State v. Lane

Decision Date04 May 1989
Docket NumberNo. 55690-3,55690-3
Citation112 Wn.2d 464,771 P.2d 1150
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Jeffrey Eugene LANE, Jonathan Clyde Woods, and Wayne Stanley Anderson, Jr., Petitioners.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Raymond H. Thoenig, Lloyde L. Alton, Jr., Tacoma, for petitioner Jeffrey E. Lane.

Davies & Pearson, Clifford G. Morey, Tacoma, for petitioner Jonathan C. Woods.

Girolami, Edmondson, Poole & Wood, L. Steve Edmondson, Tacoma, for petitioner Wayne S. Anderson.

John Ladenburg, Pierce County Prosecutor, Chris Quinn-Brintnall, Deputy, Tacoma, for respondent State.

ANDERSEN, Justice.

FACTS OF CASE

At issue in this case is whether the State of Washington has jurisdiction to try the three petitioners for aggravated first degree murder. The petitioners maintain that the state lacks jurisdiction because the victim was killed at Fort Lewis, Washington, on land held under exclusive federal jurisdiction.

The parcel of Pierce County land ceded to the federal government for a military reservation, and where the killing actually occurred, will be referred to herein simply as Fort Lewis.

Petitioners Jeffrey Lane, Jonathan Woods and Wayne Anderson have been charged in the Superior Court of the State of Washington with the crime of aggravated murder in the first degree. They were so charged by the Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney as a result of the death of 89-year-old Eva Jane Wolfe. 1

Petitioners are awaiting trial and as yet there has been no adjudication of the facts of this case. The Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney has, however, filed an affidavit for determination of probable cause which sets forth the evidence which the State asserts it has in support of the charges against the petitioners. The facts of this case, as alleged by the State through this affidavit, are as follows.

In the late evening of April 30, 1988, the three petitioners drove to the victim's home in Tacoma, Washington. Each of them wore ski masks and gloves. Lane was armed with a .380 caliber semiautomatic handgun. Anderson cut what he thought was the cable to the victim's telephone and then kicked in her back door. Petitioners entered the house, took the victim's purse and checkbook and put her in the trunk of her car.

Next, according to the affidavit filed by the State, the three petitioners drove away in the victim's car, with her in the trunk, and headed for a remote, wooded area. Upon arriving in such an area, Lane gave Woods the .380 handgun that Lane was carrying and Woods removed the victim from the trunk and led her away from the car. Woods shot the 89-year-old victim six times in the leg and returned to the car, laughing and saying "I killed the bitch." Lane and Woods celebrated by gleefully giving each other "high The State alleges that this was not the victim's first encounter with petitioners Lane and Woods. On November 4, 1987, according to the State's affidavit, these two petitioners forced their way into the victim's home. They told her that they were evading the police and stayed there some 2 1/2 hours. The State later brought charges against Lane and Woods and subpoenaed the victim for the trial. While in jail prior to abducting her, Lane and Woods discussed killing her in revenge for her assisting the State in that prosecution.

                fives" (slapping hands), before they discovered the victim was still alive.   She begged them not to leave her there and pleaded for mercy.   The petitioners responded by loading two more rounds into the clip of the gun and then Woods went back and shot her to death--"shot her face off", as one of the petitioners expressed it.   Woods, however, claims it was Lane who actually shot the victim
                

The State, through its affidavit, also asserts that the petitioners went to the victim's house "to fix her", and that they took her to the wooded area to "dispose of her".

Woods later led police to the victim's body. It was located in a wooded area of Fort Lewis. Empty .380 caliber shell casings were found near the body. The State and petitioners stipulated that the fatal wounds were inflicted and the victim's death occurred at Fort Lewis.

All three petitioners were charged in the Superior Court of the State of Washington with having in Pierce County committed the crimes of aggravated first degree murder and first degree burglary, robbery and kidnapping. Petitioners moved to dismiss the aggravated first degree murder charge for want of jurisdiction. The Superior Court denied that motion, whereupon petitioners sought and were granted discretionary review by this court. 2

One issue is presented for our decision.

ISSUE

Does the State of Washington have jurisdiction to try the petitioners for aggravated first degree murder where the victim was killed within the State of Washington but on land which had been ceded to the federal government?

DECISION

CONCLUSION. The State of Washington may exercise jurisdiction over a criminal offense if an essential element of the offense occurred within the state but outside the land ceded to the federal government (where the offense culminated). Premeditation is an essential element of aggravated first degree murder and the State has made a sufficient showing of facts to establish that this element of the offense occurred within this state outside the federal lands in question.

Jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine a case. 3 A court's jurisdiction over a case may be either exclusive or concurrent with that of other courts. 4 Petitioners maintain that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the aggravated first degree murder charge in this case because the victim was killed on land ceded to the federal government.

We first turn to the constitution of the United States; it expressly provides that Congress has the power

[t]o exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, ... over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, ...

(Italics ours.) U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8 (part). As a consequence, it is the general rule that where a crime is committed within the boundaries of land purchased by the United States with the consent of the state for the erection of forts federal courts have jurisdiction over the prosecution of that crime to the exclusion of state courts. 5 However, where property is ceded to the federal government, as opposed to being purchased by it, the terms of the cession determine the extent of federal jurisdiction. 6 The decisions of this court are in accord with these principles. 7

The land embracing Fort Lewis was conveyed by Pierce County to the federal government in 1919. According to the deed evidencing this conveyance, the property was donated "free of cost" to the United States. Thus, the property was not "purchased" by the federal government and the terms of cession determine the extent of the federal jurisdiction. The state legislation which authorized Pierce County to convey the property in question provides:

Pursuant to the constitution and laws of the United States, and especially to paragraph seventeen of section eight of article one of such constitution, the consent of the legislature of the State of Washington is hereby given to the United States to acquire, by donation from Pierce county, title to all lands herein intended to be referred to, ... and the consent of the State of Washington is hereby given to the exercise by the congress of the United States of exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such tracts or parcels of land so conveyed to it ... provided, That all civil process issued from the courts of this state and such criminal process as may issue under the authority of this state, against any person charged with crime in cases arising outside of said reservation, may be served and executed thereon in the same mode and manner and by the same officers as if the consent herein given had not been made.

(Italics ours.) Laws of 1917, ch. 3, § 20, p. 14. 8 Since the mere reservation of state jurisdiction for service of process does not defeat a grant of exclusive jurisdiction, 9 it is apparent that the State has ceded such jurisdiction over the Fort Lewis property to the United States. 10

The State concedes that the fatal wounds were inflicted, and the victim's death occurred, in this area of exclusive federal jurisdiction. It maintains, however, that Washington still has jurisdiction because an element of the crime--premeditation--occurred within the State of Washington and Pierce County, outside Fort Lewis. We agree.

It is fundamental that jurisdiction over a crime rests exclusively in the courts of the state in which the crime is committed. 11 However, where elements of a crime are committed in different jurisdictions, any state where an essential part of the crime has been committed may take jurisdiction. 12 At least, this is the case where a state provides for such jurisdiction by statute. 13 This same rule also applies where elements of a crime are committed in both a federal enclave and the territory of a state. 14

Washington's criminal jurisdiction statute provides in pertinent part:

The following persons are liable to punishment:

A person who commits in the state any crime, in whole or in part.

(Italics ours.) RCW 9A.04.030(1). This statute modifies the common law and enlarges the scope of our state's criminal jurisdiction. 15 An offense is committed "in part" in Washington, within the contemplation of the criminal jurisdiction statute, when an "essential element" of the offense has been committed here. 16

In State v. Swanson, 16 Wash.App. 179, 189, 554 P.2d 364 (1976), review denied, 88 Wash.2d 1014, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 967, 98 S.Ct. 509, 54 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977), our Court of Appeals explained that "[t]he purpose of this statute is to eliminate twilight zones affording safe haven to persons who commit offenses partly...

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33 cases
  • State v. Grissom, 66268
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • November 10, 1992
    ...kidnapping and death." 241 Mont. at 388, 787 P.2d 336. Montana and Kansas have similar jurisdiction statutes. In State v. Lane, 112 Wash.2d 464, 771 P.2d 1150 (1989), the victim was kidnapped in Washington, but murdered in an area in which the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction. ......
  • State v. Ellis
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    ...1129 (1996) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). As we said in State v. Lane, 112 Wash.2d 464, 472-73, 771 P.2d 1150 (1989): Premeditation is an element separate and distinct from the specific intent to kill required for first degree murder;......
  • Wright v. Colville Tribal Enterprise Corp.
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    • December 7, 2006
    ...involves whether the court has the power to adjudicate the claim, while the latter is a disposition on the merits. State v. Lane, 112 Wash.2d 464, 468, 771 P.2d 1150 (1989). Unlike a CR 12(b)(6) dismissal, a CR 12(b)(1) dismissal has no preclusive effect, is immediately appealable, and may ......
  • Banowsky v. Backstrom
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    ...Comm’n, 173 Wash.2d 608, 618, 268 P.3d 929 (2012) ). It "is the power of a court to hear and determine a case." State v. Lane, 112 Wash.2d 464, 468, 771 P.2d 1150 (1989) (citing State v. Hampson, 9 Wash.2d 278, 281, 114 P.2d 992 (1941) ; 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 88, at 449 (1965) ). "A tribu......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Territorial Jurisdiction in Ohio Post-Wogenstahl.
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    ...317, 320 (Cal. 1953); People v. Holt, 440 N.E.2d 102, 106 (111. 1982); State v. Harrington, 260 A.2d 692, 697 (Vt. 1969); State v. Lane, 771 P.2d 1150, 1156-57 (Wash. 1989) (Utter, J., concurring). See also 4 LaFave et al., supra note 19, [section] (80.) See People v. Garton, 412 P.3d 315, ......

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