State v. Laney

• Decision Date: 06 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 26123.,26123.
• Citation: 627 S.E.2d 726
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Michael James LANEY, Appellant.

627 S.E.2d 726

The STATE, Respondent, v. Michael James LANEY, Appellant.

No. 26123.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard January 5, 2006.

Decided March 6, 2006.

Rehearing Denied April 6, 2006.

Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney General Melody J. Brown, all of Columbia; and Robert M. Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent.

Justice BURNETT:

Michael James Laney (Appellant) was charged with two counts of murder; two counts of possession of a weapon during the commission of or attempted commission of a violent crime; arson to a dwelling; criminal sexual conduct, first degree; and kidnapping. He was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to death. We reverse and remand for a new sentencing proceeding.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 25, 2000, Dorothy Hancock and Thelma Godfrey were murdered in Hancock's home in Greenville County. The victims were neighbors and both in their eighties. Around 9:15 p.m. that night, John Gillard, another neighbor, heard a loud noise. Upon investigation, he saw smoke coming from Hancock's house and observed Hancock's garage door had been smashed and her car was missing. He entered the garage and saw Hancock's body on the floor. Gillard's wife reported the incident to 911. Responding to the call, a firefighter found Godfrey's body in a bedroom; her body was tied to a chair with a telephone cord and was covered with tape, a sheet, and a cloth.

Dr. Michael Ward, the Greenville County Medical Examiner, performed autopsies on both victims and testified as an expert in forensic pathology. He testified Hancock had several broken ribs, a broken sternum, and had been sexually assaulted. He testified Hancock received three stab wounds including a fatal stab cutting her throat from side to side. Hancock's cause of death was multiple blunt and sharp forced injuries.

Ward testified Godfrey had stab and incise wounds to the neck which included a cut trachea. He determined the incise wounds caused Godfrey's death.

David Tafaoa of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) testified as an expert in arson investigation. He opined the fire in Hancock's house was intentionally set by someone pouring an ignitable liquid in four different areas of the house. Alex Layton of SLED testified several swatches of carpet from Hancock's house tested positive for the accelerant gasoline.

On September 26, 2000, Appellant was arrested in North Carolina as a suspect in the double homicide. Officers testified the coveralls Appellant was wearing at the time of his arrest smelled of gasoline. Hancock's blood was found on the coveralls and on Appellant's underwear. Appellant's blood was under Hancock's fingernails and his semen was on her body. Appellant's fingerprints were on a phone base and an end section of cut tape collected from under the bedspread in the room where Godfrey was found.

During the sentencing phase of his trial, Appellant presented mitigating evidence regarding his mental ability and health. Two doctors testified Appellant was not mentally retarded but had mental illnesses. Another doctor testified Appellant's IQ was between borderline intellectual functioning and mild mental retardation. The State sought the death penalty based on the following statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed while in the commission of a criminal sexual conduct in the first degree; (2) the murder was committed while in the commission of a kidnapping; and (3) two or more persons were murdered by Appellant by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct.

As part of the jury charges during the sentencing proceeding, the trial judge charged the jury to consider the above-referenced statutory aggravating circumstances and the following statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) whether Appellant was under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance; (2) whether Appellant was mentally retarded; (3) whether Appellant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law was substantially impaired; and (4) Appellant's age or mentality. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(a) & (b) (2003 & Supp.2004). After finding Appellant guilty as charged, a jury recommended the death penalty. Appellant was sentenced to death for each of the murders, thirty years imprisonment for criminal sexual conduct, and twenty years imprisonment for arson, to be served consecutively. Appellant was not sentenced for the kidnapping and weapon convictions. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 16-3-910 & 16-23-490 (2003). This appeal follows and Appellant seeks a new sentencing proceeding.

ISSUES

I. Did the trial court err by not charging the jury that a life imprisonment sentence meant life without parole because the State offered evidence of Appellant's future dangerousness?

II. Do the cases of Atkins v. Virginia and Ring v. Arizona, decided by the United States Supreme Court after Appellant's trial, require Appellant's case to be remanded for a new sentencing proceeding before a jury?

III. Did the trial court lack subject matter jurisdiction to sentence Appellant to death because the murder indictments did not identify any statutory aggravating circumstances necessary to expose Appellant to a punishment of death?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In criminal cases, this Court sits to review errors of law only and is bound by factual findings of the trial court unless an abuse of discretion is shown. State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001). An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law. State v. McDonald, 343 S.C. 319, 325, 540 S.E.2d 464, 467 (2000).

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Jury Charge

Appellant argues the trial judge erred by failing to charge the jury that a life imprisonment sentence meant life without parole. We agree.

Appellant contends a jury charge that life imprisonment meant life without parole was required under Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 121 S.Ct. 1263, 149 L.Ed.2d 178 (2001); and Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 122 S.Ct. 726, 151 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002), because the State offered evidence of Appellant's future dangerousness. The State concedes it submitted evidence supporting Appellant's future dangerousness during the sentencing phase of the trial.¹ The State further concedes due process required Appellant be given an opportunity to inform the jury of parole ineligibility, but contends the issue is procedurally barred from review. In the alternative, the State argues due process was not violated because Appellant's counsel told the jury that life imprisonment meant life without parole.

After reviewing the entire record, we find the issue sufficiently preserved for review on appeal. Further we find it unnecessary to address the State's due process argument to resolve this issue.

In Shafer and Kelly, the United States Supreme Court held that where a defendant's future dangerousness is at issue in a capital sentencing proceeding, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without parole, due process entitles the defendant to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility.² The Kelly Court specifically noted counsel's arguments in Shafer that the defendant "would die in prison" or would "spend his natural life there" and the trial judge's instructions that "life imprisonment means until the death of the defendant" were insufficient to convey a clear understanding to the jury of Shafer's parole ineligibility. 534 U.S. at 257, 122 S.Ct. at 733-34; see also State v. Stone, 350 S.C. 442, 567 S.E.2d 244 (2002) (reversing and remanding for a new sentencing proceeding where the State submitted evidence of Stone's future dangerousness but trial court failed to instruct jury after request by defense counsel that Stone would be ineligible for parole if sentenced to life imprisonment and finding statements by counsel and the court to the jury that Stone would spend the rest of his life in prison did not convey to the jury that Stone would be ineligible for parole as required by Kelly).

In State v. Shafer, 352 S.C. 191, 202, 573 S.E.2d 796, 801-02 (2002), we stated, "given the United States Supreme Court's decision in Kelly, the better practice is for trial judges to give the capital sentencing jury a parole eligibility charge whether it is requested or not."³ Today we conclude where a defendant's future dangerousness is at issue in a capital sentencing proceeding, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without parole, the trial judge shall charge the jury, whether requested or not, that life imprisonment means until the death of the defendant without the possibility of parole. The trial judge erred in failing to charge the jury that life imprisonment meant until the death of Appellant without the possibility of parole because the State placed Appellant's future dangerousness in issue during the capital sentencing proceeding.

II. New Sentencing Proceeding under Atkins v. Virginia and Ring v. Arizona

Appellant argues the intervening cases of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), require his case be remanded for a new sentencing proceeding. We disagree.

Appellant's trial began on October 8, 2001, and he was sentenced to death on October 19, 2001. The United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Atkins on June 20, 2002, which held the execution of a mentally retarded person is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supreme...