State v. Laflam

• Citation: 2008 VT 108, 965 A.2d 519
• Case Date: August 21, 2008
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Vermont

965 A.2d 519 2008 VT 108 STATE of Vermont
v.
Timothy LaFLAM. No. 06-326, 06-417. Supreme Court of Vermont. August 21, 2008.

[965 A.2d 520]

Present: REIBER, C.J., DOOLEY, JOHNSON, SKOGLUND and BURGESS, Associate Justices.

ENTRY ORDER

¶ 1. Defendant appeals a jury conviction of driving with a suspended license (DLS) and the district court's resulting restitution order. On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) the evidence does not support his conviction; and (2) the court's restitution order is improper because his conviction of DLS did not cause the accident and resulting damage, and because the court failed to make findings concerning defendant's ability to pay. We affirm defendant's conviction and vacate the district court's restitution order.

¶ 2. The following facts were presented at trial. At 9 p.m. on January 15, 2006, a van drove into the front of a variety store in Bristol, causing $1000 in uninsured damage to the building. An employee of the store saw the van hit the store and then observed defendant getting out of the van. Moments after the accident, another employee saw defendant behind the wheel of the van. Following the accident, the store owner arrived, recognized defendant, and spoke with him. After apologizing for the damage, defendant then fled on foot. The following day, police located defendant and spoke with him. Defendant explained that he had been drinking the day before and did not remember an accident. At the time of the accident, defendant's driver's license was under suspension for DUI. Defendant was charged with DLS and convicted following a jury trial. Following a restitution hearing, the district court ordered defendant to pay $1000.

¶ 3. Defendant first contends that the evidence does not support the conviction. Specifically, defendant argues that, although witnesses saw him at the scene and behind the wheel of the van after the crash, no one actually saw him drive the van into the store. Defendant concedes that he failed to raise this argument in the trial court, but contends that the court should have dismissed the charge against him sua sponte.

¶ 4. The evidence in this case was not so tenuous as to require the court to grant acquittal by its own motion. A court must move for acquittal by its own motion only when the record reveals that the evidence is so thin that a conviction would be unconscionable. State v. Norton, 139 Vt. 532, 534, 431 A.2d 1244, 1245 (1981) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brooks, 163 Vt. 245, 658 A.2d 22 (1995);

965 A.2d 521

see V.R.Cr.P. 29(a) (providing that court may, on its own motion, direct a verdict of acquittal "if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction"). No acquittal is required when the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, and disregarding any modifying evidence, sufficiently and fairly supports a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Grega, 168 Vt. 363, 380, 721 A.2d 445, 457 (1998). Here, there was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict. One witness testified that defendant's van hit the store and saw defendant exit the vehicle. Another witness observed defendant behind the wheel moments after the accident. In addition, when the store proprietor arrived and spoke with defendant, defendant apologized for the damage. Police testified that the van was registered to defendant, and when police spoke with defendant the day after the accident, he asserted that he had been drinking the previous day and did not remember the accident. Police also testified that when they asked defendant if anybody was exiting the store at the time of the crash, defendant responded that no one had been leaving at the time. The trial court did not err in allowing the case to proceed to verdict.

¶ 5. Defendant next contends that the court did not have authority to order restitution in this case, because the accident and resulting damage were not causally connected to defendant's conviction for DLS. By statute, "[r]estitution shall be considered in every case in which a victim of a crime ... has suffered a material loss." 13 V.S.A. § 7043(a)(1). A "[v]ictim" is defined as "a person who sustains physical, emotional or financial injury or death as a direct result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime." Id. § 5301(4). Defendant argues that the proprietor of the variety store does not fit the definition of a victim, because the damage to the store was not a direct result of defendant's crime. Defendant asserts that his crime—driving with a suspended license—was unrelated to the accident because he could have driven into the store, even with a valid license.

¶ 6. To support a restitution award, the State must demonstrate "causation between the defendant's criminal act and the victim's loss." State v. Forant, 168 Vt. 217, 222, 719 A.2d 399, 403 (1998). We have cautioned that "[a]n order of restitution must relate directly to the damage caused by the defendant's criminal act for which he was convicted." Id. at 222-23, 719 A.2d at 403; see State v. VanDusen, 166 Vt. 240, 244, 691 A.2d 1053, 1055 (1997) (explaining that restitution must relate directly to the conduct for which defendant was convicted).

¶ 7. We acknowledge that there are arguments for and against awarding restitution in this case. On the one hand, it is undisputed that defendant drove his vehicle through the front door of the victim's store and caused $1000 in damage. On the other hand, defendant was never charged with a crime directly connected to that act and was convicted only of DLS.

¶ 8. The State argues that defendant should not have been driving, given his license suspension. But for defendant's decision to drive, the State concludes, the damage at issue would not have been caused. Under the State's theory, the sole connection between defendant's conviction for driving with a suspended license and the damage to the building is that defendant's driving caused the damage to the building, and defendant was driving illegally at the time. We can reach this result only if we hold that causation in fact—"but for" causation—is the sole standard for causation for...