State v. Lanciloti

Decision Date12 February 2009
Docket NumberNo. 81219-5.,81219-5.
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Louis F. LANCILOTI, Petitioner.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Ramona Coral Brandes, Eileen Farley, Northwest Defenders Association, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

King County Prosecutor's Office, Jennifer H.S. Atchison, James Morrissey Whisman, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

CHAMBERS, J.

¶ 1 Our constitution guarantees "an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have been committed" in all "criminal prosecutions." Const. art. I, § 22. The primary question before us today is whether the legislature violated this guaranty when it allowed King County to divide itself into two superior court jury districts. We conclude that the legislature had the plenary power to enact this legislation, affirm the superior court, and remand.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 King County holds superior court in two locations: the King County courthouse in Seattle and the Norm Maleng Regional Justice Center in Kent. Until recently, potential jurors were summoned to either courthouse randomly, without regard to proximity. By the late 1990s, judges began to notice that juror response to the summons was not random. Instead, jurors were more likely to appear if summoned to the courthouse closer to their homes. Judge Michael Fox also suspected that distance to the courthouse had a disproportionate impact on poor and minority jurors, making juries overall less representative of King County.

¶ 3 Working with the Seattle-King County Department of Public Health, Judge Fox and court staff pulled together detailed demographic information about the county. They compared this data with juror response rates. Indeed, the data generally showed an inverse relationship between the distance from the summoning courthouse and the likelihood of appearing in response to a jury summons. The data also showed that "lower income and racial minority citizens were less likely than higher income and non-minority citizens to report to a court house more distant from their home." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1548. This indeed, as Judge Fox has suspected, meant a poorer response rate from lower income and minority populations.

¶ 4 Concerned that juries were not representative of the larger community and after considerable debate, the King County Superior Court judges sought legislation or a constitutional amendment that would authorize dividing their county into two jury districts. CP at 1551; H.B. REP. 1769, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.2005); S.B. REP. 5691, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.2005). The legislature was persuaded and amended the jury source list statute. RCW 2.36.055.1 Now, in counties "with more than one superior court facility ... the jury source list may be divided into jury assignment areas that consist of registered voters and licensed drivers and identicard holders residing in each jury assignment area." Id. Our legislature has also authorized the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) to designate and adjust jury assignment areas. Id. Working with Norris "Butch" Stussy (the state court administrator at the time), the King County judges and the AOC drew up two jury assignment areas. According to Administrator Stussy, the two jury districts proposed by the judges "are very similar in terms of race and ethnicity." Mot. for Accelerated Review, App. A.2 Administrator Stussy approved the districts on behalf of the AOC. Id. Shortly afterward, the King County Superior Court promulgated King County Local General Rule (LGR) 18 and amended King County Superior Court Criminal Rule 5.1 to accommodate the two districts and direct cases appropriately. Roughly speaking, the "Seattle Case Assignment Area" includes all of the city of Seattle and everything north of Interstate 90 and the "Kent Assignment Area" includes everything else. Judges on their own motion or by request from the parties may order a panel drawn from the whole county "whenever required for the just and efficient administration of justice." LGR 18(e)(2).3

¶ 5 Meanwhile, Louis Lanciloti was charged with possession of methamphetamine. The State alleges that early one morning in Seattle's Capitol Hill neighborhood, Lanciloti and a friend melted down methamphetamine crystals on the bottom of a Bud Light beer can with the intention of injecting the drug. Lanciloti's trial was scheduled to be held in the King County courthouse in downtown Seattle. Lanciloti sought a jury trial and challenged the constitutionality and legality of the statute and court rules. He did not move for a jury panel drawn from the county as a whole.4 Rejecting his challenge, Judge Christofer Washington ruled:

[T]his Court finds RCW 2.36.055 and King County Local General Rule 18 do not violate Article 1, Section 22 of the Washington State Constitution. That constitutional provision provides that all defendants have the right to a trial "by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged." This language does not mandate that the jury venire must be drawn from the entire county; the provision is satisfied as long as the jurors are drawn from a portion of the county. This Court also finds that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury from a fair cross-section of the county has not been violated by the implementation of Local General Rule 18 because the defendant has not established that dividing King County into two jury assignment areas has resulted in the systemic exclusion or underrepresentation of a "distinctive group" within the county.

CP at 1539-40. Judge Washington certified the case for our review.

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 Lanciloti challenges the constitutionality of RCW 2.36.055, arguing that the constitutional injunction that juries be "of the county" means juries must be "of the whole county." "We presume statutes are constitutional and review challenges to them de novo." Ludvigsen v. City of Seattle, 162 Wash.2d 660, 668, 174 P.3d 43 (2007) (citing State v. Shultz, 138 Wash.2d 638, 642-43, 980 P.2d 1265 (1999)). Lanciloti bears the burden of showing the statute is unconstitutional. Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 144 Wash.2d 556, 561, 29 P.3d 709 (2001). Relevantly, RCW 2.36.055 says:

In a county with more than one superior court facility and a separate case assignment area for each court facility, the jury source list may be divided into jury assignment areas that consist of registered voters and licensed drivers and identicard holders residing in each jury assignment area. Jury assignment area boundaries may be designated and adjusted by the administrative office of the courts based on the most current United States census data at the request of the majority of the judges of the superior court when required for the efficient and fair administration of justice.

(Emphasis added.) The Washington constitution provides that "[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have been committed." CONST. art. I, § 22. This follows the common law principle that juries should be drawn from the area of the alleged crime. See Steven A. Engel, The Public's Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L.REV. 1658, 1674 (2000). Historically, jurors were not just drawn from the area; they might also be witnesses to the crime or character of the accused. LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 38-39 (reprint 1975) (1973). Over time, the ideal jury evolved into a panel of impartial community members drawn from the community at large. The constitutional requirements that the jury be both impartial and "of the county" balances those two principles. The question before us is whether "of the county" means "drawn from the whole county" or "drawn from the county."

¶ 7 We considered a somewhat similar question in State v. Twyman, 143 Wash.2d 115, 17 P.3d 1184 (2001). The defendants there were tried in district court. The jury panels for district courts are drawn from an area that is "generally coextensive" with the district's electoral district. Id. at 117, 120, 17 P.3d 1184 (citing RCW 2.36.050). The defendants argued that under article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution, they were entitled to have juries drawn from the whole county, rather than from merely the rough area that elected the district court judge. We rejected the argument unanimously:

The issue is whether a statute that allows courts of limited jurisdiction to select jurors for jury panels "at random from the population of the area served by the court," is reconcilable with article I, section 22 of our state constitution, which requires that "[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have been committed." Petitioners read the words "of the county" to require that a jury panel be comprised of jurors selected from the entire county. This argument is unpersuasive on its face.

Twyman, 143 Wash.2d at 123, 17 P.3d 1184 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting CONST. art. I, § 22 and RCW 2.36.050). We held that the legislature could authorize a jury drawn from a smaller area. Id. at 124, 17 P.3d 1184.

¶ 8 Our legislature has a recent history of revising the methods for compiling the jury lists in an effort to make the pool of eligible jurors more inclusive and representative. In 1993, the legislature expanded the jury source lists to include not only registered voters but also licensed drivers and identity card holders. LAWS OF 1993, ch. 408, § 5, codified as RCW 2.36.055. In 2006, the legislature allowed those without a traditional address to register to vote. LAWS OF 2006, ch. 320, § 3, codified as RCW 29A.08.112. Since the juror list is based in part on the voter list, that has the impact of further increasing the...

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