State v. Labrecque
| Citation | 2023 VT 36 |
| Docket Number | 22-AP-314 |
| Decision Date | 07 July 2023 |
| Parties | State of Vermont v. Larry L. Labrecque |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Vermont |
On Appeal from Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Criminal Division John R. Treadwell, J.
Evan Meenan, Deputy State's Attorney, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Allison N. Fulcher of Martin, Delaney & Ricci Law Group Barre, for Defendant-Appellee.
Matthew Valerio, Defender General, and Rebecca Turner and A Alexander Donn, Appellate Defenders, Montpelier, for Amicus Curiae Office of the Defender General.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Carroll, Cohen and Waples, JJ.
¶ 1. Following a guilty verdict, the criminal division granted defendant Larry L. Labrecque's motion to dismiss for a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The State appeals, and we reverse and remand. I. Facts & Procedural History
¶ 2. On July 23, 2018, the State charged defendant with aggravated sexual assault of a child in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3253a(a)(8), aggravated sexual assault in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3253(a)(9), and sexual assault in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3252(d). The same day, he was arraigned and preliminarily held without bail. He remained held without bail through his trial, which commenced on May 9, 2022. A total of approximately 45.5 months passed between charging and trial.
¶ 3. In that time, the parties engaged in ample motion practice, and a global pandemic occurred. We have reviewed this case four times previously in the context of bail appeals and have detailed the procedural history therein. See State v. Labrecque (Labrecque I), 2020 VT 81, 213 Vt. 635, 249 A.3d 671 (mem.); State v. Labrecque (Labrecque II), 2021 VT 58, 215 Vt. 641, 261 A.3d 632 (mem.); State v. Labrecque (Labrecque III), 2022 VT 6, ___ Vt. ___, 273 A.3d 642 (mem.); State v. Labrecque (Labrecque IV), 2022 VT 20, ___ Vt. ___, 279 A.3d 118 (mem.). Here, we overview the events relevant to the disposition of this appeal.
¶ 4. A trial-ready date was originally set for May 2019; however, this date was moved to November 2019 pursuant to the parties' stipulation. In September 2019, defendant's counsel moved to withdraw, and the criminal division granted this request the next month. New counsel was appointed, and the parties stipulated to a March 2020 trial-ready date. The criminal division set jury draw for mid-April 2020.
¶ 5. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, this Court declared a judicial emergency on March 9, 2020, A.O. 48, and temporarily suspended jury trials on March 16, 2020, A.O. 49. The criminal division accordingly continued the April jury draw.
¶ 6. Defendant filed a motion for bail review on March 13, which was denied on March 18. On April 1, he filed a motion to reconsider, citing concerns for the health and safety of incarcerated persons during the pandemic, which was consolidated with similar motions from other criminal defendants. At a May 12 status conference on the motion, defense counsel argued that due process required defendant's release, citing to his nearly 2-year detention pending trial and "the judiciary's inability to honor [his] speedy-trial rights." The motion was denied in August, and we affirmed. See generally Labrecque I, 2020 VT 81. In that appeal, we rejected defendant's argument that his continued pretrial detention violated his due-process rights protected under Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Id. ¶ 1. As a part of our due-process consideration, we relied on Sixth Amendment speedy-trial analysis to evaluate" 'the government's responsibility for the delay in proceeding to trial[] and the length of the detention itself.'" Id. ¶ 17 ().
¶ 7. On October 20, 2020, defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, which was denied on December 7. The criminal division determined that the length of delay, approximately 28 months at the time, was sufficient to trigger full consideration of the balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), but that the factors together did not weigh in favor of finding a speedy-trial violation.
¶ 8. Defendant filed another motion for bail review on March 5, 2021, in which he raised due-process concerns with his continued pretrial detention and incorporated reference to defendant's right to a speedy trial as part of his plea for pretrial release on bail or conditions. A hearing was held on May 6, and the motion was denied the same day. After this, defendant filed two more motions for bail review in 2021, resulting in Labrecque II, 2021 VT 58, and Labrecque III, 2022 VT 6. Litigation of both motions involved reiteration of his due-process arguments, among others. No due-process violations were found, and his pretrial detention continued.
¶ 9. In November 2021, the criminal division scheduled a jury draw for January 10, 2022. However, on January 4, 2022, the criminal division granted defendant's unopposed motion to continue the trial and rescheduled the trial to start on February 8, 2022.
¶ 10. On January 11, defendant filed a second motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. The criminal division did not act on this motion before the February jury draw and subsequently deferred ruling on the motion.
¶ 11. On February 8, the day trial was set to commence, the criminal division continued the trial because a necessary State witness was unavailable. The witness was unable to testify in person because she was experiencing symptoms of COVID-19 that prevented her from entering Vermont courthouses under then-existing safety protocols. Defendant declined to waive his Confrontation Clause rights to allow the witness to testify remotely. The same day, defendant moved for bail review, renewing his previous due-process arguments. This bail-review motion was later denied by the criminal division and affirmed on appeal. See generally Labrecque IV, 2022 VT 20.
¶ 12. The criminal division rescheduled the trial for May 2022. A jury was drawn on May 5, and the trial was held from May 9 to May 13. The jury returned a guilty verdict on the lesser-included charge of sexual assault. A sentencing hearing was scheduled for November 23.
¶ 13. On August 5, defendant filed a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal in which his sole argument was that his speedy-trial right had been violated. Following a hearing, the criminal division concluded that defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated and dismissed the case against him with prejudice. As a preliminary matter, the criminal division concluded that, based on this argument, defendant's motion was not properly brought under Rule 29 but was instead a motion to dismiss asserting a speedy-trial violation. Noting that it had deferred ruling on defendant's January 2022 speedy-trial motion, the criminal division elected to treat the motion as one to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial.[1]
¶ 14. The criminal division concluded that the over 45-month delay between charging and trial was sufficient to trigger full consideration of the four factors set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514. It determined that the length of delay and reasons for delay both weighed against the State, and that defendant consistently asserted his right to a speedy trial. It also found that defendant did not establish any actual prejudice; however, it concluded that the length of delay warranted a presumption of substantive prejudice, and that the State failed to rebut this presumption. Accordingly, it presumed that defendant was prejudiced under the fourth factor. Balancing the factors together, it concluded that all four factors weighed, to a greater or lesser extent, in favor of defendant, and therefore, defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated.
¶ 15. The State filed a motion to reconsider, raising arguments primarily focused on the criminal division's conclusions regarding prejudice. The criminal division denied the State's motion. The State appealed.[2]
¶ 16. The State argues that defendant's speedy-trial right was not violated. It concedes that the length of delay necessitates full consideration of the Barker factors; however, it proposes that none of the factors weigh in defendant's favor. Defendant asserts that all the factors weigh against the State and that the State failed to preserve various arguments made under each factor.
II. Speedy-Trial Analysis
¶ 17. Defendants in Vermont have parallel rights to a speedy trial under Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Reynolds, 2014 VT 16, ¶¶ 7, 17-18, 196 Vt. 113, 95 A.3d 973. To determine whether a speedy-trial violation has occurred, we use the test articulated in Barker v. Wingo, which requires us to balance four factors: "the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the extent to which [the] defendant asserted his speedy[-]trial right, and any prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay." Id. ¶ 8. The first factor, the length of the delay, "serves a dual role"; it acts as a threshold for a delay long enough to trigger full review of the other Barker factors, and if full consideration is triggered, it is balanced along with the remaining factors to determine whether a violation has occurred. State v. Vargas, 2009 VT 31, ¶ 12, 185 Vt. 629, 971 A.2d 665 (mem.) (quotation omitted). If a violation has occurred, the only remedy is dismissal of the charge. Reynolds, 2014 VT 16, ¶ 7.
¶ 18. We employ a mixed standard of review; the criminal division's findings will be upheld unless clearly erroneous but its legal conclusion that defendant's speedy-trial right was violated...
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