State v. Langley
Citation | 855 S.E.2d 376,358 Ga.App. 343 |
Decision Date | 08 February 2021 |
Docket Number | A20A1806 |
Parties | The STATE v. LANGLEY. |
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
John Herbert Cranford Jr., Newnan, Christine Diane Caldwell, for Appellant.
Jared Benjamin Craig, for Appellee.
In this case, we must determine whether the trial court may probate a sentence imposed under OCGA § 16-11-131 (b), which makes it unlawful for a person on probation to possess a firearm. The trial court concluded that it had the discretion to probate a portion of the sentence, and the State appealed.1 After considering the relevant statutory language, we conclude that the trial court lacked the discretion to impose the probated sentence. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence, and remand the case for resentencing.
The facts are undisputed. In 1987, Dennis Mark Langley was convicted of murder. Following his release from incarceration, he began his term of probation. In 2019, the department of community supervision conducted a search of his home, as permitted by the terms of his probation, and discovered several firearms. As a result, Langley was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of OCGA § 16-11-131 (b). He pled guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years, to serve six months in prison with the remainder on probation. The State now appeals, arguing that Langley's sentence is void because the trial court lacked the discretion to impose a probated sentence under the plain language of the sentencing statute. We agree.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Mays v. State , 345 Ga. App. 562, 563, 814 S.E.2d 418 (2018).
Where the trial court imposes a sentence the law does not allow, that sentence is void. Wilder v. State , 343 Ga. App. 110, 112, 806 S.E.2d 200 (2017). In determining whether the statutory language vested the trial court with the discretion to impose a probated sentence, we turn to the rules of statutory construction.
When interpreting any statute, we necessarily begin our analysis with familiar and binding canons of construction. In considering the meaning of a statute, our charge as an appellate court is to presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. Toward that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, consider the text contextually, read the text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would, and seek to avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage. Further, when the language of a statute is plain and susceptible to only one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Mays , 345 Ga. App. at 564, 814 S.E.2d 418 ; see also Major v. State , 301 Ga. 147, 150 (1), 800 S.E.2d 348 (2017).
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Blackwell v. State , 302 Ga. 820, 828 (4), 809 S.E.2d 727 (2018) ; see also OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (A) (2018) ().
To resolve the issue before us in this appeal, we therefore must determine whether the specific provision of OCGA § 16-11-131 (b) abr...
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Langley v. State
...discretion to probate any portion of a sentence imposed for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See State v. Langley , 358 Ga. App. 343, 345, 855 S.E.2d 376 (2021). We conclude that the Court of Appeals did err, and we therefore reverse its judgment.1. In 1987, Dennis Mark Langley......
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Langley v. State
...265 Ga.App. at 495. The Court of Appeals vacated Langley's sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. See Langley, 358 Ga.App. at 345. We Langley's petition for certiorari. 2. Langley contends that the Court of Appeals erred in construing the phrase "shall be impris......
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