State v. LaMere

• Decision Date: 24 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-043.,01-043.
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Clifford Thomas LaMERE, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

67 P.3d 192

2003 MT 49

314 Mont. 326

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Clifford Thomas LaMERE, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 01-043.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs December 13, 2002.

Decided March 24, 2003.

Rehearing Denied April 29, 2003.

Chad Wright, Appellate Defender Office, Helena, Montana, For Appellant.

Hon. Mike McGrath, Montana, Attorney General; Ilka Becker, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Brant Light, Cascade County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana, For Respondent.

District Judge BLAIR JONES, sitting by designation for Justice W. WILLIAM LEAPHART, delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Clifford Thomas LaMere (LaMere) appeals from the Eighth Judicial District Court's denial of LaMere's motion for directed verdict of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence and LaMere's conviction of mitigated deliberate homicide. We affirm.

¶ 2 The following issue was presented on appeal:

¶ 3 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied LaMere's motion for directed verdict of acquittal?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On September 7, 2000, LaMere was convicted by a Cascade County jury of mitigated deliberate homicide for the stabbing death of Great Falls resident Steven Brownlee (Brownlee). The District Court sentenced LaMere to serve 40 years in the Montana State Prison for the commission of mitigated deliberate homicide together with a consecutive 10 year term for using a dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense.

¶ 5 At the close of the State's case at trial, LaMere moved for a directed verdict of acquittal contending that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that LaMere killed Brownlee while acting under extreme mental or emotional stress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse, an element of mitigated deliberate homicide. The District Court denied the motion and the case ultimately went to the jury. The jury returned a guilty verdict. LaMere appeals, asserting that the District Court erred when it denied LaMere's motion for directed verdict of acquittal.

¶ 6 This is the second appeal arising from criminal charges filed against LaMere resulting from Brownlee's death. On March 13, 1997, LaMere was charged with deliberate homicide for stabbing Brownlee to death in an alley behind Brownlee's apartment in Great Falls, Montana. At his first trial, LaMere requested instructions on the affirmative defense of mitigated deliberate homicide. On August 22, 1997, a jury convicted LaMere of mitigated deliberate homicide.

¶ 7 LaMere appealed the conviction, challenging the process by which the Clerk of the District Court summoned potential jurors for jury duty. This Court reversed LaMere's conviction, ruling that the process of summoning jurors by telephone does not comply with Montana law and constitutes structural error. State v. LaMere, 2000 MT 45, ¶ 42, 298 Mont. 358, ¶ 42, 2 P.3d 204, ¶ 42. Upon remand, the State charged LaMere with mitigated deliberate homicide. A jury again found LaMere guilty of the offense.

¶ 8 In considering whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying LaMere's motion for directed verdict of acquittal, we initially review pertinent evidence presented at trial relevant to the extreme mental or emotional stress element of mitigated deliberate homicide.

¶ 9 At trial, the State called Lawrence Colwell (Colwell) as a witness. Colwell was a neighbor of the victim, Brownlee. Describing the altercation he witnessed, Colwell testified on direct examination that LaMere was the aggressor, did all of the fighting, and delivered all of the blows. Colwell indicated that Brownlee was only trying to defend himself and "never did anything toward LaMere." However, on cross-examination, Colwell acknowledged that he had given a taped statement to police where he "probably" told a detective that he saw two drunks arguing behind Colwell's garage and they appeared to be "half heartedly thumping on each other." Testimony from Dan Ingersoll (Ingersoll), a detective investigating Brownlee's death, confirmed that Colwell had given Ingersoll a taped statement approximately a month after the incident. Ingersoll testified that Colwell reported seeing a couple of drunks having a disagreement "fighting each other, wrestling around." In Ingersoll's view, Colwell's taped statement indicated that both LaMere and Brownlee were struggling and Colwell saw LaMere and Brownlee "thumping each other." There was testimony that Brownlee was larger in stature and heavier than LaMere.

¶ 10 Julie Jorgensen, another of Brownlee's neighbors, testified that she had occasion to witness the confrontation between LaMere and Brownlee as she traveled up the alley in her car on the way to an appointment. Her car was very close to LaMere and Brownlee as the men were standing almost in the middle of the alley and she had to negotiate her vehicle around them. Ms. Jorgensen testified that both men appeared to be angry and were circling each other "like men sometimes do before they get into a fight."

¶ 11 The State also presented testimony from Great Falls police detective Steve Lohse. Detective Lohse testified that LaMere voluntarily gave a statement to Lohse after LaMere's arrest. According to Lohse, LaMere stated that he got in a fight with Brownlee and Brownlee pulled a gun on LaMere. LaMere took the gun away from Brownlee and put it in a truck. LaMere also stated to police that Brownlee pulled a knife on LaMere and that LaMere took the knife away from Brownlee and stabbed him with the knife. When asked what he had done with the knife after stabbing Brownlee, LaMere told police that he laid the knife down next to "the guy." No gun was ever located by the police during the investigation nor was any knife found next to the victim. The State presented evidence that LaMere acted calm and respectful to the police at the time of his arrest. LaMere did not complain of nor did the police observe any physical injury to LaMere consistent with someone involved in a fight.

¶ 12 At the close of the State's case, LaMere moved the District Court for a directed verdict arguing that the State failed to prove that LaMere killed Brownlee while acting under extreme mental or emotional stress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. The District Court denied the motion articulating two independent rationales. First, the District Court expressed the view that the State cannot be required to prove a mitigating factor. Second, the District Court found that sufficient evidence had been presented during the State's case to defeat a motion for directed verdict citing the prior statement of Colwell that LaMere and Brownlee were "flailing at each other or however it was stated" and the testimony of Detective Lohse who testified that LaMere told Lohse after LaMere's arrest that the victim pulled a gun and a knife on LaMere at the time of the stabbing incident.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 13 A denial of a motion for a directed verdict is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Blackcrow, 1999 MT 44, ¶ 18, 293 Mont. 374, ¶ 18, 975 P.2d 1253, ¶ 18 (citation omitted). A district court's denial of a motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of the evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Miller, 1998 MT 177, ¶ 21, 290 Mont. 97, ¶ 21, 966 P.2d 721, ¶ 21. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court determines whether, upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Miller, ¶ 21.

DISCUSSION

¶ 14 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied LaMere's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal?

¶ 15 Following reversal of LaMere's first conviction, the State charged LaMere with mitigated deliberate homicide pursuant to § 45-5-103(1), MCA (1997). The statute provides in pertinent part:

A person commits the offense of mitigated deliberate homicide when the person purposely or knowingly causes the death of another human being but does so under the influence of extreme mental or emotional stress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of the explanation or excuse must be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the actor's situation.

At the close of the State's case at trial, LaMere moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the grounds the State failed to prove the mitigation element beyond a reasonable doubt. In a criminal case, a trial court is authorized to direct a verdict of acquittal where there is insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support a conviction. See § 46-16-403, MCA.

¶ 16 As noted above, the District Court articulated two reasons for denial of LaMere's motion for directed verdict. The State concedes and we agree that the District Court erroneously concluded that the State cannot be required to prove a mitigating factor. It is well established that when the State charges an offense, the State assumes the burden of proving each and every element of the offense. State v. Hegg, 1998 MT 100, ¶ 13, 288 Mont. 254, ¶ 13, 956 P.2d 754, ¶ 13 (citing State v. Fuller (1994), 266 Mont. 420, 422, 880 P.2d 1340, 1342). Therefore, when the State charges the offense of mitigated deliberate homicide, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of mitigated deliberate homicide, including the mitigation element. In contrast, when a defendant asserts mitigating circumstances as an affirmative defense to a charge of deliberate homicide, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted under the influence of extreme mental or emotional stress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. See § 45-5-103(2), MCA (1997).

¶ 17 We turn now to the second reason offered by the District Court for denial of LaMere's motion...