State v. Lambert, 84-342
| Docket Nº | No. 84-342 |
| Citation | 146 Vt. 142, 499 A.2d 761 |
| Case Date | July 19, 1985 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Vermont |
Page 761
v.
Lawrence H. LAMBERT.
Page 762
Robert M. Butterfield, Caledonia County Deputy State's Atty., St. Johnsbury, for plaintiff-appellee.
Alexandra N. Thayer, East Hardwick, for defendant-appellant.
Before ALLEN, C.J., and HILL, PECK, GIBSON and HAYES, JJ.
GIBSON, Justice.
Defendant was convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, 23 V.S.A. § 1201, and sentenced to serve from three to six months with all but 20 days suspended. He appeals (1) the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop of his vehicle, and (2) the sentencing court's consideration of one of his two prior convictions. We affirm.
Shortly after midnight, in the morning of April 23, 1983, defendant's[146 Vt. 143] wife telephoned the Hardwick Police Department seeking its help in locating her husband, daughter, and two young grandchildren, who were late in arriving from Connecticut by car. Defendant's wife told the police that another daughter had telephoned from the point of departure in Connecticut to convey a message from the daughter traveling with defendant. That daughter's message said, in effect, that they were in the White River Junction area, defendant was drunk, and she didn't want to ride with him any more. Defendant's wife gave the officer a description of the car, the license plate number and the names of the occupants. Within 35 minutes, the officer, who did not know defendant personally, spotted the vehicle in Hardwick and stopped it.
I.
Defendant has challenged neither the officer's grounds to request that defendant submit to a breath test after he observed defendant, nor any aspect of the DUI processing. The only contested issue is the officer's initial grounds for stopping the vehicle.
Defendant asserts that the officer, lacking personal knowledge and observing no erratic behavior before the stop, based the stop solely on thirdhand hearsay. Defendant argues that thirdhand hearsay is inherently unreliable and cannot provide the facts necessary to form the basis for the reasonable and articulable suspicion prerequisite to any warrantless stop. Defendant claims a police informant must have personal knowledge of such facts.
In cases after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), police intrusions have been permitted when "specific and articulable facts ..., taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." This rule includes vehicle stops. A brief detention, its scope reasonably related to the justification for the stop and inquiry, is permitted in order to " 'investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.' " Berkemer v. McCarty, ---
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State v. Boyea, No. 99-061.
...the public's interest in safety against the relatively minimal intrusion posed by a brief investigative detention, see State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143, 499 A.2d 761, 762 (1985), the scale of justice in this case must favor the stop; a reasonable officer could not have pursued any other p......
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Com. v. Canavan, No. 95-P-306
...499 N.W.2d 590, 593 (N.D.1993) (concurring opinion); Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 363 (Utah Ct.App.1992); State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 144, 499 A.2d 761 (1985); Barrett v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 196, 200-01, 435 S.E.2d 902 (1993), rev'd on reh'g en banc, 18 Va.App. 773, 447 S.E.2......
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In re RH, No. 99-353.
...inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion contemplated. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868; State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143, 499 A.2d 761, 762 (1985). This is to avoid intrusions based on "nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches." Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 8......
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State v. Lamb, No. 96-252.
...reliability, this is far more particularized information than could be expected from a total stranger. See, e.g., State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 144, 499 A.2d 761, 763 (1985) (upholding stop based upon wife's hearsay report that defendant might be driving while Although the dissent suggests......
-
State v. Boyea, No. 99-061.
...the public's interest in safety against the relatively minimal intrusion posed by a brief investigative detention, see State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143, 499 A.2d 761, 762 (1985), the scale of justice in this case must favor the stop; a reasonable officer could not have pursued any other p......
-
Com. v. Canavan, No. 95-P-306
...499 N.W.2d 590, 593 (N.D.1993) (concurring opinion); Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 363 (Utah Ct.App.1992); State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 144, 499 A.2d 761 (1985); Barrett v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 196, 200-01, 435 S.E.2d 902 (1993), rev'd on reh'g en banc, 18 Va.App. 773, 447 S.E.2......
-
In re RH, No. 99-353.
...inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion contemplated. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868; State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143, 499 A.2d 761, 762 (1985). This is to avoid intrusions based on "nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches." Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 8......
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State v. Lamb, No. 96-252.
...reliability, this is far more particularized information than could be expected from a total stranger. See, e.g., State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 144, 499 A.2d 761, 763 (1985) (upholding stop based upon wife's hearsay report that defendant might be driving while Although the dissent suggests......