State v. Lacon
| Decision Date | 30 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | 19-478 |
| Parties | STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JAMAL CHRISTOPHER LACON |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
STATE OF LOUISIANA
v.
JAMAL CHRISTOPHER LACON
19-478
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
December 30, 2019
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. CR 158064
HONORABLE JOHN DAMIAN TRAHAN, DISTRICT JUDGE
ELIZABETH A. PICKETT JUDGE
Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Jonathan W. Perry, Judges.
CONVICTION AFFIRMED. SENTENCE AFFIRMED AS AMENDED. REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
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Annette Fuller Roach
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1747
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1747
(337) 436-2900
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
Jamal Christopher Lacon
Hon. Keith A. Stutes
Fifteenth JDC District Attorney
Daniel M. Landry, III
Assistant District Attorney
P. O. Box 3306
Lafayette, LA 70502-3306
(337) 232-5170
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana
Jamal Christopher Lacon
Angola State Prison
Camp D, Falcon Unit -4
Angola, La 70712
PRO SE
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PICKETT, Judge.
On July 6, 2016, two males shot and killed the victim, Desmond Boutte. The males fled the scene on foot. An eyewitness told police that Raven Lamar Wiltz was one of the shooters. Within thirty minutes of the shooting, both the defendant, Jamal Christopher Lacon, and Raven Lamar Wiltz were apprehended in a nearby area and arrested for murder. Clothing that matched the description of one of the shooters as well as the guns used in the shooting were found in the area within which the defendant and Wiltz were apprehended.
On August 17, 2016, the defendant and Wiltz were each charged by grand jury indictment with one count of second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. A jury trial of both the defendant and Wiltz began on February 25, 2019, and ended on February 28, 2019, with both the defendant and Wiltz being convicted of second degree murder. On March 14, 2019, the defendant, was sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
On March 26, 2019, the defendant filed a motion for appeal, which was granted on April 1, 2019. The defendant's appellate counsel filed a brief, alleging four assignments of error - one involving the sufficiency of the evidence, one involving the trial court's failure to dismiss two jury panels, one involving unrecorded bench conferences, and one involving the erroneous admission of evidence. The defendant also filed a pro se brief, alleging error as to the trial court's allowance of audio and video evidence in the jury deliberation room.
1. The evidence introduced at the trial of this case, when viewed under the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) standard, was insufficient to prove beyond a
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reasonable doubt that Jamal Christopher Lacon committed either the offense of second degree murder or one of the lesser offenses.
2. Appellant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury was violated when the trial court denied the defense's requests to dismiss two of the jury panels.
3. The trial court erred in failing to assure that discussions and arguments made during bench conferences were recorded and preserved for appellate review, thereby denying Appellant of his constitutional right to an appeal.
4. Appellant was denied his constitutional due process rights when the trial court admitted the radio communication recording into evidence.
1. The trial court abused its discretion allowing the audio and video into the deliberation room, by tainted procedures subseptable [sic] to abuse.
2. Should Art. 793 be severed due to areas of unconstitutionality of the right to a fair trial?
In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there is one error patent regarding the sentence imposed.
The trial court failed to impose the sentence at hard labor even though a sentence for second degree murder must be imposed at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:30.1. Thus, the sentence is illegally lenient. State v. Williams, 16-579 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/15/17), 216 S0.3d 107. We hereby amend the sentence and order that it be served at hard labor and order the trial court to enter a minute entry reflecting this amendment.
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The defendant alleges the evidence was insufficient to prove the identity of the two shooters. The standard of review in a case of identification is well-established:
"In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court in Louisiana is controlled by the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). . . . [T]he appellate court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.1984). Furthermore, when the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. State v. Weary, 03-3067 (La. 4/24/06), 931 So.2d 297; State v. Neal, 00-0674 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649. Positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. Weary, 03-3067 at p. 18, 931 So.2d at 311; Neal, 00-0674 at p. 11, 796 So.2d at 658; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1311 (La.1988). It is the factfinder who weighs the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and this court will generally not second-guess those determinations. State v. Bright, 98-0398, p. 22 (La. 4/11/00), 776 So.2d 1134, 1147.
State v. Hughes, 05-992, pp. 5-6 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047, 1051 (alteration in original).
The first witness to testify at trial was Chelsey Anderson. Around 6:00 p.m. on the day at issue, Ms. Anderson drove her friend, Kelsea Bonner, to the Martin Luther King Center (Center) so that Ms. Bonner could get her car. According to Ms. Anderson, Ms. Bonner's boyfriend, Keelan, was at the Center playing basketball with his friend, Desmond. When Ms. Anderson pulled up, Desmond and Keelan walked up to her vehicle. According to Ms. Anderson, Desmond sat in the back of the car, and Keelan leaned over on the passenger-side window. While Desmond and Keelan were talking with Ms. Anderson and Ms. Bonner, two "boys" walked up from the side of the building and started shooting. Ms.
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Anderson described the "boys" as black and as being regular height. One of the boys, Ms. Anderson testified, had "dreads." Ms. Anderson testified that one of the individuals started shooting first and then the other individual started shooting. Ms. Anderson stated that she never looked into the faces of the shooters. When asked if she remembered what the shooters were wearing, Ms. Anderson replied, "They both had on like white shirts and red. I seen one of them have on a red cap, but that's it."
The call Ms. Anderson made to 911 was played for the jury and introduced as State's Exhibit 3. The caller reported a shooting at the Center. The caller also stated that the shooters had taken off running. In the recording, the caller described one of the shooters as having a black rag around his head and as wearing black shorts. When asked if there were one or two shooters, the caller stated there were two shooters, and both of them fired shots. The caller also mentioned one of the shooters was wearing a white shirt. Although something was described as "red," it is difficult to decipher what the caller said was "red."
At trial, Ms. Anderson agreed that when she was talking to the 911 operator, she identified one of the shooters as wearing a red cap and one as having "dreads." The following colloquy took place regarding a photograph marked by the state for identification purposes:
Q. Ms. Anderson, I have marked for identification purposes only a photograph of two individuals. Does that look like what the individuals you observed were wearing?
A. It could be, yes.
Q. Okay. I mean, we've got the black pants, white shirt, and we've got the individual with the hat. Is that what you observed?
A. Yes.
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Ms. Anderson agreed that she told police she did not want to identify the two individuals and did not want to testify. When asked why she did not want to testify, Ms. Anderson replied:
A. Because Desmond momma buried him, and then next it would be my momma burying me, and then what?
Q. So you were scared?
A. Yes.
Q. And in fact, we had to bring you here the first time this matter was set for trial, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's because you didn't show up because you were scared?
A. Yes.
Q. And as we sit here today you still don't want to testify?
A. Correct.
On cross-examination, Ms. Anderson agreed that she was arrested by the United States Marshals in Texas and extradited to Louisiana to testify. When asked if she felt pressure from the state to put "Raven's" name into this case, Ms. Anderson replied:
A. I mean, pressured because they subpoenaed me to. I stayed in jail for eight days to testify. But not pressure like making me say this and making me say that. I don't know him.
Q. Right.
A. I don't know him from nobody except that day. That was my first time ever, and I don't even - - You know, I just gave a description of them. I never said his name, not even to Mr. Landry, no.
Ms. Anderson agreed that after the shooting, she was asked to look at a photo lineup but failed to identify the defendant or Wiltz. On re-direct, the following colloquy took place regarding the photo lineup:
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Q. Okay. So let me ask you about these lineups. I questioned you about these lineups when you were brought here the first time, correct?...
A. Correct.
Q. And you actually did circle a number indicating a suspect, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And you actually circled two different ones, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Those
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