State v. Lafferty

• Decision Date: 13 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 28669.,28669.
• Citation: 139 Idaho 336,79 P.3d 157
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert LAFFERTY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

79 P.3d 157

139 Idaho 336

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert LAFFERTY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 28669.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

October 13, 2003.

Whipple Law Office, Burley, for appellant. Kent D. Jensen argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Ralph Reed Blount, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Ralph Reed Blount argued.

WALTERS, Judge Pro Tem.

Robert Lafferty was charged with possession of methamphetamine. Prior to trial, Lafferty filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search within his home, arguing the search was illegal. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion. Following a jury trial, Lafferty was convicted of possession of methamphetamine. Lafferty appeals from both the denial of the motion to suppress evidence and the judgment of conviction. On appeal, Lafferty poses two issues: (1) whether the motion to suppress should have been granted because discovery of the methamphetamine was the result of an unlawful search; and (2) whether the conviction should be reversed because the State failed to establish a sufficient nexus between Lafferty and the methamphetamine to prove that he "possessed" methamphetamine. We reverse and remand.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

Two police officers, Lieutenant Kindig and Deputy Nye, went to Lafferty's home to speak with him about some stolen property. An acquaintance of Lafferty's, Shane Richardson, had been previously arrested at the home, and there was reason to believe Richardson may have left stolen property at the residence. Lafferty was not a suspect in this criminal investigation.

The officers, who were not in uniform, knocked on the door and Alan Gunderson answered. The officers said they were there to speak with Lafferty. Gunderson told the officers to come in, and directed them upstairs to the home's living room area where Lafferty was sitting. Gunderson shouted, "Bobby, there's a couple guys here to see you." The officers proceeded upstairs. Upon arriving in the living room they saw Lafferty sitting in a chair with a shoebox lid on the table in front of him. The lid contained what appeared to be marijuana.

The officers spoke with Lafferty, stating that they believed they had enough evidence to obtain a search warrant for the residence, but would prefer that Lafferty just cooperate with them, turn over any drugs in his possession, and participate in a controlled purchase at a later time. Lafferty agreed to work with the officers. The officers asked Lafferty if he had any methamphetamine. Lafferty denied having any methamphetamine, but admitted to having some marijuana and drug paraphernalia.

Lafferty proceeded to lead the officers through his home, locating and producing drug paraphernalia for the officers. Lafferty took the officers to his bedroom, where he removed a bag of marijuana from his dresser and gave it to the officers. Lafferty then admitted to having some methamphetamine, and searched for it in his nightstand. Lafferty was unable to locate the methamphetamine.

Lafferty and the officers returned to the living room, where Lafferty asked his guests, Gunderson and Grant Maupin, if they knew where the methamphetamine was. The two guests denied knowledge of the methamphetamine. One of the officers then asked Gunderson to get off the couch he was sitting on, and, lifting a cushion from the couch, the officer found a container containing a substance that eventually tested positive for methamphetamine.

Lafferty was charged with possession of methamphetamine, in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1). He filed a motion in the district court to suppress evidence obtained through the search of his home. A hearing was held, and Lafferty and Maupin testified for the defense. The State put into evidence the preliminary hearing transcript, containing testimony from the officers. The court found that Gunderson lacked actual authority to grant consent for the officers to enter the home. The court additionally held that Gunderson lacked apparent authority because the officers knew that Lafferty lived at the home and Gunderson did not. The court concluded the entry into the home was made without reliance on any authority and that the entry was therefore unlawful. However, the court found that subsequent to the initial entry into the home, Lafferty voluntarily consented to the search and that his consent was not the product of coercion or duress. On this basis, the court denied the motion to suppress evidence.

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Lafferty argues that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his consent to the officers' presence in his home was not given freely and voluntarily in light of the totality of the circumstances. Specifically, he asserts that his consent was a result of duress or coercion, and the exploitation of an unlawful entry into his home.

While the district court and the parties focused upon the authority possessed by Gunderson, the possibility that Lafferty's consent was obtained through coercion or duress, and the possibility that any initial taint from the officers' entry into the home was cured by intervening circumstances, we are not required to address those issues. We need not decide whether the initial entry was valid based upon Gunderson's invitation for the officers to enter, or whether Lafferty consented to the continued presence of the officers within his home. We conclude that the dispositive issue is whether Lafferty consented to any search of his home by the police officers beyond their observation of whatever was in plain view as they followed Lafferty through the house.

The review of a suppression motion presents mixed issues of fact and law. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 886, 26 P.3d 1222, 1223 (2001); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App.1999). This Court will look only at the evidence before the district court at the time of the motion to suppress, and not at evidence subsequently adduced at trial. See State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 261, 266, 858 P.2d 800, 805 (Ct.App.1993)

.

Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is per se unreasonable and violative of the Fourth Amendment, such an entry or search may be rendered reasonable by an individual's consent. State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d 387, 390 (Ct.App.1998). In such instances, the State has the burden of demonstrating consent by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 749, 947 P.2d 420, 422 (Ct.App.1997). Consent to search may be in the form of words, gestures, or conduct. State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 348, 815 P.2d 1083, 1088 (Ct. App.1991). When consent to search a home is not explicit but must be inferred, the burden on the State of showing consent is "heaviest." State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 695, 978 P.2d 881, 883 (Ct.App.1999) (quoting United States v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir.1990)). As the United States Supreme Court stated:

The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home—a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: "The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ... shall not be violated."

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1381, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 652 (1980).

In Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 978 P.2d 881, a complaint of child abuse was made to the Shoshone County Sheriff's Department. The mother under investigation let an officer into the home. The officer explained what was going on, and the mother asked the officer to step outside so she could think. The officer refused to leave, claiming that the presence of a gun cabinet created a security concern. The officer accompanied the mother to the child's bedroom to obtain clothes for the child. When it was determined that the child slept in the master bedroom, the officer accompanied the mother to that room. Bright lights coming from a closet and the smell of marijuana...