State v. Langley, No. 15220

• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: 109 Idaho 119,705 P.2d 1074
• Decision Date: 05 September 1985
• Docket Number: No. 15220
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William A. LANGLEY, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 1074

705 P.2d 1074 109 Idaho 119 STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
William A. LANGLEY, Defendant-Appellant. No. 15220. Court of Appeals of Idaho. Sept. 5, 1985.
Petition for Review Granted Nov. 14, 1985.

Page 1075

[109 Idaho 120] William Langley, pro se.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

PER CURIAM.

William Langley represented himself on a charge of armed robbery. A jury trial was conducted largely in his absence when Langley refused to participate. He was convicted and he now appeals this conviction, raising the pivotal issue that his decision to waive the assistance of counsel was not made knowingly and intelligently. We find that the record does not indicate Langley's waiver of counsel was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made, and therefore, we reverse and remand. We also briefly address other issues raised by Langley in this appeal.

At Langley's arraignment, the following dialogue took place between the district judge and Langley:

THE COURT: Mr. Langley, apparently you were represented also by the public defender in the lower court; is that correct, sir?

DEFENDANT LANGLEY: I represented myself pro se, Your Honor. I proceeded with the guidance of assistance of the public defender as a legal advisor.

Page 1076

[109 Idaho 121] THE COURT: Well, then, I might ask you: What is your thinking in regard to the attorney in this court?

DEFENDANT LANGLEY: Well, I intend to proceed pro se with the assistance of legal advisors from the public defender's office. Mr. Laird Stone has been assigned to me.

THE COURT: You would like to continue that arrangement?

DEFENDANT LANGLEY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Well, I might advise you that I have been in this business a long time, and I have never yet found a person that has represented themselves very well pro se, and I think it's a very foolish idea to do so.

DEFENDANT LANGLEY: I'm a fool for a client is what you mean.

THE COURT: I think that's about it. Even I have an attorney and am in court over in a civil case in Payette, and I'm not representing myself.

DEFENDANT LANGLEY: I would rather proceed pro se, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well, then, I have advised you accordingly.

DEFENDANT LANGLEY: Excuse me, Your Honor. I would like the assistance of an attorney as a legal advisor.

THE COURT: Well, I'll give you that right, and the public defender is there. I hope you reconsider and change your mind in that regard. And to that extent, I'll reaffirm the public defender to represent you.

DEFENDANT LANGLEY: No. I'll proceed pro se.

THE COURT: Very well....

On the day of the trial, Langley refused to participate in the trial and walked out of the courtroom as jury selection was about to begin. Previously, at several pretrial court hearings Langley appeared pro se but generally had an attorney from the public defender's office present as a legal advisor. On the day of trial, however, the record does not show that his standby counsel was present. Langley made only three brief reappearances at trial, once to make a statement on the record in the presence of the jury; once to move, in the absence of the jury, after the state had rested, for a month's continuance "to prepare a defense;" and finally, again in the absence of the jury, to object generally to the trial and to the absence of his legal advisor. Langley also communicated with the judge on occasions by a telephone hookup to a video room where Langley was taken after he walked out of the trial. Therefore, except for brief appearances by Langley, the trial proceeded without him and without any representative for him being present. Through the video hookup Langley viewed and heard the proceedings.

Generally a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to conduct his own defense, however, such a waiver of counsel must be made "knowingly and intelligently." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); accord, State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 606 P.2d 1000 (1980). Further, the United States Supreme Court has noted that the defendant "should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' " Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87...