State v. Lacy
| Decision Date | 29 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 50738-2-II,50738-2-II |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, v. KATRINA MEGAN LACY, Respondent/Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
MAXA, C.J. - The State appeals the trial court's order waiving Katrina Lacy's restitution and mandatory legal financial obligations (LFOs) because she was indigent. Lacy cross-appeals the trial court's refusal to waive the interest that had accrued on the restitution and mandatory LFOs. While this appeal was pending, the legislature in 2018 enacted amendments to several statutes addressing LFOs and interest on those obligations.
We hold that (1) RCW 9.94A.753 establishes that the trial court did not have the authority to waive Lacy's restitution obligation because of her inability to pay; (2) the 2018 amendments to LFO statutes apply prospectively to this appeal of a motion to waive LFOs and related interest; (3) the crime victim penalty assessment imposed on Lacy cannot be waived under the 2018 amendments to RCW 9.94A.6333(3)(f); (4) the trial court has the authority under the 2018 amendments to RCW 9.94A.6333(3)(f) to waive the DNA collection fee imposed on Lacy because she is indigent and her failure to pay the fee was not willful; (5) we do not address Lacy's argument that attempting to collect restitution and the crime victim penalty assessment when she is indigent violates due process or equal protection because waiver of those obligations would not be the remedy even if she established constitutional violations; and (6) interest on restitution cannot be waived under RCW 10.82.090(2)(b) but interest on nonrestitution LFOs must be waived under the 2018 amendments to RCW 10.82.090(2)(b).1
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's waiver of Lacy's DNA collection fee and the trial court's refusal to waive accrued interest on restitution, but we reverse the trial court's waiver of the crime victim penalty assessment and restitution and refusal to waive interest on nonrestitution LFOs. We remand for the trial court to vacate the order waiving the crime victim penalty assessment and restitution and to strike any accrued interest on nonrestitution LFOs.
In 2010, Lacy pleaded guilty to one count of second degree burglary. The sentencing court imposed $580.52 in restitution and three mandatory LFOs: a $500 crime victim penalty assessment, a $100 DNA collection fee, and a $200 criminal filing fee. The judgment and sentence stated that Lacy was required to make payments of not less than $30 per month beginning two months later.
In 2011 and again in 2013, the Pierce County Clerk assigned Lacy's restitution and LFO obligations plus accrued interest to AllianceOne Receivables Management, Inc. (AllianceOne), a debt collection agency. In November 2013, AllianceOne obtained a writ of garnishment for acontinuing lien on Lacy's earnings. In 2014, AllianceOne garnished Lacy's wages and received a payment that was applied to the restitution obligation. In 2014, AllianceOne also obtained a judgment against Lacy for $268.62 in garnishment costs.
In May 2017, Lacy filed a motion to remit or revoke all her LFOs and to waive all restitution and nonrestitution interest. In support, Lacy submitted a declaration establishing that she was indigent under GR 34 even though she was employed. She stated that she owed $14,866.34 in LFOs to various courts.2 Finally, she stated that her housing voucher would expire in 2020 and that the existence of outstanding debts would make it more difficult for her to obtain affordable housing.
As of June 2017, $283.51 of the restitution and all of the mandatory LFOs imposed in this case remained outstanding. Total accrued interest on these obligations was $1,522.61, including $324.71 of interest on the restitution portion.
The trial court issued a letter ruling regarding Lacy's motion. The court found that Lacy was indigent, and that her violation of the sentencing conditions was not willful. The court ruled that it had authority under RCW 9.94B.040(3)(d) to modify a previous order regarding payment of LFOs. The court ordered that Lacy's judgment and sentence be modified to waive, remit and/or revoke all mandatory LFOs, which apparently included restitution. But the court denied Lacy's request to waive accrued interest.3
The State appeals the trial court's waiver of restitution and certain mandatory LFOs, and Lacy cross-appeals the trial court's failure to waive accrued interest.
The State argues that the trial court lacked statutory authority to waive Lacy's restitution and mandatory LFOs. Lacy argues that the trial court had such authority under various statutory provisions.4 She also argues that if the trial court had no authority to waive these obligations, attempting to collect restitution and LFOs when she could not pay them would violate the due process and equal protection provisions of the United States Constitution. The 2018 amendments to various LFO statutes now address the trial court's authority regarding waiver of certain mandatory LFOs.
We hold that the trial court erred in waiving the restitution and the crime victim penalty assessment but not in waiving the mandatory DNA collection fee. And we decline to address Lacy's constitutional claims.
This case involves the trial court's authority to waive restitution, mandatory LFOs, and related interest. Whether a trial court has authority to issue an order is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Soto, 177 Wn. App. 706, 713, 309 P.3d 596 (2013).
Under RCW 9.94A.753(5)5, "[r]estitution shall be ordered whenever the offender is convicted of an offense which results in injury to any person or damage to or loss of property." (Emphasis added.) The sentencing court imposed restitution on Lacy pursuant to this statute.
RCW 9.94A.753(4) states that restitution "may be modified as to amount, terms, and conditions" while the offender remains under the sentencing court's jurisdiction. However, RCW 9.94A.753(4) also expressly states, "The court may not reduce the total amount of restitution ordered because the offender may lack the ability to pay the total amount."
Here, the sole basis for the trial court's revocation of restitution was Lacy's indigence. Therefore, the court's order violated RCW 9.94A.753(4).
Lacy notes that RCW 9.94A.753(4) prohibits revocation of restitution only if the offender cannot pay the total amount, and she claims that RCW 9.94A.753(4) is inapplicable here because she cannot pay any amount. But this distinction makes no sense. RCW 9.94A.753(4) unambiguously prohibits a trial court from reducing ordered restitution based on the offender's inability to pay.
We hold that the trial court did not have authority under RCW 9.94A.753(4) to waive Lacy's restitution and therefore that the trial court erred in waiving restitution.
At the time of sentencing in 2010, specific statutes required the sentencing court to impose certain mandatory LFOs as part of Lacy's sentence: (1) a $500 crime victim penaltyassessment, former RCW 7.68.035(1)(a) (2009); and (2) a $100 DNA collection fee, former RCW 43.43.7541 (2008). Neither of those statutes required that the sentencing court consider the defendant's ability to pay these fees. See State v. Seward, 196 Wn. App. 579, 587, 384 P.3d 620 (2016), review denied, 188 Wn.2d 1015 (2017).
In 2018, the legislature amended RCW 9.94A.6333(3)(f), which now authorizes a court to waive LFOs if the offender is indigent and the prior failure to pay was not willful. However, the 2018 amendments to RCW 9.94A.6333(3)(f) expressly prohibit revoking the crime victim penalty assessment imposed under RCW 7.68.035.
Regarding the trial court's authority to impose LFOs, the Supreme Court in State v. Ramirez held that the 2018 amendments to the LFO statute apply prospectively to cases that were pending on direct appeal from the judgment and sentence when the amendments took effect. 191 Wn.2d 732, 747-49, 426 P.3d 714 (2018). A statutory amendment applies prospectively when the precipitating event for application of the statute occurs after its effective date. Id. at 749. The court held that the precipitating event for the imposition of LFOs was the termination of the defendant's case. Id. Therefore, the 2018 amendments applied to Ramirez's case because the case was pending on direct appeal and was not yet final. Id.
This case involves the trial court's authority to waive mandatory LFOs (and related interest) in response to Lacy's motion to waive. The precipitating event for the waiver of LFOs is when the trial court's ruling on a waiver motion becomes final. Here, the State's direct appeal and Lacy's cross-appeal were pending and the case was not yet final when the 2018 amendmentsto the LFO statutes took effect. Therefore, we hold that the 2018 amendments apply prospectively to Lacy's motion to waive mandatory LFOs and related interest.
Under the current version of RCW 9.94A.6333(3)(f), the trial court does not have authority to waive the crime victim penalty assessment. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's waiver of the crime victim penalty assessment imposed on Lacy.
The current version of RCW 43.43.7541, the statute authorizing the DNA collection fee, does not state that the trial court may waive the fee for indigent offenders. However, the current version of RCW 9.94A.6333(3)(f) states:
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