State v. Lanctot
Decision Date | 22 December 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 980218,980218 |
Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Douglas Joseph LANCTOT, Defendant and Appellant. Criminal |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Mark R. Boening, Assistant State's Attorney, Fargo, for plaintiff and appellee.
Richard E. Edinger, Moorhead, for defendant and appellant.
¶1 Douglas Joseph Lanctot appealed from a conviction for unlawful use of a license entered upon a conditional plea of guilty. We hold a police officer's warrantless search of Lanctot's billfold was a valid search incident to a custodial arrest. We therefore affirm the conviction.
¶2 At approximately 5:30 p.m. on January 26, 1998, two West Fargo police officers went to Pappy's Cars and Auto Repair to execute a warrant authorizing the arrest of Lanctot for a probation violation. After entering Pappy's, the officers asked an employee if Lanctot was there. The employee identified Lanctot, who was in his office. Lanctot met the two officers at his office door and identified himself. The officers arrested Lanctot while he was standing in his office by the short edge of a rectangular three by six foot desk. Lanctot's billfold was on the other end of his desk, approximately six feet from him. According to Lanctot, when the officers arrested him, he was standing "next to the edge" of the desk with one officer on each side of him, and he would have had "to push one officer all the way" to get to his billfold. One of the officers took the billfold off the desk, and without a search warrant or Lanctot's consent, searched the billfold and found two fictitious driver's licenses.
¶3 Lanctot was charged with unlawful use of a fictitious license in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-06-40(1), and he moved to suppress the evidence seized from his billfold. At the suppression hearing, Lanctot testified about the circumstances of the arrest. Although the State subpoenaed the two arresting officers, they were on vacation and did not appear at the hearing. The State initially asked for a continuance, but ultimately stipulated Lanctot's testimony accurately described the arrest.
¶4 The trial court denied Lanctot's motion to suppress, ruling the officers searched Lanctot's billfold incident to a lawful arrest, and in any event, the officers would have inevitably discovered the fictitious licenses during an inventory search of the billfold. Lanctot entered a conditional plea of guilty under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), and he appealed, contending the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
¶5 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and Art. I, § 8 of the North Dakota Constitution, protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. 1 State v. Boline, 1998 ND 67, p 19, 575 N.W.2d 906. A warrantless search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within a recognized exception to the requirement for a search warrant. State v. Kunkel, 455 N.W.2d 208, 209-10 (N.D.1990). A search incident to a valid custodial arrest is an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Phelps, 286 N.W.2d 472, 475 (N.D.1979).
¶6 In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), the United States Supreme Court outlined the scope of a search incident to a valid custodial arrest:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control"--construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
¶7 Lanctot contends the State failed to meet its burden of showing the warrantless search of his billfold fell within the Chimel radius, because the arresting officers did not testify at the suppression hearing and the State did not present any evidence establishing his billfold could contain a weapon or evidence.
¶8 Defendants alleging a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights have the initial burden of establishing a prima facie illegal search. City of Fargo v. Sivertson, 1997 ND 204, p 6, 571 N.W.2d 137. After a defendant has established a prima facie case, however, the burden of persuasion shifts to the State to show a warrantless search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, p 16, 566 N.W.2d 410.
¶9 We reject Lanctot's argument the State was required to introduce testimony from the arresting officers to satisfy its burden of showing this warrantless search fit within an exception to the warrant requirement. The State may satisfy its burden of persuasion by presenting testimony from the arresting officers; it is not required to do so. The issue is not whether the State presented testimony of the arresting officers, but whether the evidence presented to the trial court demonstrated this warrantless search fell within an exception to the warrant requirement. The State's burden is satisfied if the evidence presented to the trial court demonstrates the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement. Here, the State stipulated Lanctot's testimony described the circumstances of the arrest, and the issue is not whether the State failed to present the testimony of the arresting officers, but whether the circumstances of the arrest satisfied the State's burden of showing the police conducted a warrantless search of an area within Lanctot's "immediate control" under Chimel.
¶10 Our decisions involving the scope of a warrantless search incident to an arrest usually have involved the search of an automobile. See State v. Erbele, 554 N.W.2d 448, 451 (N.D.1996) ( ); State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93, 99 (N.D.1993) ( ); Kunkel, 455 N.W.2d at 210 ( ); State v. Hensel, 417 N.W.2d 849, 853 (N.D.1988) ( ). We have not specifically defined the limits of the area within an arrestee's immediate control for warrantless searches outside the automobile context. See Phelps, 286 N.W.2d at 475-76 ( ); State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 119 (N.D.1979) ( ).
¶11 Decisions from federal courts suggest there is no mechanical formula for defining the area within an arrestee's immediate control, and the resolution of the issue depends on the facts of each case. See United States v. Blue, 78 F.3d 56, 60 (2d Cir.1996) ( ); United States v. Johnson, 16 F.3d 69, 73, on reh'g, 18 F.3d 293, 295 (5th Cir.1994) ( ); United States v. Miller, 946 F.2d 1344, 1346 (8th Cir.1991) ( ); United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir.1984) ( ); United States v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122, 1125-26 (D.C.Cir.1975) ( ); United States v. Weaklem, 517 F.2d 70, 72-3 (9th Cir.1975) ( ); United States v. Becker, 485 F.2d 51, 55 (6th Cir.1973) ( ); United States v. Shye, 473 F.2d 1061, 1066 (6th Cir.1973) ( ); United States v. Wysocki, 457 F.2d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir.1972) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Jordan
...; United States v. Queen, 847 F.2d 346, 353 (7th Cir.1988) ; State v. Warren, 949 So.2d 1215, 1228 (La.2007) ; State v. Lanctot, 587 N.W.2d 568, 572 (N.D.1998). Thus, when determining whether the police have properly searched an area within an arrestee's control, the court must consider the......
-
State v. Schmidt
...alleging a Fourth Amendment violation has an initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of an illegal search or seizure. State v. Lanctot, 1998 ND 216, ¶ 8, 587 N.W.2d 568 ; City of Fargo v. Sivertson, 1997 ND 204, ¶ 6, 571 N.W.2d 137. “However, after the defendant has made a prima f......
-
State v. Nickel
...a separate argument under the state constitutional provision, and we treat the federal and state provisions synonymously. See State v. Lanctot, 1998 ND 216, ¶ 5 n. 1, 587 N.W.2d 568;State v. Kunkel, 455 N.W.2d 208, 209 n. 2 (N.D.1990). [¶ 14] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Consti......
-
City of Jamestown v. Dardis
...North Dakota Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Wanzek, 1999 ND 163, ¶ 7, 598 N.W.2d 811(citing State v. Lanctot, 1998 ND 216, ¶ 5, 587 N.W.2d 568). A physical entry into a home is a chief evil against which the Fourth Amendment protects. State v. DeCoteau, 1......