State v. Lane

Decision Date12 December 1979
Docket Number79-26 and 79-27,Nos. 79-25,s. 79-25
Parties, 14 O.O.3d 342 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. LANE, Appellee. The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. BRUMFIELD, Appellee. The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. ANDREWS, Appellee.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. A trial held within a prison for an offense committed within that same institution abridges the constitutional right of a defendant to a fair trial in three ways: (1) The presumption of innocence which must attach to the criminal defendant is eroded; (2) there is a major interference with the jury's ability to remain impartial; and (3) the right of the defendant to obtain witnesses is chilled.

2. A trial held within a prison for an offense committed within that same institution denies the defendant the right to a public trial which is a fundamental guarantee of both the United States and Ohio Constitutions.

3. The justification of administrative convenience as the reason for holding a trial within a prison for an offense committed within that same institution, without a further showing of a compelling state interest, denies the defendant due process of law.

Appellees, Isaiah Andrews, Paul R. Brumfield and Michael D. Lane, were inmates of the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility in Scioto County (hereinafter "penitentiary"). Separate indictments were returned against Brumfield for escape on November 20, 1976, in violation of R.C. 2921.34(A), and Andrews and Lane for escape on November 10, 1976, also in violation of R.C. 2921.34(A).

Appellee Brumfield was tried separately, while appellees Andrews and Lane were jointly tried. Prior to appellees' respective trial dates, counsel for the appellees had been informed by a newspaper article that trial was to be conducted within the confines of the penitentiary. Subsequently, on August 1, 1977, the appellees filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or, in the alternative, a writ of prohibition in this court (State ex rel. Andrews v. Mullins, case No. 77-854), seeking to prevent the trial from taking place at the penitentiary. This court did not have the opportunity to consider the question prior to the commencement of the trial proceedings, which were held at the Scioto County Court House in July and August of 1977.

Trial commenced in the customary manner and location in the Scioto County Court House, but, upon completion of Voir dire examination in one trial and during Voir dire in the other, the Scioto County prosecutor orally moved the court to transfer the proceedings to the penitentiary. The appellees timely objected to such motion. After argument in chambers by the parties in one trial and in the courtroom in the other, but without an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the state's motion for reasons of security and convenience.

The remainder of the trial in each case was held within the confines of the penitentiary in a room within the Administration Building. All the court officers and all members of the public, except the jury, were subjected to normal entry safety precautions for the penitentiary. The penitentiary, which is the state's only maximum security institution is located in rural Scioto County and ten miles from Portsmouth, the county seat, where the case would originally have been heard.

At trial, appellees Andrews and Lane were hampered in their attempt to construct the defense of duress by the fact that many of the subpoenaed witnesses, who were also inmates, refused to testify.

On July 20, 1977, appellee Brumfield was found guilty by the jury and sentence imposed upon the verdict. Subsequently, on August 11, 1977, appellees Andrews and Lane were also found guilty by the jury and sentence imposed accordingly.

Each defendant timely perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals, assigning several errors. Among the assignments of error was that the trial held within the confines of the penitentiary deprived the appellees of their constitutional rights to a fair trial, a public trial, and equal protection of the laws.

In a consolidated decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the convictions of all three defendants.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of the state's motions for leave to appeal.

Lynn Alan Grimshaw, Pros. Atty., and R. Randolph Rumble, Portsmouth, for appellant.

Christopher D. Stanley, Cleveland, for appellee Lane.

Myron Shwartz, Columbus, for appellee Brumfield.

Theodore E. Meckler, Cleveland, for appellee Andrews.

LOCHER, Justice.

The issues to be resolved in this case are three-fold. Succinctly stated, they are: Whether an inmate of a maximum security penitentiary, who is tried in an improvised courtroom within that same correctional institution for an offense committed while serving a sentence within the confines of that same penitentiary, is denied (1) the constitutional right to a fair trial; (2) the constitutional right to a public trial; and (3) the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

It is initially noted that, although prisoners in state penal institutions necessarily lose some rights as a result of their conviction and incarceration, they retain certain constitutional rights not necessarily diminished by the necessity of their imprisonment. Pell v. Procunier (1974), 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495.

I.

By holding a trial within a prison for an offense committed within that same institution, the constitutional right to a fair trial is abridged in three ways: (1) The presumption of innocence which must attach to the criminal defendant is eroded; (2) there is a major interference with the jury's ability to remain impartial; and (3) the right of the defendant to obtain witnesses is chilled.

The United States Supreme Court, in In re Murchison (1955), 349 U.S. 133, discussed, at page 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, at page 625, 99 L.Ed. 942, the constitutional requirements concerning the right to a fair trial:

"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. * * * But to perform its high function in the best way 'JUSTICE MUST SATISFY THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICe.' offutt v. united states, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11 (99 L.Ed. 11)." (Emphasis added.)

The presumption of innocence of the accused in a criminal prosecution is a basic component of a fair trial in the criminal justice system. Coffin v. United States (1895), 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 481. It is the duty of our courts to guard against factors which may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process and thereby dilute the right to the presumption of innocence. To implement the presumption courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process. Estelle v. Williams (1976), 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126. These protections are extended to all criminal defendants even those who happen to be prison inmates. See Wolff v. McDonnell (1974), 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935.

It is well established that the mere probability of deleterious effects on fundamental rights calls for close judicial scrutiny. See Estes v. Texas (1965), 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543. The prison environment which is laden with a sense of punishment of the guilty within transmits too great an impression of guilt on the part of the inmate who is on trial.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantee every accused in a criminal proceeding the right to be tried by an impartial jury. This court does not believe that a trial within a maximum security penitentiary with 12-foot high double walls, armed guards, high guard towers and visible barred windows allows a jury to maintain the delicate posture of impartiality which is a mainstay of our judicial system.

The United States Supreme Court, in Frank v. Mangum (1915), 237 U.S. 309, noted, at page 349, 35 S.Ct. 582, at page 596, 59 L.Ed. 969, that "* * * (a)ny judge who has sat with juries knows that in spite of forms they are extremely likely to be impregnated by the environing atmosphere." The exercise of calm, informed judgment by members of the jury is essential to the proper enforcement of the law. Sinclair v. United States (1929), 279 U.S. 749, 765, 49 S.Ct. 471, 73 L.Ed. 938. Unusual security measures carry obvious implications even to the most fair-minded jurors. Woodards v. Maxwell (S.D.Ohio E.D.1969), 303 F.Supp. 690.

In the instant cause, the trial setting within the confines of the penitentiary definitely affected the jury's impartiality. The defendants sought to impose the defense of duress, which would mandate that the conditions of the prison itself and the credibility of prison officials become integral elements for the jury's consideration.

Judge Stephenson, in the opinion in the Court of Appeals, noted this effect upon the jurors when he stated:

"It is evident that in most criminal trials which arise out of prison life, especially in escape cases, defenses such as duress or self defense are presented which inextricably, to some degree, put the prison itself on trial. The facts and circumstances upon which the alleged justification by the accused is predicated call into question the institution and society existing therein. Typically, administrators, prison officials and employees are called to testify, their character thus thrown into issue. To the extent that internal policies of the prison itself and the credibility of the personnel of the prison appear as factual matters of probable relevance to issues presented to a jury, the neutrality of the prison as a place of trial has been, to that extent, compromised.

" * * * It is reasonable to assume that the jurors in a criminal trial in a penitentiary are aware...

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