State v. Lampley

• Decision Date: 03 August 1993
• Docket Number: No. 61850,61850
• Citation: State v. Lampley, 859 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. App. 1993)
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ervin LAMPLEY, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 909

859 S.W.2d 909

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ervin LAMPLEY, Appellant.

No. 61850.

Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District, Division Seven.

Aug. 3, 1993.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied Aug. 26, 1993.

S. Paige Canfield, St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Millie Aulbur, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before KAROHL, C.J., and PUDLOWSKI and CRANDALL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Ervin Lampley, was convicted of two counts of sodomy in violation of § 566.060, RSMo 1986. The court sentenced Lampley as a prior offender to serve 13 years on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. We reverse and remand because the court refused to permit cross-examination on a matter that could tend to prove a motive to fabricate a false accusation by the prosecuting witness.

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. However, we briefly summarize the facts and reasonable inferences which the jury could reasonably have found in arriving at its verdict, ignoring evidence and inferences to the contrary. State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Mo. banc 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1113, 109 S.Ct. 3175, 104 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1988).

On the evening of January 30, 1991, defendant was at home babysitting his three year old son and nine year old stepdaughter, A.C., while his wife was at work. At about 6:00 p.m., while A.C. was in the bathtub, defendant came in to use the bathroom. He made A.C. close the shower curtain. Thereafter, defendant engaged in the acts that, according to A.C.'s description of them, would constitute the offenses of which he was convicted.

The following morning, A.C. told her mother, defendant's wife, what had happened. Her mother immediately reported the incident to the Child Abuse Hotline. The Department of Family Services referred her to the Sexual Abuse Management Unit of a local children's hospital. At the hospital, A.C. told an employee of the unit about the incident with her stepfather the night before. A doctor at the hospital subsequently examined her. The doctor testified that his findings during the physical examination were consistent with sexual abuse.

Defendant presents eight points on appeal. One issue requires remand. The remaining issues are either unlikely to recur or are without merit.

Defendant argues the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to cross-examine A.C. about a previous complaint of sexual abuse involving someone else. Defendant contends that such evidence was relevant to show how nine year old A.C. would have had previous knowledge of sexual matters and how she benefitted from the prior complaint.

After the parties selected a jury, state made an oral motion in limine. It referred to a hearing on the previous day which informed the court that A.C. was "the victim of a prior act of abuse by boyfriend, son or cousin. [Those events] [h]appened approximately three or four years ago. I'm going to ask that any reference to the prior incident on this particular victim be held inadmissible as being totally irrelevant to this case." Defense counsel informed the court that the proposed cross-examination "goes to her knowledge of sexual acts, of what can happen in a situation as that one, and the repercussions that can result from it." The court sustained the motion and observed that if A.C. did,

have some knowledge of sexual acts I don't know that necessarily indicates in any way whatsoever she's not telling the truth or is not a credible witness in this case here today, and that's the only reason it could be offered for to go to her credibility--I won't allow any question with regard to her prior sexual encounter.

Defense counsel than explained to the court the relevance of the proposed cross-examination--"at this point in her life [A.C.] no longer cared for Ervin Lampley, did not like him, apparently something had happened ... She knew this was a way of getting Mr. Lampley out of her home, and that would go to her credibility, whatever." This explanation identified for the court the subject matter of the proposed cross-examination, a prior assault complaint with a resulting benefit, hence, an identified possible motive to be untruthful in the present complaint. This matter was preserved in defendant's motion for new trial where defendant contended the court denied constitutional rights when it excluded "the child's prior experience of what could and would happen to someone who was accused of any form of sexual abuse."

In their briefs, both the state and defendant address the relevancy of this previous molestation to show how A.C. had prior knowledge of sexual matters. This is a matter on which the trial court has discretion which was probably not abused. However, defendant also opposed the motion in limine to preserve the right to cross-examine state's witness on the favorable consequences of a prior abuse complaint. The subject of the prior complaint was convicted of a charge and removed from A.C.'s home. The defendant sought to show that A.C. did not like defendant and, thus, accusing him of sexual molestation was a way of getting him out of her home. The court addressed only the prior knowledge ground and sustained the state's in limine motion. It did not address the issue in the context of the prosecuting witness' possible motive to testify untruthfully. It did, however, absolutely prevent any inquiry on the subject which was relevant to A.C.'s motives. No effort was made to propose a way to protect both A.C. and defendant.

Motive for false accusation of one charged with a crime by a witness for the state is a proper subject for inquiry in a criminal prosecution, and evidence to prove the motive may be developed either by cross-examination or by impeachment. State v. Woods, 508 S.W.2d 297, 301 (Mo.App.1974). The danger that the trial will become bogged down in collateral issues and the jury distracted and confused does not outweigh defendant's interest in showing the accusing witness' bias. State v. Hedrick, 797 S.W.2d 823, 827 (Mo.App.1990). The bias of an accusing witness is never a "collateral" matter but is directly and intimately involved in the issues of the case. State v. Johnson, 700 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Mo. banc 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1119, 106 S.Ct. 1980, 90 L.Ed.2d 663 (1986).

The trial court may properly limit the scope and extent of cross-examination into a witness' bias or prejudice, but it is not within the trial court's discretion to prevent it entirely. Hedrick, 797 S.W.2d at 828. In this case, A.C. may have had a motive to falsely accuse defendant. Because of the previous molestation and the subsequent conviction and removal of the offender from her home, evidence regarding the prior event of such was relevant to her credibility. Although it is within the trial court's discretion to limit the scope and extent of cross-examination into A.C.'s previous experience, the court erred in foreclosing the evidence. Exclusion of the evidence violated defendant's right to a fair trial. For that reason the convictions must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

The...