State v. Lambdin

• Decision Date: 16 July 2015
• Docket Number: No. 20130521–CA.,20130521–CA.
• Citation: 2015 UT App 176,356 P.3d 165
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Dennis Wayne LAMBDIN, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

356 P.3d 165

2015 UT App 176

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.Dennis Wayne LAMBDIN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20130521–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

July 16, 2015.

Joanna E. Landau and McCaye Christianson, for Appellant.

Sean D. Reyes and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Judge STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which Judges J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and JOHN A. PEARCE concurred.

Opinion

ROTH, Judge:

¶ 1 Dennis Wayne Lambdin appeals his conviction for murder. Lambdin contends that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of special mitigation by extreme emotional distress. Lambdin also argues that the State misstated the law when it described extreme emotional distress to the jury. Finally, Lambdin asserts that he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of those errors. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In August 2009, Lambdin killed his wife in their kitchen. Lambdin never denied that he killed her. Instead, he asserted that his actions were the result of extreme emotional distress brought on by years of marital strife, his wife's heavy drinking, her affair and resulting pregnancy, and her expressed intention to divorce him.

¶ 3 At Lambdin's request, the trial court agreed to instruct the jury on the elements of special mitigation by extreme emotional distress. If Lambdin could prove extreme emotional distress by a preponderance of the evidence, the jury would be required to return a verdict of manslaughter instead of murder. See Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–205.5(5)(b)(iii) (LexisNexis 2012).¹ Both Lambdin and the State proposed instructions on extreme emotional distress, but the court prepared and gave its own instructions to the jury.² In his closing statement, the prosecutor described extreme emotional distress consistent with the pertinent jury instructions. The jury convicted Lambdin of murder, unanimously finding by special verdict that Lambdin had not proven special mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence. Lambdin appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 4 Lambdin first argues that three of the trial court's jury instructions contained “erroneous statements of Utah law on special mitigation by EED.” “[W]hether a jury instruction correctly states the law presents a question of law which we review for correctness.” State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, ¶ 6, 122 P.3d 566 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ¶ 17, 17 P.3d 1153 (“Failure to give requested jury instructions constitutes reversible error only if their omission tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶ 5 Second, Lambdin asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he “mis-informed [the jury] on the law of special mitigation by EED” during closing argument. See State v. Akok, 2015 UT App 89, ¶ 11, 348 P.3d 377 (stating that a prosecutor may not “call to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We consider whether the prosecutor's remarks departed from applicable law as a question of law.³

ANALYSIS

I. Jury Instructions

¶ 6 Lambdin first contends that the trial court failed to correctly instruct the jury on the elements of special mitigation by extreme emotional distress. We conclude that the court's instructions accurately described Utah law.

A. Special Mitigation by Extreme Emotional Distress

¶ 7 The Utah Legislature has determined that “[s]pecial mitigation exists” to reduce certain murder charges “when the actor causes the death of another ... under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.” Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–205.5(1)(b), (5) (LexisNexis 2012). The burden lies with the defendant to establish the requisite extreme emotional distress by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 21, 233 P.3d 476.

¶ 8 The special mitigation statute does not define extreme emotional distress. In the absence of an express statutory definition, the Utah Supreme Court has defined extreme emotional distress as “extremely unusual and overwhelming stress that would cause the average reasonable person under the same circumstances to experience a loss of self-control, and be overborne by intense feelings, such as passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation, or other similar emotions.” State v. White, 2011 UT 21, ¶ 26, 251 P.3d 820 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ¶ 14, 152 P.3d 315 (“A person suffers extreme emotional distress when exposed to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress such that the average reasonable person would react by experiencing a loss of self-control.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)),⁴ abrogated on other grounds by State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, 349 P.3d 712. Certain stressors, however, such as those created by the defendant's own conduct or those “resulting from mental illness as defined in [Utah Code] Section 76–2–305,” cannot mitigate a defendant's actions that cause death. Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–205.5(3). “Thus, ‘an external triggering event is also required.’ ” State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ¶ 30, 309 P.3d 1160 (quoting White, 2011 UT 21, ¶ 32, 251 P.3d 820 ).

¶ 9 Whether external stressors are sufficient to cause a person to lose self-control must be viewed in the “broader context,” taking into account any external “mental trauma [that] has affected a defendant's mind for a substantial period of time.” White, 2011 UT 21, ¶¶ 30–31, 251 P.3d 820. Although the statute requires consideration of “the circumstances surrounding a defendant's extreme emotional distress, those circumstances must be viewed from the viewpoint of a reasonable person.” Id. ¶ 36 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–205.5(4) (“The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse ... shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.”). Thus, when a defendant asserts extreme emotional distress, the factfinder may examine the circumstances—both historical and contemporaneous to the murder—to determine whether “objectively, a reasonable person would have experienced an extreme emotional reaction and loss of self-control under the circumstances.” Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, ¶ 28, 293 P.3d 345 ; accord White, 2011 UT 21, ¶ 36, 251 P.3d 820.

¶ 10 We now examine the instructions given by the trial court in light of the applicable law.

B. The Jury Instructions

¶ 11 Although the trial court gave the jury seven instructions relating to extreme emotional distress, this appeal implicates only three of them—Jury Instructions 19, 20, and 21. Jury Instruction 19 reads,

Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the defendant commits murder, but Special Mitigation is established. Special Mitigation generally involves a factor or set of factors that make a person less blameworthy for a criminal act. Special Mitigation exist[s] when a person causes the death of another under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse. In this case, the defendant asserts that Special Mitigation exists because he caused the death of another under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse.

A person acts under the influence of extreme emotional distress when he is exposed to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress that would cause the average reasonable person in similar circumstances to experience a loss of self-control and be overborne by intense feelings such as passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation, or other like emotions. The standard is not whether the defendant subjectively thought his reaction was reasonable. Rather, it is an objective standard, determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person faced with the then-existing circumstances.

Jury Instruction 20 provides,

Although a building emotional reaction to a series of events may contribute to extreme emotional distress, an external triggering event is also required. However, the triggering event need not be contemporaneous with the Defendant's loss of self-control.

Finally, Jury Instruction 21 states,

In examining the reasonableness of the explanation or excuse offered by the defendant you should consider all the then-existing circumstances. “Then-existing circumstances” include more than just the triggering event. The phrase refers to the broader context of past experiences and emotions that give meaning to the defendant's reaction, that is to say, to the defendant's loss of self control.

¶ 12 Jury Instructions 19, 20, and 21 correctly informed the jurors of the factors that they should take into account in considering whether Lambdin met the requirements of extreme emotional distress. Instruction 19 informs the jury that it could find that Lambdin was acting under extreme emotional distress if he were “exposed to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress that would cause the average reasonable person in similar circumstances to experience a loss of self-control and be overborne by intense feelings such as passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation, or other like emotions.” This language is almost verbatim the definition of extreme emotional distress set out in our precedent. See, e.g., State v. White, 2011 UT 21, ¶ 26, 251 P.3d 820. In addition, Instruction 19 informs the jury that the loss of self-control resulting from the extreme emotional distress must be viewed from a reasonable person's point of view. See Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–205.5(4) (LexisNexis 2012) (“The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse ... shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.”). Finally,...