State v. Langley, 16239
Decision Date | 02 May 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 16239,16239 |
Citation | 110 Idaho 895,719 P.2d 1155 |
Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William A. LANGLEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.
William Langley was convicted of robbery, pursuant to I.C. § 18-6501, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2520. The district court sentenced Langley to an indeterminate life sentence on the robbery count and a consecutive 15-year indeterminate term pursuant to I.C. § 19-2520, for the use of a firearm in the commission of the robbery. Langley now argues that his conviction should be overturned. We disagree and uphold the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed.
On September 6, 1980, a Molenaar's Jewelry Store in Boise was robbed. After an informant tied Langley to the crime, two Molenaar's employees picked Langley out of a photographic lineup, identifying him as the man who had held them at gunpoint, forced them to lie on the floor, handcuffed them, and threatened to "blow off" their heads. Langley, no stranger to the criminal justice system, was subsequently extradited from Utah where he was being held on an unrelated charge.
Langley insisted on representing himself, agreeing to use a public defender only as a legal advisor. Acting pro se, with the public defender's office as legal advisor, Langley filed a number of pretrial motions. In fact, the record reflects that Langley filed over twenty pretrial motions. Most of these motions sought dismissal of the charges against Langley due to alleged defects in the extradition proceedings, disqualification of the district court judge, 1 or suppression of the prosecution witnesses' testimony. The record also reflects that between the arraignment on February 18, 1983, and July 18, 1983, when Langley ultimately stood trial, Langley appeared at least nine times in the district court to argue these various motions. A legal advisor from the public defender's office was present at each of these court appearances.
Trial was originally set for May 31, 1983. The minute entry from that date indicates that Langley refused to go to trial at that time, requesting a continuance. He argued that he needed the continuance in order to obtain alibi witnesses. Following argument by both Langley and a representative from the public defender's office, the trial was continued until July 18, 1983.
The case went to trial on July 18, 1983. At trial, Langley, still insisting upon representing himself, nevertheless refused to remain in the courtroom and participate in the trial. 2 As a result, Langley was taken Langley then appealed, asserting several errors at trial. The Court of Appeals found no merit in most of Langley's arguments, but held that Langley did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. Thus, the court reversed Langley's conviction. State v. Langley, 109 Idaho 119, 705 P.2d 1074 (Ct.App. 1985). Our review of the record causes us to conclude otherwise.
[110 Idaho 897] from the courtroom into a nearby room where he was able to view and participate in the trial through the use of audio-visual equipment. See I.C.R. 43.1. 3 The record reflects that no legal advisor from the public defender's office was present at this trial. 4 A jury was picked, and the prosecution presented its case. Langley completely refused to present a defense, but instead made a motion for a continuance, which was denied. Ultimately, the jury returned a guilty verdict, and the trial court entered judgment and sentence
Langley, who asserted his constitutional right to represent himself at trial, now argues that his conviction should be overturned since he was not adequately informed of the dangers of self representation. We disagree and uphold the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed.
It is basic to appellate practice that error in the trial court will not be presumed, but must be affirmatively shown by the appellant. State v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691, 695, 662 P.2d 1135, 1139 (1983); Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 233, 236, 392 P.2d 423, 424 (1964). See also Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 602, 604, 701 P.2d 222, 224 (1985); Gaither v. E.G. & G. Idaho, Inc., 106 Idaho 675, 676, 682 P.2d 628, 629 (1984). Langley, the appellant, has not affirmatively shown error here.
The record reflects that Langley repeatedly insisted on representing himself, agreeing to use a public defender only as a legal advisor. This relationship between Langley and the public defender, Laird Stone, was clarified during Langley's preliminary hearing in magistrate court:
In accord with his wishes, Langley represented himself at the preliminary hearing, questioning all the prosecution's witnesses and calling and questioning his own witnesses. The record reflects that the public defender participated in the hearing only in an advisory capacity.
Later, during Langley's arraignment in district court, Langley rejected the court's attempts to persuade him to have counsel appointed. The following exchange took place:
The record also reflects that Langley's decision to represent himself was discussed several times during Langley's many court appearances. The minute entry from a May 12, 1983, motion hearing reflects that at this time the district court again advised Langley to allow his legal advisor to represent him. At that time Langley again articulated his desire to continue to represent himself pro se. A later minute entry, from the May 31, 1983, hearing at which the continuance was granted, reads,
The record also reflects that a pretrial motion hearing was held on July 7, 1983. The minutes of this hearing reflect that Langley called Laird Stone, the public defender serving as his legal advisor, as a witness. It is unclear what the substance of Stone's testimony was or why he was called to testify. However, the minutes of this hearing do contain the following entry: "The Court affirmed the trial date of July 18, 1983 at 9:00 A.M. Response by the Defendant regarding the refusal to attend In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that an individual has a right to pro se representation. This right, conditioned upon a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, arises out of the United States Constitution. Specifically, the Court stated:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Lovelace
...made, with an understanding of the charges, and possible penalties and dangers of self-representation. See also State v. Langley, 110 Idaho 895, 719 P.2d 1155 (1986), citing Faretta v. California, At a July 28, 1997 hearing, which was noticed for a change of plea, Lovelace informed the dist......
-
State v. Hall
...be affirmatively shown by an appellant." State v. Lovelace , 140 Idaho 53, 65, 90 P.3d 278, 290 (2003) (citing State v. Langley , 110 Idaho 895, 897, 719 P.2d 1155, 1157 (1986) ). Here, Hall has failed to demonstrate specific prejudice he suffered because some proceedings were conducted off......
-
State v. Kirkwood
...economy, to delegate criminal cases to the Court of Appeals and then routinely overturn their decisions. See, e.g., State v. Langley, 110 Idaho 895, 719 P.2d 1155 (1986); State v. Lewis, 107 Idaho 616, 691 P.2d 1231 (1984); State v. Wilson, 107 Idaho 506, 690 P.2d 1338 (1984). This is parti......
-
State v. Reber
...Amendment. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817-36, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2532-41, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 571-82 (1975); State v. Langley, 110 Idaho 895, 899, 719 P.2d 1155, 1159 (1986). The right to self-representation, however, is not absolute. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 15......