State v. Land

• Decision Date: 11 December 2000
• Citation: 34 S.W.3d 516
• Parties: STATE of Tennessee v. Samuel D. LAND.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

34 S.W.3d 516

STATE of Tennessee v. Samuel D. LAND.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, at Nashville.

April 28, 2000.

Application for Permission to Appeal Denied December 11, 2000.

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Eric L. Davis, Franklin, TN, for appellant, Samuel D. Land.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael Moore, Solicitor General, Todd Kelley, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald L. Davis, District Attorney General, and Jeff P. Burks, Assistant District Attorney General, for appellee, State of Tennessee.

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Application for Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court December 11, 2000.

OPINION

HAYES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SMITH, J. and OGLE, J., joined.

The appellant, Samuel D. Land, was found guilty by a jury of one count of felony evading arrest and one count driving on a revoked license, second offense. He was sentenced, as a career offender, to twelve years in the Department of Correction for the felony offense. A concurrent sentence of eleven months, twenty nine days was imposed for the misdemeanor offense. In this appeal as of right, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress a statement made after his constitutional right to counsel had attached and the trial court's denial of his motion for mistrial resulting from allegedly prejudicial comments made by the court. Additionally, he raises numerous evidentiary issues and challenges the sufficiency of the convicting offense. After review, we find one issue regarding hearsay evidence meritorious. We conclude, however, that this error is harmless. Furthermore, we find that no other error of law requiring reversal exists. We affirm the judgments of conviction entered by the trial court.

The appellant, Samuel D. Land, was charged by presentment with theft over $10,000, driving under the influence, second offense, driving on a revoked license, second offense, and felony evading arrest. Prior to trial, the State entered a nolle prosequi as to the offenses of theft over $10,000 and driving under the influence. A jury found the appellant guilty of the offenses of evading arrest, a class D felony, and driving on a revoked license, a class A misdemeanor. Following trial, the appellant pled guilty to the offense of driving on revoked second offense. The appellant was sentenced as a career offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction for the felony offense and eleven months, twenty-nine days in the Williamson County Jail for the misdemeanor. In this appeal as of right, the appellant contends:

I. The trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion to suppress his statement to Detective Brown;

II. The trial court erred in denying a mistrial when the court informed the jury that the trial would be delayed as the result of "late-filed notices" by the defense;

III. The trial court improperly admitted hearsay statements under the excited utterance exception;

IV. The trial court improperly permitted a witness to testify as to statements made by appellant's mother during a telephone conversation;

V. The evidence introduced at trial failed to establish the appellant's guilt for both offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

After review, we affirm.

Background

On August 22, 1998, Trooper Richard Cash and Trooper Israel Silva of the Tennessee Highway Patrol were "running a stationary radar at mile-marker 74 on I-65" in Williamson County. During the operation, the troopers observed a vehicle approaching from the rear at a very high rate of speed. Trooper Cash made a visual estimate that the vehicle was traveling at over one hundred miles per hour. As the vehicle passed their patrol car, he was able to identify a white male as the sole occupant and driver of the dark-color Ford vehicle. Trooper Cash advised Trooper Silva to activate the radar, however, because of heavy traffic, the equipment failed to "clock" the vehicle. The troopers then initiated pursuit in an attempt to "pace" the vehicle. The troopers reached a speed of one hundred and fifteen miles per hour during their pursuit. The pursued vehicle exited I-65 at the Cool Springs exit, made a "sharp lane change," and passed a vehicle on the right. At this point, the troopers were close enough to the pursued vehicle to activate the patrol car's emergency lights. The pursued vehicle made a right turn on to Mack Hatcher Boulevard, proceeding to the intersection of Franklin Road where the vehicle went through a red traffic signal. The vehicle passed several other vehicles. The patrol car slowed down because of other traffic and lost the fleeing vehicle. As the troopers proceeded in the direction of the pursued vehicle, they observed skid marks on the road and the pursued vehicle in a ditch on the side of the road. Upon approaching the vehicle, the troopers discovered that the vehicle was unoccupied, the doors were ajar and the engine was smoking.

During a check of the license tag on the 1996 Ford Taurus, the troopers discovered that the vehicle was registered to William Land and obtained Mr. Land's address. Trooper Cash proceeded to the residence of William Land, approximately one-half mile from the location of the disabled vehicle. Trooper Cash, accompanied by officers of the Franklin Police Department, arrived at the Land residence at approximately 2:20 a.m. Mrs. Land answered the door. Trooper Cash informed Mrs. Land that "her vehicle had been wrecked a short distance from her home. "Mrs. Land, the appellant's mother, became angry and "started cursing." She exclaimed, "He, the appellant, stole my car, he stole my car" Trooper Cash accompanied Mrs. Land to the appellant's bedroom; the appellant was not there. Mrs. Land told Trooper Cash, "He's drunk, he stole my car." She also informed Trooper Cash that her car keys were in her purse and that the appellant took the keys out of her purse and stole her vehicle. She advised that she wanted to file criminal charges. Trooper Cash, having been provided the appellant's name and birth date from his mother, checked the appellant's driving status and learned that the appellant's license had been revoked due to May 19, 1998, convictions for driving under the influence and driving on a revoked license.

On September 8, 1998, Franklin Police Detective Richard Brown contacted Mrs. Land regarding this incident. Pursuant to this telephone conversation during which Mrs. Land again stated that the appellant took her vehicle without her permission, Detective Brown obtained a warrant against the appellant for theft of the vehicle. The appellant was ultimately located, resulting in his arrest on September 13, 1998. On September 21, 1998, Detective Brown encountered the appellant in the hallway of the General Sessions Court as the appellant was being escorted to meet with his appointed counsel. The appellant informed Detective Brown that "the charge of theft is not correct, it should have been unauthorized use of a vehicle since it was my parents' vehicle."

Based upon this proof, the jury returned guilty verdicts as to the offenses of Driving on a Revoked License and Felony Evading Arrest. The appellant waived his right to have the jury determine the charge of driving on revoked, second offense, and entered a guilty plea.

I. Motion to Suppress

On February 16, 1999, the trial court conducted a suppression hearing regarding the statements made to Detective Richard Brown on September 21, 1998. Detective Brown testified that he saw the appellant with his attorney standing in the back hallway of the General Sessions Court near the inmate holding cell. The appellant, who was in custody at the time, informed Detective Brown, "The charge of theft is not correct, it should have been unauthorized use of a vehicle since it was my parents' vehicle." Detective Brown denied initiating the conversation with the appellant, although he conceded that he "may have said `hello'."

The appellant refuted Detective Brown's testimony by stating that, while he was waiting to speak with his attorney, Detective Brown approached him, offered his hand, and said "How are you doing, David?" The appellant related that the following colloquy occurred:

Appellant: Fine, except for these charges.

Brown: Now, I've got you on a theft charge, that'll do good.

Appellant: No you don't, I wasn't in the car.

Brown: That's not what I hear.

Appellant: The police charged me with unauthorized use of a vehicle ... how are you getting a theft when I wasn't in the vehicle.

The appellant asserted that he then terminated the conversation and "walked off."

Based upon the proof at the hearing, the trial court denied the motion finding the appellant's proof not credible and that the appellant's statement was not a response to police initiated interrogation. The appellant now contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Specifically, the appellant "submits that Detective Brown's actions and conduct were specifically designed as an attempt to elicit incriminating statements from the defendant," and was unconstitutional custodial interrogation. Additionally, notwithstanding his motion to suppress, the appellant contends that the statement "should not have been admitted during the trial as an admission of a party opponent" as the appellant was "not making any assertion as to his guilt or innocence." Rather, the appellant argues that he was "merely making a legal conclusion as to the appropriate charge as the allegation involved the use of his parents' vehicle.

A. Suppression

The appellant, in contesting the admission of his statement to Detective Brown, is essentially claiming a violation of his Sixth Amendment¹ right to counsel during custodial interrogation.² It is a firmly established tenet of constitutional law that, after the initiation of formal charges against an accused, the Sixth Amendment right to couns...