State v. Lamprey
| Decision Date | 23 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2002–036.,2002–036. |
| Citation | 149 N.H. 364,821 A.2d 1080 |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Nancy LAMPREY. |
Stephen J. Judge, acting attorney general (Jonathan V. Gallo, attorney, on the brief and orally), for the State.
Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, by brief and orally, for the defendant.
The defendant, Nancy Lamprey, appeals a jury verdict from the Superior Court (Fitzgerald , J.) finding her guilty of one count of manslaughter, see RSA 630:2 (Supp.2002), one count of misdemeanor reckless conduct, see RSA 631:3 (1996), and four counts of first-degree assault, see RSA 631:1 (1996), in connection with a motor vehicle crash that occurred on September 14, 2000, in Loudon. The defendant argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the element of causation and improperly admitted evidence of prior acts. We affirm.
The record supports the following facts. The defendant operated a child daycare center in her home. For a number of years, she cared for pre-school-age children during the day and provided after-school care to school-age children. The defendant would meet the school-age children in the afternoon at the bus stop where the school bus dropped them off, sometimes walking to the bus stop and other times driving her pickup truck. When the defendant drove the truck, the children routinely rode back to her house in the truck bed. According to testimony at trial, on one occasion not long before the accident, a parent saw children riding in the bed of the defendant's truck and complained to her.
On September 14, 2000, the defendant drove her truck to the bus stop and picked up six children. Three of the children were six years old and three were ten years old. At the bus stop, she opened the gate to the bed of the truck and all six children climbed into the bed. No child seats or safety belts were in place in the truck bed.
On the drive to the defendant's home, the truck left the road and struck a tree. All six children suffered injuries, and one of the children, Katie Silva, died.
According to the State, the accident occurred while the defendant was driving so-called "swervies" to entertain the children. When performing swervies, the defendant would steer the truck back and forth in a zigzag pattern. The State introduced testimony from three children that the defendant was doing swervies just before the accident, as well as testimony by police officers about tire marks they observed on the road leading to the site of the accident. According to expert testimony for the State, no mechanical problem with the truck contributed to the accident. The defendant stated she did not remember doing swervies on the day of the accident but, if she did so, it was because there was a dog in the road. She contended that a mechanical defect in the truck caused an unexpected acceleration resulting in the accident. She also argued that the tire tracks were too contaminated by other vehicles for the State's witnesses to have drawn reliable conclusions.
We first address whether the trial court's jury instruction on causation conflicts with New Hampshire law by defining too restrictively the circumstances in which an intervening cause warrants acquittal. Causation is an element of both manslaughter, see RSA 630:2, I, and first-degree assault, see RSA 631:1, I(d). To establish causation, the State needed to prove not only that the prohibited result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the defendant, but also that the defendant's conduct was the legal (or proximate) cause of the prohibited result. See W. LaFave, Criminal Law § 3.12, at 292 (3d ed.2000).
The scope and wording of jury instructions is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court, and any allegations of error will be evaluated by interpreting the disputed instructions in their entirety, as a reasonable juror would have understood them, and in light of all the evidence in the case. State v. Bonacorsi, 139 N.H. 28, 30, 648 A.2d 469 (1994). Reversal of a jury verdict is unwarranted when a jury charge fairly covers the issues and law of a case. Id.
The instruction given by the trial court was, in pertinent part, as follows:
Under the instructions given by the trial court, the element of legal causation is defeated by an intervening cause only when the intervening cause amounts to the "sole substantial cause" of the prohibited result. The defendant argues that this instruction is contrary to New Hampshire law and thus a violation of her right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution. First, she argues that the language provided by the trial court failed to instruct the jury on legal causation in accordance with State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736, 746, 673 A.2d 786, cert. denied , 519 U.S. 853, 117 S.Ct. 146, 136 L.Ed.2d 93 (1996), and second, that the standard for defeating legal causation provided by the trial court was appropriate for cases involving responsive intervening causes and inappropriate for coincidental intervening causes such as the instant case.
First, we address whether the jury instruction was in accord with Seymour . The trial court in Seymour stated that "a legal cause is the cause without which the event would not have occurred, and the predominating cause, a substantial factor from which the event follows as a natural, direct and immediate consequence." Seymour, 140 N.H. at 746, 673 A.2d 786. Here, the jury instruction described legal causation using the following language:
a cause that is a direct and substantial factor in bringing about that death and/or injuries ... not merely a possible cause or a contributing cause.... It must be the predominant cause without which the results would not have occurred.... [T]he State [must] prove that the victim's death and/or injuries were a direct result of the defendant's actions....
While the language used by the trial court in Seymour is preferable, the jury instruction in this case made clear that the legal cause must be the predominant cause and a substantial factor in bringing about the prohibited result. Further, the instruction that the prohibited result must be the "direct result" of the defendant's actions is substantially the same as the "natural, direct and immediate consequence" instruction in Seymour . We conclude that the jury instruction provided by the trial court, considered as a whole, adequately stated the relevant law as set forth in Seymour .
Second, we address whether the "sole substantial cause" standard used by the trial court is the correct standard for legal causation under New Hampshire law in cases involving coincidental intervening causes. The "sole substantial cause" standard for legal causation has previously been used in criminal negligence cases. See State v. Soucy, 139 N.H. 349, 653 A.2d 561 (1995). As the defendant points out in her brief, the trial court applied the "sole substantial cause" standard of Soucy , "though Lamprey's case involved no question of medical malpractice."
Notwithstanding Soucy , the defendant argues that the "sole substantial cause" language of Soucy should be limited largely to "medical malpractice intervening causes." The defendant argues that an intervening cause that is a coincidence —a cause that occurs simultaneously with the defendant's act—should be treated differently from an intervening act that is a response to the defendant's prior act. She contends that when the intervening cause is a response to the defendant's act, as in Soucy , a greater degree of culpability is appropriate because the defendant's act placed the victim in danger of the subsequent act (e.g. , medical negligence) occurring. However, when the intervening cause is coincidental (such as the alleged unexpected acceleration in this case), the defendant argues that a lesser degree of culpability is appropriate because the...
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State v. Lamprey, 2002-036.
...149 N.H. 364821 A.2d 1080THE STATE OF NEW NANCY LAMPREY No. 2002-036. Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Argued: February 13, 2003. Opinion Issued: April 23, 2003. Stephen J. Judge, acting attorney general (Jonathan V. Gallo, attorney, on the brief and orally), for the State. 149 N.H. 365 Chri......