State v. Lamp

• Decision Date: 21 July 1982
• Docket Number: No. 66105,66105
• Citation: 322 N.W.2d 48
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Fred Louis LAMP, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 48

322 N.W.2d 48

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Fred Louis LAMP, Appellant.

No. 66105.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 21, 1982.

John C. Wellman of Polk County Offender Advocate, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Michael K. Jordan, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Dan L. Johnston, Polk County Atty., for appellee.

Considered en banc.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

Defendant, Fred Louis Lamp, appeals from his conviction of murder in the first degree in violation of sections 707.1 and 707.2, The Code 1979. He advances various allegations of error on the part of the district court in holding certain evidence presented by the State admissible at trial. We find no merit in defendant's assignments of error and affirm his conviction.

On May 10, 1980, at approximately 12:35 a.m., Mr. and Mrs. Patrick M. Hoffman found sixteen-year-old Melody Oliver lying face down in the middle of Northwest 107th Street near 70th Avenue in Des Moines. She was partially unclothed and said she had been raped and stabbed. Mr. Hoffman went to a nearby residence and made a telephone call for emergency assistance, while Mrs. Hoffman remained with Miss Oliver. At this time and again when Polk County Deputy Sheriff Thomas L. Pope arrived, at approximately 12:45 a.m., Miss Oliver stated that her assailant was approximately thirty-one years old, that he said his name was Fred, and that he was driving a blue van. She also said she had been there for a long time, that her injuries were very painful, and that she knew she was dying. Miss Oliver was transported to Broadlawns General Hospital by ambulance, where she expired at approximately 3:20 a.m.

Defendant was charged with and, following a jury trial, convicted of first-degree murder. He appeals, alleging error on the part of the district court, Dale Missildine, J., in overruling a pretrial motion to suppress and on the part of the trial court, Joel D. Novak, J., in overruling evidentiary objections at trial. Defendant contends the district court erred: (1) in refusing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an allegedly unreasonable stop of his motor vehicle; (2) in refusing to suppress evidence allegedly obtained pursuant to an unlawful warrantless search of his vehicle; (3) in refusing to suppress evidence allegedly obtained pursuant to an unreasonable search of his person; (4) in refusing to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to in-custody interrogation in violation of his right to counsel; and (5) in refusing to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant issued on the basis of unlawfully seized evidence. He asserts the trial court erred: (1) in admitting into evidence a law enforcement officer's hearsay testimony as to the results of other officer's investigations concerning the homicide, and (2) in admitting into evidence without an adequate foundation showing a proper chain of custody the results of a blood analysis.

I. Reasonable cause to stop the vehicle. Defendant first contends that his vehicle was stopped by a law enforcement officer without probable cause in violation of his rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. When constitutional rights are at issue, we find the facts de novo. State v. Dickerson, 313 N.W.2d 526, 530 (Iowa 1981).

At the scene where Miss Oliver was found, Deputy Pope advised Johnston City Policeman Kent Morton of Miss Oliver's description of her assailant. Officer Morton responded that the description matched that of defendant, who was a suspect in a couple of sexual abuse cases near Hoover High School in Des Moines.

Later, while investigating an automobile accident at approximately 2:00 a.m., Deputy Pope met Mark Bowersox, a Polk City Policeman. He informed Officer Bowersox of the rape and stabbing, the description of the assailant, and that defendant was a suspect. At approximately 4:20 a.m. Officer Bowersox observed a vehicle traveling southeasterly toward Polk City on Northwest Madrid Drive. The vehicle appeared to be moving rather slowly. Officer Bowersox became curious and followed it; he discovered that it was a blue van. As the van approached Polk City, it crossed the center line into the left lane, but returned to the right lane. It then came to a complete stop at the intersection of Third and Broadway Streets, although there was no stop sign at the intersection. Officer Bowersox then stopped the van on Third Street (Highway 415). The driver got out and met the officer at the rear of the van. The officer asked for the driver's license and discovered that the driver was defendant.

It is well settled that the fourth amendment requires reasonable cause to stop a vehicle for investigatory purposes. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968); State v. Cooley, 229 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Iowa 1975). When a stop is challenged on the basis that reasonable cause did not exist, the State must show that the stopping officer had "specific and articulable cause to support a reasonable belief that criminal activity may have occurred." State v. Aschenbrenner, 289 N.W.2d 618, 619 (Iowa 1980) (emphasis added). Circumstances giving rise to suspicion or curiosity will not suffice. State v. Dixon, 241 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Iowa 1976). The officer is bound by the true reason or reasons for making the stop; that is, the officer may not rely on reasons that he or she could have had but did not actually have. Aschenbrenner, 289 N.W.2d at 619. If the State fails to meet its burden, the evidence obtained as a result of the stop must be suppressed. State v. Reese, 259 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Iowa 1977).

In this case Officer Bowersox clearly had reasonable cause to stop defendant: (1) he was investigating a specific crime; (2) he had been given a description of the assailant and the vehicle he was driving; and (3) the perpetration of the crime was reasonably close in time (approximately four and one-half hours) and distance (approximately five miles) to the investigatory stop under the circumstances. When a crime has been committed it is constitutionally permissible for law enforcement officials to stop a vehicle matching the description of that used by the assailant, in an area reasonably close in proximity to the place where the crime occurred, and request germane information, such as identification, destination, and reason for being in the area. See Loyd v. Douglas, 313 F.Supp. 1364, 1370 (S.D.Iowa 1970); cf. State v. Dixon, 241 N.W.2d 21, 22-23 (Iowa 1976) (officers who, after observing automobile occupied by four black males depart from narrow residential street in all-white area, received radio dispatch of armed robbery by black males in area and were aware automobile was traveling in direction away from scene of robbery had reasonable cause to make investigatory stop).

Furthermore, although peace officers cannot use false pretenses or subterfuge as the basis for an investigatory stop, State v. Farrell, 242 N.W.2d 327, 329 (Iowa 1976), reasonable cause exists when an officer observes unusual conduct leading the officer to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot. State v. Donnell, 239 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Iowa 1976). The record reveals that such conduct existed in the present case. Together, the facts that defendant was traveling unusually slow, crossed the centerline, and stopped at an intersection at which there was no stop sign are circumstances justifying an investigatory stop.

II. Warrantless search of vehicle. Upon discovering the identity of the driver, Officer Bowersox radioed the Sheriff's Department and was informed that Sheriff's deputies wanted to talk with defendant. Defendant agreed to the conversation and waited in the backseat of the officer's patrol car. Officer Bowersox advised defendant of his Miranda rights. Three deputies arrived within ten minutes. Deputy Charles N. Collins again advised defendant of his Miranda rights, and defendant took a seat in the rear of the deputies' patrol car. Deputy Collins then walked over to defendant's van, shined a flashlight through the windows, and noticed that there appeared to be blood on a pail in the rear of the van.

Defendant claimed that the deputy's observation constituted a warrantless search that was not supported by probable cause and exceeded the scope of a search incident to an investigatory stop under Terry. The district court overruled defendant's motion to suppress on the basis that the search fell within the "plain view" exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. We agree that the evidence was admissible.

When law enforcement officials have lawfully stopped a vehicle on a public way, it has consistently been held that an observation of items in plain view in the interior of the vehicle does not constitute a search. See, e.g., United States v. Hood, 493 F.2d 677, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Booker, 461 F.2d 990, 991-92 (6th Cir. 1972); State v. Post, 98 Idaho 834, 838, 573 P.2d 153, 157 (1978); 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.5 at 355-56 (1978). The rationale for this position is that there is a diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile, the occupants and contents of which are exposed to the "plain view" of the public when used or parked in public places. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538, 549 (1977). Thus, a law enforcement officer who is rightfully at the location where the observation is made, stands in essentially the same position as a private citizen making the same observation. When the officer stops the automobile prior to making the observation, the lawfulness of the stop must, of course, be determined. W. LaFave, supra, § 7.5 at 591; see e.g., Hood, 493 F.2d at 680; People v. Waits, 196 Colo. 35, 40, 580 P.2d 391, 394 (1978) (en banc); State v. Chattley, 390 A.2d 472, 476 (Me.1978). Furthermore, the fact that artificial light is used to illuminate articles that would be readily visible in daylight does not affect...