, the conviction for burglary should be overturned and the case remanded for a new trial with respect to that offense. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On August 28, 2016, A resided with his daughter, who was eight years old, in a single-family residence in West Haven. A's girlfriend, T, frequently visited him at the home. The home was owned by J, who is the mother of A and his brother, who is the defendant. J did not reside in the home at that time.
The defendant had been living in Maryland, but as of August 28, 2016, he made plans to move to Connecticut and live with his brother, A, at the West Haven home. The defendant called A at approximately 6 a.m. on August 28, 2016. During the call, the defendant gave A reason to immediately become concerned about his pending arrival. On the basis of statements made by the defendant, A believed that the defendant had been consuming alcohol and "partying ...." At one point in the conversation, the defendant asked A if he could provide him with "Adderall or something to help keep him awake." A warned the defendant that he could not come to the home if he was intoxicated because his daughter was at the home with him. A stated, "please
[do] not show up if you're drinking or anything ...." A also told the defendant that if he came to the home while intoxicated "that we probably couldn't let you in because my daughter was there." Initially, the defendant was upset with these restrictions, but after he spoke with A further, he asked A for time "to sober up and everything and do what I have to do." A agreed that he would talk to the defendant later that day.
At approximately 9 a.m., the defendant called A a second time. A asked the defendant if he was doing any better and again cautioned the defendant to "just please wear it off before you make any efforts or steps to come to the house." Once again, A asked the defendant not to come to the home in light of the defendant's condition or state of mind, and emphasized that, under the circumstances, the defendant could not come in contact with A's daughter. A offered to help the defendant, at a different location, but the defendant hung up on him. At approximately 1 p.m., the defendant called A a third time. He made it clear that he was coming to the house regardless of A's objections. Once more, A asked the defendant not to come if he was intoxicated and stressed that, because a child resided at the home, the defendant had to be sober. The defendant, upset with the restrictions being placed on him by A, sent A a text message that stated, "Do you want to play with fire, you are going to get burned."
Later that day, while A and T were inside of the home, the defendant arrived. The defendant, who did not have a key to the home, angrily banged on the front door, which was locked. The defendant was screaming and yelling. The defendant went to a locked back door, broke a window on the door, and entered the home. A and T, fearing for their safety, fled from the home by means of the front door. As he left the home, A saw the defendant entering and asked him to "please stop, stop ...."
After they exited the home, A and T stayed a safe distance away, while seeking the aid of neighbors and attempting to contact the police. The defendant, brandishing a wooden baseball bat, emerged from the home and began to strike A's automobile, which was parked in the driveway, with the bat. The defendant used the bat to cause significant damage to property inside of the home as well. The police arrived on the scene a short time later, at which point the defendant was inside of the home. The defendant exited the home when the police instructed him to do so and, while he was being taken into custody, he noticed A standing nearby and stated that he "was going to kill [him] when [he] get[s] out of this ...." Hours later, while in police custody at the police department and undergoing the booking process, the defendant repeated his threat to kill A.
Following the defendant's arrest, but prior to trial, the court issued three separate protective orders that, among other things, prohibited the defendant from having contact with A and A's daughter. The orders stated, "Do not contact the protected person in any manner, including by written, electronic or telephone contact, and do not contact the protected person's home, work-place or others with whom the contact would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the protected person." While he was bound by this provision, the defendant called A from prison on nine separate occasions. Also, on several occasions, the defendant mailed letters from prison to several persons in an attempt to persuade A not to cooperate with the prosecution of the charges related to his conduct on August 28, 2016, and the charges that related to his violation of a protective order. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
First, the defendant claims that because the state did not present sufficient evidence that he committed the
burglary offense, he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal with respect to that offense.2 We disagree.
The present claim consists of two subclaims. First, relying on evidence that J, who owned the home, granted him permission to reside at the home, the defendant argues that the state's theory of the case, that he entered or remained unlawfully in the home on August 28, 2016, was not legally viable. Second, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was armed with a dangerous instrument.
Before analyzing each subclaim, we set forth our standard of review and relevant legal principles. "When a criminal conviction is reviewed for the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply a well established [two part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ... [P]roof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt ... nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [finder of fact], would have resulted in an acquittal. ... On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable
view of the evidence that supports the [fact finder's] verdict of guilty." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fisher , 342 Conn. 239, 249, 269 A.3d 104 (2022).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Whitnum-Baker , 169 Conn. App. 523, 525–26, 150 A.3d 1174 (2016), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 923, 155 A.3d 753 (2017).
Section 53a-101 (a) provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when (1) such person enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument ...." The state bore the burden of proving the following essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant entered or...
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State v. Kyle A.
...senior assistant state's attorney, in opposition.The defendant's petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, 212 Conn. App. 239, 274 A.3d 896 (2022), is granted, limited to the following issue:"Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the trial court's instruction ......