State v. Laflamme

• Decision Date: 08 February 1917
• Citation: 116 Me. 41,99 A. 772
• Parties: STATE v. LAFLAMME.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

99 A. 772

116 Me. 41

STATE

v. LAFLAMME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Feb. 8, 1917.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Oxford County, at Law.

Mose Laflamme was convicted of maintaining a liquor nuisance. From order overruling his motion in arrest of judgment, he excepts. Exceptions overruled. Judgment for the state.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and CORNISH, KING, BIRD, HALEY, HANSON, and PHILBROOK, JJ.

Albert Beliveau, Co. Atty., of Rumford, for the State. Bisbee & Parker, of Rumford, for respondent.

CORNISH, J. Indictment for maintaining a liquor nuisance at Rumford in the county of Oxford. The respondent was tried at the May term, 1916, and convicted. After verdict he filed a motion in arrest of judgment, which was overruled by the presiding justice. The case is before this court on exceptions to that ruling.

The typewritten caption of the indictment alleges that it was found at a term of the Supreme Judicial Court "begun and holden at Paris within and for the county of Oxford on the second Tuesday of October in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fieteen." It is contended by the respondent that, although it was undoubtedly the intention of the scrivener to typewrite the word "fifteen," he did not do so, and we must take the indictment as we find it; that the word "fieteen" is meaningless and must be rejected as surplusage, and that the caption must therefore be held by this court to allege the time of finding as "on the second Tuesday of October one thousand and nine hundred." If this is so, then the indictment is fatally defective because it alleges the offense to have been committed on the fifteenth day of August in the year of our Lord 1915 and on divers other days and times between that day and the finding of the indictment. So construed, the indictment appears to have been found 16 years before the continuing offense was committed.

But neither reason nor authority compels such a conclusion, and it would be a reproach to the law if they did. The major premise in the argument is fallacious. The word "fieteen" taken in connection with the context, is not meaningless, and should not be rejected as surplusage. To the ordinary reader it means "fifteen," because it is at once apparent that a typographical error has converted "fifteen" into "fieteen," the letter "e" on the typewriter having been struck by chance instead of "f." The nature of the error is as palpable as the error itself, and the intendment of the word is clear from the context.

The object of an indictment is to apprise the accused of the definite offense with which he is charged, set forth with such necessary allegations as to time and place that he may be enabled to properly prepare and present his defense. It must be drawn that in case any other proceedings should be brought against him for the same offense, he could plead the former acquittal or conviction in bar. This is the general rule, and reason has made the rule.

But another rule, entirely consistent with the one just stated, and likewise based upon reason, is equally well established. That rule is this: That if the meaning of an indictment is clear so that the accused is thereby informed of the precise charge which he is called upon to meet, verbal inaccuracies grammatical, clerical, or orthographical errors, which are explained and corrected by necessary intendment from other parts of the indictment, are not fatal. In other words, an indictment is not vitiated by a clerical or typographical slip the correction of which is furnished by the context. Such errors have been held harmless with practical unanimity. The books contain many illustrations. Let us state a few where errors of this sort have been considered and the indictments held valid: "Tebruary" for "February," Witten v. State, 4 Tex. App. 70; "eiget" for "eight," Somerville v. State, 6 Tex. App. 433. In the latter case the court say:

"In the printed part of the indictment, a typographical error occurs in the alleged date of the offense, making 'eight' read 'eiget.' It is believed that, as the allegation stands in the indictment, it admits of but one construction, and the intention of the pleader is unmistakable. It is certain and intelligible, the 'h' being substituted for the V by intendment. It certainly could not have misled the defendant as to what he was called on to answer, and the conviction had would bar a subsequent prosecution."

Again, "eigh," for "eight," State v. Coleman, 8 S. C. 237; "Janury" for "January" in Hutto v. State, 7 Tex. App. 44, where the language of the opinion is:

"We think 'Janury' is idem sonans with 'January,' and if not so, that it is intelligible, and no one could well have been misled by it."

Other instances are "stael" for "steal," State v. Lockwood, 58 Vt. 378, 3 Atl. 539; "stal" for "steal," Wills v. State, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 457; "larger" beer for "lager" beer, State v. Colly, 69 Mo. App. 444; "Assalt" or "assatt" for "assault," State v. Crane, 4 Wis. 417, where the court characterizes the objection as a "gossamer obstacle" which should not be permitted to stay the due administration of justice; "frunk" for "drunk," Kincade v. State, 14 Ga. App. 544, 81 S. E. 910. "The clearly inadvertent substitution,"' says the court, "of the letter 'f for 'd' in the word 'drunk' is so palpably a clerical error that it is unnecessary to deal in extenso with the objection." "Di" for "did," Holland v. State, 11 Ala. App. 134, 66 South. 126: "inten" for "intent," Stinson v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 173 S. W. 1039; "effect" for "affect," Smith v. Territory, 14 Okl. 162, 77 Pac. 187; same mistake in State v. Cabodi (1914) 18 N. M. 513, 138 Pac. 262; "monet" for "money," ...