State v. Kyles

• Decision Date: 02 September 1975
• Citation: 363 A.2d 97,169 Conn. 438
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Geoffrey KYLES.

Page 97

363 A.2d 97

169 Conn. 438

STATE of Connecticut v. Geoffrey KYLES.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Sept. 2, 1975.

Thomas F. Brown, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).

William F. Gallagher, Sp. Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Arnold Markle, State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, MacDONALD, LONGO and BARBER, JJ.

LONGO, Associate Justice.

The defendant was arrested on September 22, 1972, for robbery with violence. He was arraigned on the date of arrest, and held at the Connecticut Correctional Center, New Haven, in lieu of bond. After the Circuit Court found probable cause, he was bound over to the Superior Court, which took jurisdiction on December 18, 1972. An information was filed on February 15, 1973. The defendant first appeared in the Superior Court on February 27, 1973, in response to the charge. That evening, the defendant, with approximately seventeen other inmates, escaped from the correctional center, and within twenty-four hours the defendant was captured in Milford with several other escapees. On March 6, 1973, he was charged by an information with counts of kidnapping, escape and assault. That information was later amended by a substitute information filed October 17, 1973, by withdrawing the kidnapping counts. On July 24, 1973, the state nolled the charge of robbery with violence, which was the original cause of the defendant's confinement. The defendant was, however, later convicted of the escape from the correctional center and of two counts of assault, second degree.

The defendant has abandoned the first two assignments of error in his brief and has briefed six other issues. He claims error in the denial by the court, at his trial for assault and escape, of his offer of proof that he was illegally arrested and illegally bound over from the Circuit Court to the Superior Court with respect to the robbery with violence charge, and detained contrary to Connecticut statutes and his constitutional rights. He attacks the portion of the charge which stated: 'Even if the defendant might have been innocent of the charge for which he was being held and had been arrested, he would not be justified in escaping from jail.' The defendant further assigns as error the denial by the court of his motions to dismiss.

In his first motion, the defendant claimed that since the state did not present the defendant on the robbery charge in accordance with General Statutes § 54-53a within forty-five days of his arrest, his detention on the date of his escape was, therefore, illegal, and justified his escape. In his second motion to dismiss, the defendant claimed that the irregularities in the process rendered his detention illegal and also justified his escape. All of the assignments of error depend on his contention that the assault and escape statutes as applied are unconstitutional because they should be required to preserve the defense of illegal confinement. ¹

Under our statutes, illegal confinement is no defense to escape or to assault on a correctional officer. This is clearly indicated by the change from prior statutes, ² in that the new legislation eliminated any prerequisite that a person be 'legally confined.' It must be presumed that when the legislature changed the language, it intended to change the meaning. Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Water Resources Commission, 162 Conn. 89, 99, 291 A.2d 721; Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 247, 129 A.2d 606, appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15, 78 S.Ct. 36, 2 L.Ed.2d 21. Furthermore, it mut be presumed that the legislature was aware of prior judicial decisions following the common-law rule that it is lawful for a person to use force to resist an unlawful arrest as set forth in State v. Amara,152 Conn. 296, 299, 206 A.2d 438, and State v. Engle, 115 Conn. 638, 648, 162 A. 922, or to escape from a confinement when the process under which he has been detained is invalid as enunciated in State v. Leach, 7 Conn. 452, 456. See also Renz v. Monroe, 162 Conn. 559, 562, 295 A.2d 558; Little v. United National Investors Corporation, 160 Conn. 534, 541, 280 A.2d 890; Brown v. Cato, 147 Conn. 418, 421, 162 A.2d 175.

The defendant in his brief argues that the statutes deprive him of his liberty as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and the due process clause found in article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. He asserts further that the statutes provide for cruel and unusual punishment, prohibited by the eighth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 9, of the Connecticut constitution. The due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions have the same meaning and impose similar limitations. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn. 521, 537, 245 A.2d 579; State v. Doe, 149 Conn. 216, 226, 178 A.2d 271. Where a statute is attacked, it is presumed to be constitutional unless it is clearly invalid. Schwartz v. Kelly, 140 Conn. 176, 179, 99 A.2d 89, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 891, 74 S.Ct. 227, 98 L.Ed.

The basic test which the statutes in question must meet was set forth in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421, 4 L.Ed. 579, by Chief Justice Marshall: 'Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that and, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.' See Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 249, 129 A.2d 606. We have carefully reviewed the defendant's assertions although he has not enunciated in what manner the statutes attacked fail to meet constitutional requirements.

That no person should take the law into his own hands is so basic to our legal tradition that it needs no citation. The statutes attacked by the plaintiff operate to protect the basic concept that criminal cases ought to be decided by evidence in the courts of law and not by combat at the prison walls. They operate to protect the legal system, to promote order and safety of persons, and to deter a detainee from prolonging his sentence should he be convicted. People v. Briggs, 19 N.Y.2d 37, 42, 277 N.Y.S.2d 662, 224 N.E.2d 93; People ex rel. Haines v. Hunt, 229 App.Div. 419, 242 N.Y.S. 105. See comments, 79 Harv. L.Rev. 847 and 60 W.Va.L.Rev. 369. See cases cited in note, Justification for Escape, 70 A.L.R.2d 1430, and Later Case Service; 30A C.J.S. Escape § 5; 27 Am.Jur.2d Escape, Prison Breaking, and Rescue, § 9. The defendant's proper remedy for any illegal detention was by resort to the courts by means of a writ of habeas corpus. It is the court, not the defendant, which has the authority to decide whether the defendant was lawfully confined.

The defendant in his brief asserts that the sentence received for escape constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The defendant supervised, with two other inmates, an assault on correctional officers so severe that another...