State v. Langley
| Decision Date | 05 September 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 15220,15220 |
| Citation | 109 Idaho 119,705 P.2d 1074 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William A. LANGLEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
William Langley, pro se.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.
William Langley represented himself on a charge of armed robbery. A jury trial was conducted largely in his absence when Langley refused to participate. He was convicted and he now appeals this conviction, raising the pivotal issue that his decision to waive the assistance of counsel was not made knowingly and intelligently. We find that the record does not indicate Langley's waiver of counsel was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made, and therefore, we reverse and remand. We also briefly address other issues raised by Langley in this appeal.
At Langley's arraignment, the following dialogue took place between the district judge and Langley:
On the day of the trial, Langley refused to participate in the trial and walked out of the courtroom as jury selection was about to begin. Previously, at several pretrial court hearings Langley appeared pro se but generally had an attorney from the public defender's office present as a legal advisor. On the day of trial, however, the record does not show that his standby counsel was present. Langley made only three brief reappearances at trial, once to make a statement on the record in the presence of the jury; once to move, in the absence of the jury, after the state had rested, for a month's continuance "to prepare a defense;" and finally, again in the absence of the jury, to object generally to the trial and to the absence of his legal advisor. Langley also communicated with the judge on occasions by a telephone hookup to a video room where Langley was taken after he walked out of the trial. Therefore, except for brief appearances by Langley, the trial proceeded without him and without any representative for him being present. Through the video hookup Langley viewed and heard the proceedings.
Generally a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to conduct his own defense, however, such a waiver of counsel must be made "knowingly and intelligently." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); accord, State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 606 P.2d 1000 (1980). Further, the United States Supreme Court has noted that the defendant "should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' " Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942). The standard to be applied in determining whether there has been a valid waiver of the right to counsel is whether there has been a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known right, and such determination rests on the facts of each individual case, including the background, experience and conduct of the defendant. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); accord State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 637 P.2d 415 (1981).
The right to counsel is considered so important that a trial judge's clear and recorded statement of the right followed by the defendant's affirmative waiver will not necessarily compel a finding of intelligent waiver. Bement v. State, 91 Idaho 388 422 P.2d 55 (1966). A penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances involved in a waiver of counsel must be conducted by the trial judge. Bement v. State, supra. See also, Cohen v. State, 97 Nev. 166, 625 P.2d 1170 (1981); State v. Chavis, 31 Wash.App. 784, 644 P.2d 1202 (1982). This examination should make the defendant aware of the problems inherent in self-representation so that a waiver of counsel is knowingly and intelligently made. State v. Clayton, supra. However, the validity of the waiver of the right to counsel is based not on the question of the defendant's legal skill and experience in determining his ability to represent himself, but whether the defendant has made a knowing and voluntary relinquishment of his right to counsel. Faretta v. California, supra. See also, State v. Fayle, 134 Ariz. 565, 658 P.2d 218 (App.1982); People v. Lucero, 200 Colo. 335, 615 P.2d 660 (1980); State v. Jessup, 31 Wash.App. 304, 641 P.2d 1185 (1982).
Our Legislature has enacted additional requirements which must be satisfied before a waiver of counsel is accepted. Idaho Code § 19-857 provides:
A person who has been appropriately informed of his right to counsel may waive in writing, or by other record, any right provided by this act, if the court concerned, at the time of or after waiver, finds of record that he has acted with full awareness of his rights and of the consequences of a waiver and if the waiver is otherwise according to law. The court shall consider such factors as the person's age, education, and familiarity with the English language and the complexity of the crime involved. [Emphasis added.]
In the present case, the record indicates that the district judge did not make a finding at any point in the record that Langley acted with full awareness of his...
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State v. Langley, 16239
...that Langley did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. Thus, the court reversed Langley's conviction. State v. Langley, 109 Idaho 119, 705 P.2d 1074 (Ct.App. 1985). Our review of the record causes us to conclude otherwise. I Langley, who asserted his constitutional rig......
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