State v. Landeros
Decision Date | 21 November 1955 |
Docket Number | No. A--28A,A--28A |
Citation | 118 A.2d 521,20 N.J. 69 |
Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Albert Herman LANDEROS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Morton Stavis, Newark, for appellant (J. Mercer Burrell, Newark, attorney).
Leon Gerofsky, Pros. of Somerset County, Somerville, for the State (William E. Ozzard, Somerville, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This is an appeal of right, by reason of a dissenting opinion, from a judgment of the Appellate Division affirming the conviction of the defendant on a criminal indictment charging him with assault with intent to commit rape, atrocious assault and battery, and assault and battery, all charges emanating from the same incident. 32 N.J.Super. 168, 108 A.2d 11 (App.Div.1954).
The jury, in the court's charge, was permitted to find and did find the defendant guilty on all counts of the indictment and he was accordingly sentenced on all three counts, the sentences to run concurrently.
The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the conviction and sentences on the atrocious assault and battery and simple assault and battery counts, holding these were but lesser offenses and were therefore included within the conviction on the more serious charge, assault with intent to commit rape.
The defendant appeals and before us contends there was illegal evidence admitted in the case which produced an unjust and unconscionable result and in fact constituted failure of substantial justice.
It is urged evidence was erroneously admitted showing (1) that the complaining witness had previously identified the defendant; (2) that the defendant had been previously arrested; (3) that the previous arrest was for attempted rape while actually it was merely for assault; (4) that the police captain was convinced and was permitted to testify as to his opinion of the defendant's guilt.
The defendant specifically refers to testimony revealing the complaining witness' identification of him at the police line-up, theorizing that it 'corroborated' her subsequent trial identification and was injurious because it additionally revealed the defendant was in jail at the time.
The defendant insists also that added to the improper emphasis thus laid upon the testimony of the complaining witness, her testimony was further inflated by the evidence emanating from Burns, a deputy warden of the Union County Jail, and Colacci, police captain of Bound Brook, in reference to the same incident, and it is contended the prosecution was compounding the error which had been made by calling these witnesses to corroborate the testimony of the complaining witness as to prior identification.
Evidence bolstering a witness' testimony consisting of previously made consistent statements is not admissible to corroborate. State v. Griffin, 19 N.J.Super. 581, 89 A.2d 67 (App.Div.1952); People v. Jung Hing, 212 N.Y. 393, 106 N.E. 105 (Ct.App.1914); 4 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1124.
Arrest without more does not in law, any more than in reason, impeach the integrity or impair the credibility of a witness. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948); State v. Cooper, 10 N.J. 532, 92 A.2d 786 (1952).
All the testimony relating to the fact that the defendant was in jail or had been arrested on a similar charge, however, excepting a minor question or two having no important bearing on the issues presented, came into the trial as a result of the interrogation of a witnesses by the defendant's counsel. No motion was made to strike the testimony or to charge the jury to exclude it from their consideration, and we are in accord with the conclusion of the Appellate Division that it did not of itself constitute plain error of which the court could or should take notice. State v. Rhams, 14 N.J. 282, 102 A.2d 40 (1954); State v. LeFante, 14 N.J. 584, 103 A.2d 585 (1954).
As to the contention that there was error in the previous arrest at Rahway being referred to as attempted rape whereas the record in fact showed it to be merely assault, the conflict apparently occurred by reason of the defendant's cross-examination of the police captain.
In response to the question by the defense: 'What was the purpose of your trip over there then?' the captain answered: 'I was informed by the Rahway Police that they had apprehended a man with an attempted rape.'
This refers to the informal information the witness had received from a cooperating police department, and if it was not exactly in accord with the official record, it still apparently was a correct and truthful answer to the inquiry submitted. There was no error in this respect.
Next, error is cited in the following portion of the court's charge:
It is said in effect that the jury was instructed to ignore any discussion of the facts by counsel, thus destroying the defendant's right to the assistance of counsel,...
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...nor lay opinion police testimony may be used to express a view on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence); State v. Landeros, 20 N.J. 69, 74–75, 118 A.2d 521 (1955) (reversing conviction because of police officer's prejudicial testimony regarding the defendant's guilt). Those cases foc......
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...impact upon the jury's verdict than all the evidence proven in the whole trial by both the prosecution and defense." State v. Landeros, 20 N.J. 69, 75, 118 A.2d 521 (1955). This is a tragic case. Two elderly people died as a result of the automobile collision. Nonetheless, the State had the......
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State v. Hill-White
...at 271, 478 A.2d 408 (citing State v. Landeros, 32 N.J. Super. 168, 172, 108 A.2d 11 (App. Div. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 20 N.J. 69, 118 A.2d 521 (1955) ). In contrast to merger, the rule against multiplicity prohibits the State from charging a defendant with multiple counts of the sa......
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...that expresses a direct opinion that defendant is guilty of the crime charged is wholly improper. See, e.g., State v. Landeros, 20 N.J. 69, 74, 118 A.2d 521 (1955) (improper for expert, when asked if the defendant was guilty, to reply, "He is as guilty as Mrs. Murphy's pet pig."); see also ......