State v. Labarge
| Decision Date | 05 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | AC 37581 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL LABARGE |
(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, D'Addabbo, J.)
William B. Westcott, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Melissa L. Streeto, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Brian Preleski, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The defendant, Michael Labarge, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a and tampering with physical evidence in violation of General Statutes § 53a-155 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motion to sever for trial the two charges against him and (2) denied his motion to suppress certain statements that he had made to state correction officers. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury could have reasonably found the following facts. In the evening of August 29, 2009, the defendant came across the victim, Cornell Johnson, selling crack cocaine to the defendant's girlfriend, Sherri Clarke. The defendant then beat the victim with a baseball bat and stabbed him nineteen times with a knife, killing him. The defendant then cut off the victim's penis and left the murder scene with Clarke, taking the victim's penis, identification, money, and drugs with him. The couple went to their apartment in New Britain where the defendant flushed the victim's penis down the toilet. The couple also showered, changed clothing, and smoked crack.
In the early morning of August 30, 2009, the defendant and Clarke returned to the murder scene and set fire to the victim's car. Later that morning, the couple purchased two hand saws from The Home Depot and again returned to the murder scene. There, they used the hand saws to cut the victim's body into fifteen pieces and they then hid the victim's remains in the nearby woods.
The defendant subsequently was arrested in connection with the murder and dismemberment of the victim. The state charged the defendant in a two count, single long form information with murder in violation of § 53a-54a in count one and tampering with physical evidence in violation of § 53a-155 (a) (1) in count two. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted on both counts,1 and the court, D'Addabbo, J., sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of sixty-five years incarceration. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant first claims that the court abused its discretion by denying his motion to sever the murder count from the tampering count. His claim is twofold. The defendant first relies on State v. Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714, 723, 529 A.2d 1260 (1987),2 to argue that the denial of his motion to sever prejudiced his right to a fair trial because the jury, after hearing the facts underlying the tampering charge, which he argues were particularly brutal, violent, and shocking, could not fairly consider his guilt as to the murder charge. Inaddition, the defendant argues that the court's denial of his motion to sever compromised his fifth amendment right to testify in connection with the murder charge but to remain silent with respect to the tampering charge.
The following additional procedural facts are relevant to the resolution of the defendant's severance claims. On May 10, 2012, the state filed a substitute long form information charging the defendant in count one with murder in violation of § 53a-54a and in count two with tampering with physical evidence in violation of § 53a-155 (a) (1). The factual underpinning of the tampering charge related to the state's claim that, on the day after the murder, the defendant, with the help of his girlfriend, cut up and concealed the victim's body by placing it in various locations in the woods. In response, on May 15, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to sever the murder charge from the tampering charge.
At the May 24, 2012 hearing on the severance motion, the defendant made a twofold claim. First, he argued that being required to defend the murder and tampering charges in the same trial would substantially prejudice him because the facts underlying the tampering charge were too brutal, violent, and shocking to allow the jury to consider fairly and independently his guilt as to the murder charge.3 Second, he claimed that he wished to testify in response to the murder charge but not in regard to the tampering charge, and that being required to defend both charges in the same trial prejudiced his right, alternately to present a defense to the murder charge while preserving his right to remain silent as to the tampering charge. As to this second aspect of his claim regarding severance, the defendant stated that he had In addition, he stated that "[i]n contrast . . . there [was] no advantage to him or incentive to him to testify on the tampering case."
The state responded that severance was unwarranted where the charges arise from the same criminal act or transaction and the offenses are of the same character. Specifically, the state argued that the burden rested on the defendant to prove that he would be substantially prejudiced by failing to sever the charges for trial and that the defendant had not only failed to meet this burden, but had overlooked it entirely because the evidence regarding each charge would, in fact, be admissible regarding the other charge. Thus, the state claimed, because the evidence would, in any event, be cross admissible, the defendant could not prove any prejudice by the joinder of the charges. In making this assertion, the state noted that the defendant had acknowledged that the evidence underlying the two charges would be cross admissible if the charges were tried separately.4
On May 30, 2012, the court denied the defendant's motion in an oral ruling. The court noted that the burden was on the defendant to prove that the charges should be tried separately by establishing that the charges were not of the same character and that the defendant had not met this burden. As to the defendant's first claim, the court found that the "defendant [had] offered no evidence or argument to support the proposition that the offenses are not of the same character." Further, the court stated that 5
With respect to the defendant's second claim, the court concluded that the defendant had not met his burden to prove that trying the cases together compromised his right to testify in the murder charge and to refrain from testifying in the tampering charge. The court explained that it could grant the defendant's motion on that ground only if the defendant made a The court then considered the defendant's proffer and concluded that the defendant had not met his burden. The court noted that the defendant merely had stated that he had "substantial information to present on [the murder] count including information relevant to the defense of justification; [but] other than this presentation, there is no further information concerning the testimony as to the murder count." Additionally, the court stated that the "defendant ha[d] indicated that he wishes to exercise his fifth amendment right on the tampering with evidence count" and that "the defendant offer[ed] no information to support his position of having a, quote, unquote, strong need to refrain from testifying." As a result, the court denied the defendant's motion for severance. During the court's final instructions to the jury, it informed the jury that the defendant had been charged in two counts and that it was the jury's duty to determine the guilt or nonguilt of the defendant as to each count separately.6
Before we address the defendant's claims, we set forth the standard under which we review a trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to sever for trial charges already joined in a single information. Practice Book § 41-18 provides: "If it appears that a defendant is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses, the judicial authoritymay, upon its own motion or the motion of the defendant, order separate trials of the counts or provide whatever other relief justice may require." The decision to sever cases for trial " (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rodgers, 198 Conn. 53, 63, 502 A.2d 360 (1985). On appeal, it is always the defendant's burden "to show that the denial of severance resulted in substantial injustice, and that any resulting prejudice was beyond the curative power of the court's instructions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Boscarino, supra, ...
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