State v. Langford

Citation882 P.2d 490,267 Mont. 95
Decision Date04 October 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-368,93-368
PartiesSTATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Terry Allen LANGFORD, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Montana

William F. Hooks, Appellate Defender, Helena, for appellant.

Joseph P. Mazurek, Atty. Gen., Joseph E. Thaggard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Helena, Christopher Miller, Powell County Atty., Deer Lodge, for respondent.

HARRISON, Justice.

Terry Allen Langford (Langford) appeals from a jury verdict in the District Court for the Third Judicial District, Powell County, convicting him of burglary and deliberate homicide. We affirm.

The following issues are presented on appeal:

1. Did the District Court violate Langford's right to represent himself at trial?

2. Did the District Court err by admitting evidence of a shooting incident which occurred when officers were retaking the maximum security unit of the Montana State Prison?

3. Did the District Court err when Judge Mizner refused to recuse himself?

4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence autopsy photographs of the five inmate victims?

On the morning of September 22, 1991, nine maximum security inmates at the Montana State Prison gained control of the maximum security unit of the prison. These prisoners were able to release the other maximum security prisoners. When officers regained control of the building approximately five hours later, they discovered that five protective custody inmates had been killed in the riot, and others severely beaten.

The maximum security unit of the Montana State Prison is divided into six blocks with two central control cages. "A Block," "B Block," and "C Block" are located on the west side of the building along with the main control cage which controls operations for A, B, and C Blocks. "D Block," "E Block," and "F Block" are located on the east side of the building along with the satellite control cage which controls operations for D, E, and F Blocks. Six exercise yards are located in the center of the maximum security unit between Blocks A, B, C and Blocks D, E, and F. At the time of the riot, there were 68 inmates in the maximum security unit. Ten protective custody inmates were located on D Block, and Langford was housed on B Block.

On the morning of September 22, 1991, thirteen inmates were using the exercise yards. Officers escorted three of these inmates from exercise yard five to C Block. Nine of the remaining inmates broke through the wire fences separating the exercise yards and entered yard five. From there, they ran through an open door into the west side of the maximum security unit. Once inside the building, the prisoners attacked the main control cage on the west side of the building. Approximately 45 minutes later, the inmates gained access to the satellite control cage on the east side of the building by burning a hole in the bulletproof glass. Once inside that cage, they obtained keys that opened the main control cage. The inmates then began opening cell doors and releasing other maximum security prisoners.

Some maximum security prisoners made their way onto D Block where they attacked the protective custody inmates. Five protective custody inmates were killed in the riot, and others were severely beaten.

The prison's Disturbance Control Team entered the maximum security unit and regained control of the unit at approximately 2 p.m. the same day. Officer Robert Geach (Geach), a member of the team, entered C and B Blocks while securing the unit. Geach testified that when he was on B Block he ordered the prisoners to strip and get on the ground as a precautionary measure against hidden weapons. Geach testified that Langford neither stripped nor went to the ground when commanded to do so. According to Geach, Langford made a move towards him and Geach then fired a warning shot into the door next to Langford. After the shot, Langford complied with Geach's commands.

On February 3, 1992, Langford was charged by information with one count of burglary in violation of § 45-6-204, MCA; and five counts of deliberate homicide in violation of § 45-5-102(1)(b), MCA.

In pre-trial motions, Langford moved the court for new counsel. Instead, the court appointed co-counsel. Langford later requested that he be allowed to represent himself. The court denied this request. Langford also made a motion in limine to exclude any evidence of the shooting incident, and moved the court for a substitute judge. The court denied these motions.

Following a jury trial, Langford was convicted of burglary and one count of deliberate homicide. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison on the count of burglary and life imprisonment on the count of deliberate homicide. The sentences were to run concurrently to each other and consecutively to the sentences Langford was already serving.

I

Did the District Court violate Langford's right to represent himself?

At a pre-trial hearing held November 12, 1992, Langford informed the court that he wished to "fire" his appointed counsel, and represent himself. He also informed the court that he was seeking out-of-state counsel to represent him. The court did not allow Langford to represent himself, and continued the representation of Langford's two court appointed attorneys. Langford asserts that the court violated his right to represent himself.

The right to assistance of counsel is embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has been interpreted to include a defendant's right to represent himself. Faretta v. California (1975), 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562. This Court has interpreted Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution to provide the right of the defendant to proceed pro se. State v. Colt (1992), 255 Mont. 399, 403, 843 P.2d 747, 749.

Under Montana statute, a defendant may waive the right to counsel when the court ascertains that the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Section 46-8-102, MCA (1991). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals utilizes the additional requirement that the request to represent oneself must be unequivocal. United States v. Robinson (9th Cir.1990), 913 F.2d 712, 714. In the recent Colt case, we discussed the additional criterion of an unequivocal request but did not specifically adopt it. Colt, 843 P.2d at 751. We do so today.

First, Langford argues that, contrary to the requirements of Faretta, the District Court did not conduct a proper substantive inquiry of the defendant to satisfy itself that the defendant was in fact knowingly and intelligently foregoing the benefits of counsel. We disagree.

Faretta does not mandate any particular sort of questioning or inquiry, so long as the trial court satisfies itself that the defendant is "aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that ... 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' " Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. Similarly, we stated in Colt that we do not require district courts to rigidly adhere to a set of requirements in ascertaining whether a criminal defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Colt, 843 P.2d at 751. We also stated that:

[i]t is the district court judges who consider, assimilate, and absorb the nuances of each individual case. They are not constrained, as we are, to garnering all of their information from a cold record.... So long as substantial credible [evidence] exists to support the decision of the District Court ... it will not be disturbed on appeal.

Colt, 843 P.2d at 752; citing State v. Plouffe (1982), 198 Mont. 379, 386, 646 P.2d 533, 536.

While there is no question that the trial court must, on the record, ensure that the defendant is voluntarily and intelligently exercising his free will in choosing to represent himself, we hold that the record in this case supports our conclusion that the District Court properly determined in its various colloquies with Langford that his waiver was not voluntary, intelligent, and knowing; and that he was not competent to represent himself.

Next, we hold that Langford's request was equivocal. In discussing the requirement that the waiver of the right to assistance of counsel must be unequivocal, the Ninth Circuit stated that:

The requirement that a request for self-representation be unequivocal also serves an institutional purpose: It prevents a defendant from taking advantage of the mutual exclusivity of the rights to counsel and self-representation. A defendant who vacillates at trial between wishing to be represented by counsel and wishing to represent himself could place the trial court in a difficult position: If the court appoints counsel, the defendant could, on appeal, rely on his intermittent requests for self-representation in arguing that he had been denied the right to represent himself; if the court permits self-representation the defendant could claim he had been denied the right to counsel. See Meeks [v. Craven (9th Cir.1973) ], 482 F.2d at 468. The requirement of unequivocality resolves this dilemma by forcing the defendant to make an explicit choice. If he equivocates, he is presumed to have requested the assistance of counsel.

Adams v. Carroll (9th Cir.1989), 875 F.2d 1441, 1444. A defendant who vacillates in pre-trial proceedings places the trial court in the same difficult position as does a defendant who vacillates at trial.

In the present case, during a pre-trial hearing held on November 12, 1992, Langford made the following statement to the court:

Well, I'm aware of the statute ... where it says you can let me make a waiver of counsel if I make a ... knowing and a competent and intelligent decision. Well, clearly I know what I'm doing, I'm waiving my right to counsel. As far as competent, I think that's covered under do I know what I'm doing,...

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