State v. Lamantia, SC 20190
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Writing for the Court | KAHN, J. |
| Citation | 336 Conn. 747,250 A.3d 648 |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Jasmine LAMANTIA |
| Docket Number | SC 20190 |
| Decision Date | 03 September 2020 |
336 Conn. 747
250 A.3d 648
STATE of Connecticut
v.
Jasmine LAMANTIA
SC 20190
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Argued October 16, 2019
Officially released September 3, 2020**
Conrad Ost Seifert, Old Lyme, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Melissa L. Streeto, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Regan, state's attorney, and Christa L. Baker, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.*
KAHN, J.
The defendant, Jasmine Lamantia,1 appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of tampering with a witness in violation of General Statutes § 53a-151 (a).2 State v. Lamantia , 181 Conn. App. 648, 671, 187 A.3d 513 (2018). The defendant claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that there was sufficient evidence to permit a jury to reasonably infer that, when she sent text messages to her boyfriend, Jason Rajewski, after his altercation with David Moulson, the defendant had the specific intent to interfere with a witness’ testimony at an official proceeding. Specifically, the defendant contends that there was no evidence to infer that she thought it was more probable than not that a future criminal trial would occur, or that she thought Rajewski would probably testify at such a trial. The state responds that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to induce Rajewski to testify falsely in an official proceeding that she believed to be imminent. We conclude that the Appellate Court correctly determined that the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant tampered with a witness by sending Rajewski text messages shortly after his altercation with Moulson. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
From the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have reasonably found the following facts.3 On the evening
of July 24, 2015, Earl F. Babcock and Rajewski socialized for three or four hours at a bar in Norwich. At that time, the defendant was in a romantic relationship with Rajewski.4 At some point in the evening, the defendant also arrived at the bar
where Babcock and Rajewski were socializing. After midnight and in the early morning hours of July 25, 2015, at the defendant's suggestion, Babcock and Rajewski, in Babcock's car, followed the defendant from the bar to a house located at 18 Bunny Drive in Preston, where some teenagers, including the defendant's son, Joshua Bivens, were having a party. When they arrived, the defendant and Babcock parked their cars, and the defendant immediately went inside the house. Rajewski and Babcock lingered near Babcock's car, and, before they had the opportunity to go inside the house, Moulson, the defendant's former boyfriend, arrived and pulled his car into the driveway, shining the car's headlights on Babcock and Rajewski. Moulson exited his car, and he and Rajewski had a verbal and physical altercation that resulted in
Rajewski striking Moulson and Moulson bleeding from his face.
During the altercation, the defendant was inside the house. One of the kids at the party came into the house saying that Rajewski and Moulson were there, and the defendant stepped back outside where she saw Moulson running toward the house with Rajewski and Babcock behind him. Moulson ran into the house to call the police, and the defendant told Babcock and Rajewski that Moulson was calling the police and that they should "get out of [there]." The defendant went back into the house and stood beside Moulson, trying to minister to his wound, while he called the police. Following the defendant's warning that Moulson was calling the police, Babcock and Rajewski left 18 Bunny Drive. Babcock dropped Rajewski off at his home, and then Babcock proceeded directly home himself.
Jonathan Baker, a Connecticut state trooper, received a dispatch to 18 Bunny Drive for an active disturbance at approximately 2:30 a.m.; he and another trooper responded. Baker spoke to Moulson in the presence of the defendant, and Moulson told Baker that, as he pulled into the driveway of the house, he was assaulted by two males, one of whom he identified as Rajewski. Moulson and the defendant gave Baker Rajewski's address, and Baker proceeded to that address to continue the investigation. The other trooper stayed at 18 Bunny Drive to continue speaking with Moulson, which resulted in Moulson being taken into custody in the presence of the defendant.
At Rajewski's residence, Baker knocked on the door and, when Rajewski answered, asked if Rajewski knew why he was there. Rajewski indicated that he did know why Baker was there and presented Baker with his cell phone, telling Baker he should read the text message conversation between the defendant and Rajewski. The
text messages from the defendant notified Rajewski that the police were coming and instructed him to have blood on his clothes. Baker further testified that the defendant told Rajewski that Moulson reported to the police that Rajewski had attacked him while he was in his car but that the defendant's statement to the police was that Moulson was bloody when he got there because he was in a bar fight somewhere else. The defendant directed Rajewski to tell the police that Moulson stalks the defendant and Rajewski followed her to 18 Bunny Drive because he loves her. The defendant emphasized to Rajewski that they needed to stick with the same story, but Rajewski informed her that he was going to tell the truth that Moulson attacked Rajewski first. Based on his review of the text messages, Baker concluded that the defendant had requested that Rajewski lie to him.
While Baker was holding Rajewski's cell phone, Rajewski received a call from Babcock, and Baker answered the call at Rajewski's
request, proceeding to have a conversation with Babcock. Baker asked Babcock if they could speak, and Babcock provided Baker with his home address with the understanding that Baker would be there shortly. Baker arrested Rajewski and took him to the state police barracks, and then Baker went to see Babcock at Babcock's home. Baker took Babcock into custody as well and transported him to the barracks for processing. Later that morning, the defendant arrived at the barracks to pick up Moulson. At that time, Baker confronted the defendant about the text messages she had sent to Rajewski. The defendant told Baker that "it was autocorrect, spellcheck made her do that," and that the text messages were "taken out of context and her phone made her do it." Further, when Baker asked what her intent was with respect to the text messages, the defendant responded "that's not how I meant it." Baker placed the defendant under arrest on charges of tampering with a witness in violation
of § 53a-151 (a) and interfering with a police officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a. See footnote 6 of this opinion.
We note that the jury's verdict in the present case was also informed by the following testimony offered by the defendant at trial. The defendant testified that she did not tamper with a witness because she did not send the text messages to Rajewski at all. She denied sending the text messages to Rajewski, claiming that they were not sent from her phone or, if they were, that someone else had sent them. During cross-examination, the defendant denied that she was in a relationship with Rajewski at the time of the altercation with Moulson, claiming that their relationship spanned several months, at the most, from "April to like June-ish." When confronted with a signed statement she gave to the police5 stating that she had been in a relationship with Rajewski until August, 2015, the defendant testified that she "may have made a mistake ...." Regardless of the timing of their relationship, the defendant was adamant that she was not in love with Rajewski either at the time of the altercation with Moulson or afterward. The state introduced into evidence a Facebook message that the defendant sent to Babcock on August 16, 2015, in which she said, "I love [Rajewski] with all my heart and would do anything for him! I'm sure [you] know he just broke up with me.... I'm sure you know I lied and said I saw [Moulson] get out of his car and go after [Rajewski] in court.... I'm sure [you] know I gave him 100 [percent] of me and loved him unconditionally when he was at his worst! [A]nd would give up everything I have to be with him .... [S]o I'm sure [you] know he broke my heart .... [P]lease tell him
I will be here waiting. And he's my soulmate .... [H]e brought...
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State v. Roy D. L., SC 20152
...State v. Saez, 115 Conn.App. 295, 302- 303, 972 A.2d 277, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 909, 978 A.2d 1113 (2009); see also State v. Lamantia, 336 Conn. 747, 756-57, 250 A.3d 648 (2020). In the present case, R's testimony alone was sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that the defen......
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State v. Stephenson, AC 40250
...or when a criminal proceeding is about to commence.’’ State v. Stephenson, supra, 187 Conn. App. 33 n.9; see generally State v. Lamantia, 336 Conn. 747, 779–84, 250 A.3d 648 (2020) (D’Auria, J., dissenting) (summarizing history and circumstances of 2015 amendment to § 53a-155). This amendme......
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L. H.-S. v. N. B., SC 20596
...whether to believe or to disbelieve a competent witness are beyond our review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lamantia , 336 Conn. 747, 750 n.3, 250 A.3d 648 (2020). Further, "[w]e do not examine the 267 A.3d 189 record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reache......
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State v. Stephenson, AC 40250
...proceeding is about to commence." State v. Stephenson , supra, 187 Conn. App. at 33 n.9, 201 A.3d 427 ; see generally State v. Lamantia , 336 Conn. 747, 779–84, 250 A.3d 648 (2020) (D'Auria, J. , dissenting) (summarizing history and circumstances of 2015 amendment to § 53a-155 ). This amend......
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State v. Roy D. L., SC 20152
...State v. Saez, 115 Conn.App. 295, 302- 303, 972 A.2d 277, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 909, 978 A.2d 1113 (2009); see also State v. Lamantia, 336 Conn. 747, 756-57, 250 A.3d 648 (2020). In the present case, R's testimony alone was sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that the defen......
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L. H.-S. v. N. B., SC 20596
...whether to believe or to disbelieve a competent witness are beyond our review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lamantia , 336 Conn. 747, 750 n.3, 250 A.3d 648 (2020). Further, "[w]e do not examine the 267 A.3d 189 record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reache......
-
State v. Stephenson, AC 40250
...proceeding is about to commence." State v. Stephenson , supra, 187 Conn. App. at 33 n.9, 201 A.3d 427 ; see generally State v. Lamantia , 336 Conn. 747, 779–84, 250 A.3d 648 (2020) (D'Auria, J. , dissenting) (summarizing history and circumstances of 2015 amendment to § 53a-155 ). This amend......
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State v. Roy D. L., SC 20152
...v. Saez , 115 Conn. App. 295, 302–303, 972 A.2d 277, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 909, 978 A.2d 1113 (2009) ; see also State v. Lamantia , 336 Conn. 747, 756–57, 250 A.3d 648 (2020). In the present case, R's testimony alone was sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that the defendan......