State v. Langley

• Decision Date: 29 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 04-269.,04-269.
• Citation: 896 So.2d 200
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Ricky J. LANGLEY.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

896 So.2d 200

STATE of Louisiana v. Ricky J. LANGLEY.

No. 04-269.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

December 29, 2004.

Rick Bryant, District Attorney, Cynthia S. Killingsworth, Assistant District Attorney, Sharon Darville Wilson, Assistant District Attorney, Lake Charles, Counsel for Appellee: State of Louisiana.

Carla S. Sigler, Assistant District Attorney, Lake Charles, Counsel for Appellee: State of Louisiana.

Clive Stafford Smith, Christine Lehmann, New Orleans, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant: Ricky J. Langley.

Ricky J. Langley, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Angola.

Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, and BILLIE COLOMBARO WOODARD and OSWALD A. DECUIR, Judges.

DECUIR, J.

The Defendant, Ricky Langley, was indicted for the first degree murder of six-year-old Jeremy Guillory. He pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. After a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He now seeks review of his conviction, raising fifteen assignments of error. Because we find error in the conduct of the trial, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

I. FACTS

The testimony in the record and the Defendant's detailed confession illustrate the following facts: On February 7, 1992, the Defendant was a boarder of the Lawrence family. The Lawrence home was located in a rural neighborhood in Calcasieu Parish. The victim, a neighbor, came to the Lawrence home to play, but the two Lawrence children were not home. The Defendant then invited the victim inside to wait for their return. While the victim was playing in the children's bedroom, the Defendant came into the room, grabbed him around the neck, and strangled him. Later, he hid the boy's body in a closet and covered him with blankets. There was also evidence that the Defendant, an admitted pedophile, sexually molested the boy either before or after his death.

When the victim's mother came to the house looking for her son, the Defendant helped her search for him in the surrounding area. He also placed a 911 call to report the missing child. Three days later, the local police learned the Defendant was a convicted child molester and a Georgia parole violator. An officer and two FBI agents located the Defendant at his place of employment where he was read his Miranda rights and arrested on the parole violation. After reading the Defendant his rights a second time, one of the agents informed the Defendant that he was a suspect in the disappearance of the victim. The Defendant then admitted killing the victim and told the officers the body was in his bedroom closet. Upon arriving at the Lawrence home, the Defendant gave the officers a tour of the house and walked them through the events surrounding the murder, all of which was videotaped with his consent. He subsequently gave a second videotaped confession.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Defendant was originally convicted of first degree murder under La.R.S. 14:30 and sentenced to death. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence, but on application for rehearing, remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the Defendant's claim regarding intentional discrimination in the selection of the grand jury foreperson. State v. Langley, 95-1489 (La.4/14/98), 711 So.2d 651, reh'g granted in part (La.6/19/98). On remand, the district court granted the Defendant's motion to quash, finding the Defendant established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination which was not rebutted by the State. The supreme court affirmed the ruling and ordered further proceedings. State v. Langley, 95-1489 (La.4/3/02), 813 So.2d 356.

The Defendant was subsequently reindicted on a charge of first degree murder, to which he pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Because of great pretrial publicity, jury selection was moved to Orleans Parish, but the case was tried in Calcasieu Parish, where the sequestered jury was housed for the duration of the proceedings. The jury rejected the Defendant's insanity defense and convicted him of the lesser included offense of second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1; he was then given the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. It is from this conviction and sentence that the Defendant now appeals.

The Defendant's primary assignments of error in this appeal are that the trial judge erred in absenting himself during jury voir dire and closing arguments, in cutting off closing arguments, and in prohibiting contemporaneous objections. He contends these errors compromised the very structure of the trial and require reversal without a showing of prejudice. Other assignments of error relate to evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and alleged Batson violations in the jury selection process. The Defendant also complains of the trial court's improper references to the possibility of release after a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict and the State's failure to prove sanity as an element of the offense charged.

Regarding the Defendant's complaints concerning the trial judge's absences from the bench, the record does not reflect every absence, but the State has agreed with the Defendant's characterization of the judge's conduct. As this conduct necessarily has constitutional ramifications, we will address the Defendant's assignments of error in the context of both what the trial judge missed and the necessary adjustments made in the course of the proceedings to accommodate the judge's absence. The question to be resolved is whether the trial judge's conduct constitutes trial error, which is subject to review for harmless error, or structural error, which defies analysis by harmless error standards. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).

III. ABSENCE OF THE TRIAL JUDGE

A. Voir dire

The Defendant contends the judge's absence during significant portions of voir dire was a structural error which requires reversal. He questions whether the trial court's actions constitute an abdication of his judicial responsibilities so as to deprive the parties of a fair trial. It is urged that in failing to observe potential jurors, the court was unable to respond meaningfully to challenges and objections and otherwise insure the empaneling of a fair and impartial jury. The judge's rulings on various State challenges as well as a general Batson challenge are questioned by the defense given the fact that the judge was not present during questioning of numerous potential jurors.

The transcript of voir dire does not indicate when the judge entered or exited the courtroom, as the judge's minute clerk and court reporters did not record his entries and exits. However, comments by the judge indicate his intent to leave the courtroom, and both parties acknowledge that he did so at various points during voir dire:

I'm going to spend about 10 or 15 minutes with the Court Administrator while y'all doing this stuff. You don't — you don't need me. If you need me, just stop doing what you're doing and I'll be right back. But I'm not gonna address the jury, that's a waste of time. You guys just do what you gotta do.

....

I've got to see the Court Administrator about transportation and a bunch of other stuff. So, they're going to start asking you questions. I don't want any objections while I'm gone, please. When I come back y'all can make your objections. Any questions before I leave?

....

Okay. Good luck. All right. You may start.

....

Now, also, again, I have many things to do this morning to prepare for this. I'll be in and out of here. If there's an objection or something, you will stop talking to that juror until I come back.

....

Now, I'm gonna be in and out of here because I've got many things to do. I mean, my job is a hundred-fold.

....

Don't think I'm not interested, I've just got things to do as far as accommodations, making sure everything's going right, making sure I can leave here tomorrow, make sure the jury can leave here tomorrow, making sure the defendant is transported by the sheriff's department back to Calcasieu Parish, the whole bit. There are many things I've got to do, money, hotel bills I've got to pay for, everything. So, I've got — and I gotta do this all today.

Our review of the record reveals several instances where the trial judge was absent during the questioning of a potential juror and that juror became the subject of a challenge for cause. The record makes clear the trial judge did not hear interrogation responses of at least five challenges for cause. Additionally, the record indicates the judge was absent for the questioning of a panel from which four jurors were peremptorily challenged by the State; the Defendant's subsequent Batson objection to those challenges, it is urged, could not be effectively addressed by the court due to the judge's absence.

The Defendant contends the trial judge's absences constitute reversible error. The State suggests the judge's absences were without objection by the Defendant and constitute merely harmless error. The State argues the judge did not intend to give up control of the proceedings inasmuch as he informed counsel that if an objection arose, they were to await his return. However, the Defendant argues the judge's failure to hear the jurors' responses certainly affected his ability to exercise discretion in ruling on challenges.

B. Closing arguments

In setting forth the procedure for closing arguments, the trial court established a two-hour time limit for each side. Counsel for the defense chose to divide both their time and the subject matter of their arguments, allocating forty-five minutes to Ms. Mann to discuss specific intent and seventy-five minutes to Mr. Smith to discuss the insanity defense. The State likewise divided its time between Ms. Wilson and Ms. Killingsworth. The trial judge prohibited objections during closing arguments, then...