State v. Lamoureux

Decision Date06 April 1993
Docket NumberNo. 91-432-C,91-432-C
Citation623 A.2d 9
PartiesSTATE v. Roger T. LAMOUREUX. A.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court
OPINION

WEISBERGER Justice.

This case comes before us on the defendant's appeal from his conviction in the Superior Court on one count of first-degree sexual assault. We affirm the conviction. The facts of the case insofar as pertinent to this appeal are as follows.

The complaining witness, Cynthia, 1 testified that on the evening of April 10, 1987, she went alone to Sh-Booms, a Providence nightclub, at around ten o'clock. Cynthia sat at the bar and drank two glasses of wine, while looking around for her boyfriend. At about a quarter to twelve defendant, Roger T. Lamoureux, approached Cynthia and introduced himself as Roger. The two conversed. During this conversation defendant told Cynthia that he was married but separated from his wife, and that he had a child. Cynthia mentioned to defendant that she too had a child but was not married. Cynthia told defendant that she was looking for her boyfriend and that she was out of work. When defendant responded that he knew someone who was looking for a secretary, Cynthia wrote her telephone number on a napkin and gave it to defendant. The defendant asked Cynthia to dance; she agreed. After the dance defendant purchased Cynthia a drink.

At closing time defendant asked Cynthia for a ride home because, he said, his friends had left him behind. Cynthia agreed. They left the club together and shared a brief kiss outside Cynthia's car. She then drove with defendant toward North Providence, stopping first at an Xtra Mart so that defendant could buy cigarettes. The defendant eventually directed Cynthia into the parking lot of an apartment complex in North Providence that defendant said was his residence. According to Cynthia, defendant up to this point had been acting like "a gentleman."

When Cynthia stopped the car, however, defendant's behavior changed radically. The defendant grabbed Cynthia, who is slightly built, by the shoulders and pulled her down on the seat. The defendant kissed Cynthia, who began to cry. The defendant told her to stop crying before he got "real mad." Cynthia recalled at trial that defendant was at that time "very demanding" and "harsh." The "tone of [defendant's] voice, his eyes," she said, put her in fear for her life.

The defendant demanded that Cynthia hold him because, he said, he had not been with a woman in six months. Cynthia complied, crying hysterically and asking defendant to let her go. The defendant then told Cynthia that she was "going to do one or the other," that she would either "lick it or leg it." The defendant ordered Cynthia to take off her clothes. Cynthia did so. The defendant removed his lower garments while still on top of her, then inserted his penis into her vagina. After a time defendant removed himself. Cynthia did not remember defendant's ejaculating.

The defendant then put his clothes back on and commanded Cynthia to do the same. Cynthia dressed and told defendant that she wanted to go home. The defendant got out of the car. He asked Cynthia if she was going to call the police or her boyfriend. Cynthia responded no, that she just wanted to go home. Cynthia then drove to the house of her mother, who lived nearby. When Cynthia told her mother what had happened, her mother called the police. Cynthia was taken to the hospital that night.

The defendant did not testify at trial. During his bail hearing defendant admitted to having had intercourse with Cynthia but claimed that it was by consent, not by force or coercion.

The state called as its first witness Lucille. 2 Lucille, also a divorced mother, encountered defendant at Sh-Booms on the evening of April 1, 1987, nine days before complaining witness Cynthia. Lucille had driven to the nightclub at about nine thirty that night to meet a girlfriend. Before entering the club Lucille had "two puffs" of a marijuana cigarette. Once inside Lucille ordered a drink and waited. Sometime thereafter defendant approached Lucille at the bar and introduced himself as Roger. The defendant and Lucille conversed, speaking among other things of each other's children, marital status, and church-going habits. During this conversation Lucille wrote her telephone number on a cocktail napkin for defendant but told him that she was not promiscuous. According to Lucille, defendant was acting in a "very gentlemanly" manner.

At closing time defendant said that his friends had left him behind and asked Lucille for a ride home. Lucille told defendant that she did not usually do such things, but would do so if defendant agreed to behave himself. The defendant agreed, and the two left the club together.

In the car Lucille drove north on Mineral Spring Avenue toward North Providence. As the car neared where defendant said that he lived, defendant gestured and said that Lucille could let him off "anywhere to the right." Lucille, however, refused and drove on to the driveway of what defendant said was his home. In the driveway Lucille and defendant discussed going on a date. The defendant then leaned over and kissed Lucille, who pushed him away after a short time. The defendant then asked Lucille to "hug him." Lucille complied with a brief embrace but quickly pulled away. The defendant then grabbed Lucille's left breast. Lucille pushed defendant away and told him to get out of the car. The defendant responded by grabbing Lucille's hand and directing it toward his penis. Lucille pulled her hand away and yelled at defendant to get out of the car.

The defendant then "went crazy," according to Lucille; he began screaming at her and using obscenities. The defendant repeatedly told Lucille to touch him while Lucille screamed at defendant to get out of her car. The defendant had Lucille pinned between the two front bucket seats. Lucille managed nevertheless to get her left foot out the door and her hand on the horn. Soon thereafter a woman in a nightgown appeared at the side of the car. The woman said something to defendant, who got out of the car, swearing at the woman. Lucille thanked the woman, locked her doors, and drove away.

Lucille drove to her parents' house where she and her daughter were living. Lucille testified at trial that she did not tell her parents of the incident right away because her father had just returned from the hospital and she was worried that he would have another heart attack. A few days after the event she went to the police. Lucille also testified that she had received a swollen lip and a bruised wrist from her encounter with defendant.

Counsel for the state focused on Lucille throughout the trial, spending more time with her than with complaining witness Cynthia. Although defendant objected repeatedly to her testimony and made extensive offers of proof, the trial justice nevertheless allowed Lucille's complete testimony into evidence. The defendant was not charged with the Lucille assault in the indictment before the court. The trial justice gave the following instruction to the jury on the admissibility of prior-crimes evidence:

"You have heard evidence of other criminal activity in the form of [Lucille] when she took the stand and indicated to you what happened to her. I instruct you that this evidence, if accepted by you, has only been introduced and may only be used for the limited purpose to establish the defendant's intent, preparation, design, plan, scheme, system and absence of mistake or accident. It is not to be used to prove the character of a person in order to show he acted in conformity therewith."

The defendant advances three issues on appeal. First and foremost, he contends that the trial justice erred by admitting Lucille's testimony into evidence. In the alternative, defendant argues that even if evidence of the prior assault was admissible, the trial justice erred by not limiting the scope of Lucille's testimony. In addition, defendant argues that he was unconstitutionally denied the right to cross-examine the complaining witness on four occasions and that the trial justice committed further error by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.

I ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIME

The defendant argues that Lucille's testimony regarding the earlier assault by defendant is not admissible under Rule 404 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Rule 404(a) states that character evidence is generally not admissible to prove that the person in question acted in conformity with his or her character, except when raised by the accused or when used to rebut the defense of self-defense. Rule 404(b) reads as follows:

"Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or to prove that defendant feared imminent bodily harm and that the fear was reasonable."

The defendant argues in the alternative that if Lucille's testimony is admissible, the trial court nevertheless erred by failing to restrict its scope. By allowing the evidence of the previous assault to become the center of the state's case, the trial justice impermissibly infringed on defendant's right to a fair trial.

The defendant cites State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 382 A.2d 526 (1978), in support of his argument. In Jalette the defendant was charged with the indecent assault of his eight-year-old daughter. At trial the child's mother testified that her daughter had spoken to her soon after the subject assault of a previous incident of molestation by the defendant. The defendant objected to this...

To continue reading

Request your trial
26 cases
  • State v. Mohapatra
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • July 25, 2005
    ...it was "probative of a plan or scheme by defendant to assault his stepdaughters prior to their thirteenth birthdays"); State v. Lamoureux, 623 A.2d 9, 10-13 (R.I.1993) (affirming the admission of evidence of prior sexual misconduct perpetrated by defendant against two different women whom h......
  • State v. Rainey
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • January 11, 2018
    ...age and relationship to the defendant, constituting "a modus operandi that bore [the defendant's] signature" (quoting State v. Lamoureux , 623 A.2d 9, 13 (R.I. 1993) )).Moreover, in Hopkins , 698 A.2d at 186, we acknowledged that the remoteness of evidence is a proper consideration for its ......
  • People v. Jones
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • October 6, 2011
    ...sexual conduct “tend[ed] to show the same peculiar and characteristic behavior pattern manifested in the crime charged”); State v. Lamoureux, 623 A.2d 9, 13 (R.I.1993) (evidence that a defendant assaulted another woman in nearly identical circumstances as those in the crime charged is stron......
  • State v. Quattrocchi
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • July 31, 1996
    ...necessary in order to prove the elements of the crimes charged. See State v. Brigham, 638 A.2d 1043, 1045 (R.I.1994); State v. Lamoureux, 623 A.2d 9, 13 (R.I.1993), and State v. Cardoza, 465 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I.1983). This evidence was of such extreme prejudice that no curative instruction w......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT