State v. LaMunyon, 71985
| Decision Date | 26 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 71985,71985 |
| Citation | 911 P.2d 151,259 Kan. 54 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Steven W. LaMUNYON, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. One rule of statutory construction is that where a statute dealing generally with a subject and a statute dealing specifically with a certain phase of the subject are conflicting, the more specific statute generally controls unless the legislature intended otherwise.
2. The Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code, K.S.A. 38-1601 et seq., is a general statement of public policy as to the effect of juvenile adjudications, whereas the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act sets out specific exceptions to K.S.A. 38-1601 et seq.
3. Consideration of juvenile adjudications in calculating an offender's criminal history could result in an increased criminal history score and therefore an enhanced sentence for the adult conviction under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act.
4. Considering a juvenile adjudication in calculating an offender's criminal history score under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act does not turn that adjudication into a criminal act. The terms "criminal act" and "criminal history score" mean different things. The Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act's requirement that juvenile adjudications be considered in calculating an offender's criminal history score is not inconsistent or in conflict with the statement in K.S.A. 38-1601 that a juvenile adjudication shall not be deemed or held to import a criminal act.
5. An ex post facto violation occurs when a new law is retroactively applied to events that occurred before its enactment and the new law disadvantages the offender affected by it.
6. Due process does not require that a defendant be informed of the collateral consequences which may result from a guilty plea. One of the collateral consequences of which a defendant need not be informed is the possibility that the conviction may be used to enhance the sentence for a later crime. Similarly, due process does not require that a juvenile be informed that an uncontested or stipulated adjudication could be used to determine the sentence for a future crime.
7. A defendant's ineligibility for sentence conversion under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act is not a punishment for his or her prior juvenile adjudications but rather is a result of his or her current status as a repeat offender. The consideration of juvenile adjudications which occurred before the effective date of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act in calculating an offender's criminal history score under the Act is not a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 21 Kan.App.2d 281, 898 P.2d 1182 (1995). Appeal from Reno district court; William F. Lyle, Jr., Judge.
Rick Kittel, Assistant Appellate Defender, argued the cause, and Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, was with him on the brief, for appellant.
Timothy J. Chambers, County Attorney, argued the cause, and Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General, was with him on the brief, for appellee.
Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to one count of possession of marijuana with intent to sell and was sentenced to 3 to 10 years. After the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA) became effective, the district court found defendant ineligible for retroactive sentence conversion based on his criminal history score, which included a juvenile adjudication for burglary. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code (the Code), K.S.A. 38-1601 et seq., prohibited juvenile adjudications from being used to calculate an offender's criminal history under the KSGA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the consideration of juvenile adjudications and remanded for further proceedings in State v. LaMunyon, 21 Kan.App.2d 281, 898 P.2d 1182 (1995), and this court granted defendant's petition for review.
Steven W. LaMunyon, Jr., an adult, pleaded nolo contendere to possession of marijuana with intent to sell, a class C felony. He was sentenced to a term of incarceration of 3 to 10 years on May 7, 1993. After the KSGA became effective, the defendant's crime of conviction was determined to be a severity level 3 crime on the drug grid. The Department of Corrections (DOC) noted that the defendant's criminal history included two juvenile adjudications for theft and one for attempted criminal damage to property. Based on a criminal history of 3 person and selected misdemeanors (level "H"), the DOC issued a sentencing guidelines report showing the defendant to be eligible for sentence conversion. See K.S.A.1993 Supp. 21-4724(b) ().
The State filed a motion challenging LaMunyon's eligibility for conversion and the criminal history as stated in the guidelines report. The district court found that the defendant's criminal history included an additional juvenile adjudication for burglary that had not been considered by the DOC, an adjudication which raised his criminal history score to "D" (juvenile adjudication for one person felony). The district court held that the defendant was not eligible for retroactive sentence conversion under the KSGA because of the juvenile adjudication for burglary. See K.S.A.1993 Supp. 21-4724(b) (). The defendant appealed.
In the Court of Appeals, LaMunyon acknowledged that the legislature provided in the KSGA that juvenile adjudications would be considered in calculating criminal history and agreed that he was ineligible for conversion if his juvenile adjudication for burglary was considered as part of his criminal history. However, LaMunyon argued that under the Code, juvenile adjudications cannot be considered in calculating an adult's criminal history. The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's arguments and determined that LaMunyon's prior juvenile adjudications were to be considered in determining his criminal history score for retroactive sentence conversion under the KSGA and, under the facts, the district court had correctly concluded that the defendant was not eligible for a sentence conversion. 21 Kan.App.2d at 282-86, 898 P.2d 1182. This court granted the defendant's petition for review of this issue.
Consideration of juvenile adjudications in calculating an offender's criminal history under the KSGA could result in an increased criminal history score and therefore an enhanced sentence for the adult conviction under the KSGA. Can prior juvenile adjudications be used in calculating an offender's criminal history score under the KSGA? The question is one of first impression for this court.
The defendant acknowledges that the KSGA requires consideration of his juvenile adjudications. However, the defendant makes three arguments against the KSGA's consideration of juvenile adjudications: (1) Use of prior juvenile adjudications conflicts with the Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code; (2) consideration of juvenile adjudications violates the due process clause because there is no right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings; and (3) consideration of juvenile adjudications violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
When enacting the KSGA in 1992 the legislature expressly required the consideration of certain juvenile adjudications when determining an offender's criminal history score. See K.S.A.1993 Supp. 21-4703(d), K.S.A.1993 Supp. 21-4709, K.S.A.1993 Supp. 21-4710, K.S.A.1993 Supp. 21-4711, K.S.A.1993 Supp. 21-4714(b)(5). The defendant's first argument is that the KSGA provision requiring consideration of juvenile adjudications in calculating criminal history conflicts with the Code. K.S.A. 38-1601 states:
"In no case shall any order, judgment or decree of the district court, in any proceedings under the provisions of this code, be deemed or held to import a criminal act on the part of any juvenile...."
The defendant argues this language prohibits juvenile adjudications from having any criminal implications whatsoever. In State v. Muhammad, 237 Kan. 850, Syl. p 2, 703 P.2d 835 (1985), this court noted that under Kansas statutes, a juvenile proceeding is considered a civil proceeding of a protective nature totally divorced from any criminal implication. Based on a similar rationale, the defendant contends prior juvenile adjudications under the Code cannot be used to calculate an adult offender's "criminal" history score under the KSGA.
In support of this argument the defendant relies on the rule of statutory construction that where a statute dealing generally with a subject and a statute dealing specifically with a certain phase of the subject are conflicting, the more specific statute generally controls unless the legislature intended otherwise. State v. Reed, 254 Kan. 52, Syl. p 1, 865 P.2d 191 (1993); see Carmichael v. State, 255 Kan. 10, 15, 872 P.2d 240 (1994). The defendant reasons that the Code, which was enacted prior to the KSGA, is more specific than the KSGA because the Code deals specifically with the prosecution and disposition of juvenile offenders, whereas the KSGA deals generally with adult criminal acts.
In addressing this argument, the Court of Appeals noted that State v. Ward, 20 Kan.App.2d 238, 886 P.2d 890 (1994), rev. denied 257 Kan. 1096 (1995), had held that juvenile adjudications are not "convictions" for purposes of the Habitual Sex Offender Registration Act (the Act), K.S.A.1993 Supp. 22-4901 et seq. In reaching this conclusion, the Ward court noted that where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts are required to give effect to that language without considering what the law should or should not be. K.S.A.1993 Supp. 22-4902 defined habitual sex offenders as persons who are "convicted a second or subsequent time in separate criminal actions for commission of any of...
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