State v. Langley

• Decision Date: 22 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. DA 15–0538.,DA 15–0538.
• Citation: State v. Langley, 2016 MT 67, 383 Mont. 39, 369 P.3d 1005 (Mont. 2016)
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. James Wallace LANGLEY, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

383 Mont. 39

369 P.3d 1005

2016 MT 67

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.James Wallace LANGLEY, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 15–0538.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Feb. 24, 2016.

Decided March 22, 2016.

For Appellant: Colin M. Stephens, Nicholas K. Brooke, Smith & Stephens, P.C., Missoula, Montana.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, C. Mark Fowler, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Edward J. Corrigan, Flathead County Attorney, Allison Howard, Deputy County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana.

Justice BETH BAKERdelivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1James Wallace Langley appeals a judgment of the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, sentencing him to the Department of Corrections(DOC) for ten years, with five years suspended.We address the following issue on appeal:

Whether the District Court erred when it denied Langley's motion to withdraw his no contest plea.

¶ 2We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On February 6, 2014, the State charged Langley with one count of Arson, a felony, in violation of § 45–6–103(1)(a), MCA.Langley entered into a plea agreement with the State on January 22, 2015.The written plea agreement provides in part:

Pursuant to § 46–12–211(1)(b), MCA, and conditioned upon the understandings specified below:

The Defendant will enter into a Nolo Contendere plea to Count I, Arson, pursuant to § 46–12–212(2).

The State will recommend to the Court that SENTENCING BE DEFERRED FOR6 YEARS UNDER THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITIONS:

...

The State agrees that the Defendant shall be entitled to:

A.Enter a Nolo Contendere plea.

B.Withdraw his plea subsequent to the entry of it in the event the State fails to perform its obligations pursuant to this agreement; or

C.If the Court refuses to accept the Defendant's Nolo Contendere plea.

The agreement's Acknowledgment of Rights section provides that "in exchange for a particular plea, the prosecutor will recommend a particular sentence" and that "the recommendation of the county attorney in no way binds the court when imposing sentence."

¶ 4 At the January 22, 2015 change of plea hearing, the District Court conducted a colloquy to establish that Langley was entering into a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea.During questioning, Langley acknowledged his understanding that the court was not bound by the sentencing recommendation in the plea agreement and that the court could impose "something different than what the plea agreement calls for."The court then set a sentencing hearing date for March 12, 2015.

¶ 5 During the March sentencing hearing, the District Court informed the parties that it was not inclined to impose a deferred sentence and asked how counsel would prefer to proceed.Langley's attorney moved to withdraw the plea.The court replied, "I would normally grant that motion if it was a binding plea agreement but it's not, so I think that would have to be filed and formally briefed."The court stated that it would give Langley more time to present evidence as to why he should be given a deferred sentence, and postponed sentencing.

¶ 6 Before the next hearing, Langley filed a motion to withdraw his no contest plea and requested a hearing.Langley's motion asserted, in part, that the District Court did not comply with the statutory procedures for rejecting plea agreements and that the court must allow him to withdraw his plea pursuant to § 46–12–211(1)(b) and (4), MCA.The State opposed Langley's motion, arguing that the plea agreement did not allow Langley to withdraw his plea, and that any ambiguity should be resolved against Langley because his attorney drafted it.

¶ 7The court held a hearing on May 27, 2015, to discuss Langley's motion to withdraw his no contest plea; however, Langley's attorney informed the court that he was not prepared to proceed with the hearing because he"just got back into town last night, and [he] missed [the hearing] on the calendar."The court allowed Langley's attorney to file a reply brief despite missing the filing deadline.The court informed the parties that it had not yet decided whether to accept or reject the plea agreement.The court also determined that the motion to withdraw the no contest plea would be decided without a hearing and Langley's attorney agreed to waive that hearing.Langley filed his reply brief two days later.

¶ 8 On June 3, 2015, the court denied Langley's motion to withdraw his plea.The court based its order primarily on the conclusion that Langley entered the plea "voluntarily" and "knowingly."The court concluded that it "fully complied with the statutory pleas [sic] agreement procedure set forth in Section 46–12–211, MCA," because the court"discussed the fact that it was not bound by the plea agreement" and "specifically inquired whether, despite the fact that [Langley] could receive a different sentence, [Langley] was willing to enter a plea."

¶ 9The District Court held a sentencing hearing on June 11, 2015.After presenting witness testimony, Langley and the State—which had admitted to being bound by the agreement—both asked the court to follow the plea agreement.The court then explained why it would not follow the plea agreement based on the facts of the case, and pronounced that it would sentence Langley to the DOC for ten years with five years suspended.

¶ 10 On July 20, 2015, Langley filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court.In his petition, Langley asserted that his sentence was illegal because the plea agreement was of the type contemplated in § 46–12–211(1)(b), MCA, and therefore the District Court should have allowed him to withdraw his plea pursuant to § 46–12–211(4), MCA.We denied Langley's petition, concluding that habeas relief was not available and that Langley's remedy was a direct appeal.Langley v. Batista,––– Mont. ––––, 357 P.3d 337(2015).

¶ 11 Thereafter, on August 5, 2015, the District Court entered final judgment, sentencing Langley to the DOC for ten years with five years suspended and recommending that Langley be placed in an appropriate treatment facility.Represented by a different attorney, Langley appeals.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 12 The appeal of an order denying a motion to withdraw a plea presents a question of law that we review de novo.State v. Zunick,2014 MT 239, ¶ 10, 376 Mont. 293, 339 P.3d 1228.A plea agreement is a contract and is subject to contract law standards.State v. Shepard,2010 MT 20, ¶ 8, 355 Mont. 114, 225 P.3d 1217.The construction and interpretation of a contract are questions of law that we review for correctness.Ophus v. Fritz,2000 MT 251, ¶ 19, 301 Mont. 447, 11 P.3d 1192.

DISCUSSION

¶ 13Whether the District Court erred when it denied Langley's motion to withdraw his no contest plea.

¶ 14Section 46–12–211, MCA, provides in pertinent part:

(1)The prosecutor and the attorney for the defendant, or the defendant when acting pro se, may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense, the prosecutor will do any of the following:

(a) move for dismissal of other charges;

(b) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case; or

(c) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendants' request, for a particular sentence, with the understanding that the recommendation or request may not be binding upon the court.

(2) ...[I]f a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record, require a disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing of good cause in camera, at the time that the plea is offered.If the agreement is of the type specified in subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b), the court may accept or reject the agreement or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report.If the agreement is of the type specified in subsection (1)(c), the court shall advise the defendant that, if the court does not accept the recommendation or request, the defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw the plea.

...

(4) If the court rejects a plea agreement of the type specified in subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b), the court shall, on the record, inform the parties of this fact and advise the defendant that the court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea, and advise the defendant that if the defendant persists in the guilty or nolo contendere plea, the disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement.

Section 46–12–211(1), (2), (4), MCA.

¶ 15The State argues that the plea agreement is facially ambiguous because its language "is not reasonably susceptible to just one interpretation regarding the statutory type of plea agreement the parties formed."The State contends that the language stating that "the prosecutor will recommend a particular sentence" and that "the court[is not] bound by the agreement" tracks some of the critical statutory language in § 46–12–211(1)(c), MCA.Such language, according to the State, contradicts the agreement's express reference to § 46–12–211(1)(b), MCA.The State claims that the plea agreement is ambiguous because the two types of plea agreements implicated in the agreement are irreconcilable—each agreement entails different specific procedures owed to the defendant if a court chooses not to follow the recommendation.The State therefore argues that the rule of contract construction set forth in § 28–3–206, MCA, requires this Court to construe the agreement against Langley because his attorney drafted it.The State further argues that Langley's acknowledgments during the plea colloquy support interpreting the plea agreement under § 46–12–211(1)(c), MCA.

¶ 16 Langley asserts that he and the State entered...