State v. LaFrance, 122618 NHSC, 2017-0180

Party NameState of New Hampshire v. Joyce LaFrance
Judge PanelLynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ., concurred.
Case DateDecember 26, 2018
CourtNew Hampshire Supreme Court

State of New Hampshire

v.

Joyce LaFrance

No. 2017-0180

Supreme Court of New Hampshire

December 26, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The defendant, Joyce LaFrance, appeals an order of the Superior Court (Schulman, J.) denying her motion to dismiss charges against her for lack of a speedy trial in an earlier circuit court prosecution, under the New Hampshire and Federal Constitutions. She contends that the superior court erred by: (1) attributing certain delays to her that she claims should have been attributed to the State; (2) failing to find that she asserted her right to a speedy trial when she claimed she did; (3) finding that she suffered no trial prejudice; and (4) "overweight[ing] the need for [her] to show significant trial prejudice given the length of the delay." We assume, without deciding, that her arguments are preserved.

At the outset, we note that, when a defendant exercises her unique right to a de novo trial in superior court, the effect is to "vacate[ ] [the circuit court] conviction completely." State v. Thompson, 165 N.H. 779, 789 (2013); State v. Guy, 140 N.H. 453, 455 (1995) (stating that effect of such an appeal is to "vacate that judgment and transfer the whole proceeding to the Superior Court, there to be tried de novo" (quotation omitted)). A defendant convicted of a Class A misdemeanor in circuit court, thus, has the right either to appeal that conviction to us or to seek a de novo trial in the superior court, see RSA 599:1 (Supp. 2017), after which the defendant may appeal the superior court judgment to us. Thompson, 165 N.H. at 783. She may not do both. See id.; but see State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 54 (1985) (finding, after defendant was convicted in de novo trial in superior court, that he had been denied speedy trial in district court).

In this case, we will assume, without deciding, that the defendant did not effectively waive her challenge to the purported speedy trial violation that allegedly occurred in the now vacated circuit court action by exercising her right to a de novo trial in superior court. Thus, we review the superior court's decision including the time elapsed in both circuit and superior courts.

As the appealing party, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating reversible...

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