State v. Lantis, 082319 IDSCCR, 46171
|Opinion Judge:||BEVAN, JUSTICE|
|Party Name:||STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AARON EUGENE LANTIS, Defendant-Respondent.|
|Attorney:||Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for Appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued. Ada Country Public Defender, Boise, attorney for Respondent. Anita M. Moore argued.|
|Judge Panel:||Justices STEGNER and MOELLER, CONCUR BRODY, Justice, specially concurring: Chief Justice BURDICK|
|Case Date:||August 23, 2019|
|Court:||Supreme Court of Idaho|
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Ada County. Gerald F. Schroeder, District Judge.
The ruling of the district court is affirmed.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for Appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Ada Country Public Defender, Boise, attorney for Respondent. Anita M. Moore argued.
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal concerns the application of Idaho's Disturbing the Peace Statute, Idaho Code section 18-6409, to the unique facts presented in this case. Aaron Lantis was convicted of misdemeanor disturbing the peace by sending sexually suggestive photographs of his ex-girlfriend to her employer in an effort to get her fired. During trial, Lantis moved for a judgment of acquittal asserting that the statute did not apply to his actions. The magistrate court denied Lantis' motion. Lantis was found guilty by a jury and he made the same motion post-verdict, which was likewise denied. He appealed to the district court, asserting the same grounds. The district court agreed with Lantis and vacated Lantis' conviction, holding that Lantis' conduct was outside the scope of the statute. The State appealed and we affirm the district court.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Aaron Lantis was charged with the misdemeanor offense of disturbing the peace in violation of Idaho Code section 18-6409. The State alleged he committed the crime by sending sexually suggestive photographs of H.H. (Lantis' ex-girlfriend) to her employer in an unsuccessful attempt to have her fired. During trial, H.H. testified that Lantis' conduct left her feeling humiliated, fearful for her job, and worried what recipients of the email in question thought of her. After the State rested, Lantis made a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to I.C.R. 29(c) and a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.C.R. 48. Both motions were denied. Lantis was found guilty by the jury.
Following the verdict, Lantis made a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, asserting that the State's evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction since it failed to prove an actus reus falling within Idaho Code section 18-6409. This motion was again denied by the magistrate judge. Lantis then appealed to the district court, which reversed the jury's verdict and vacated the judgment of conviction. The district court held that the State failed to present evidence supporting a conviction for disturbing the peace because, while the conduct was "clearly offensive," it was "outside the statutory definition of disturbing the peace." Lantis also raised a constitutional challenge, alleging that the statute was void for vagueness as to his conduct. The district court did not reach that issue since it decided the case on statutory construction grounds. The State then appealed.
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did Lantis' act of sending compromising pictures of H.H. to H.H.'s employer fall within the purview of Idaho Code section 18-6409?
2. If Lantis' conduct does constitute disturbing the peace as defined in section 18-6409, is the statute void for vagueness and overbreadth?
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On review of a decision rendered by a district court while acting in its intermediate appellate capacity, this Court directly reviews the district court's decision. In re Estate of Peterson, 157 Idaho 827, 830, 340 P.3d 1143, 1146 (2014). This Court exercises free review over statutory interpretation because it is a question of law. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361, 313 P.3d 1, 17 (2013).
A. Statutory Analysis.
The objective of statutory construction is to derive the intent of the legislature from the words used and the context of the statute at issue. State v. Smalley, 164 Idaho 780,, 435 P.3d 1100, 1104 (2019). Deriving such intent must begin with the literal language of the statute. Id. "If the statute is ambiguous, then it must be construed to mean what the legislature intended for it to mean." In re Adoption of Doe, 156 Idaho 345, 349, 326 P.3d 347, 351 (2014) (citation omitted). In such circumstances, legislative intent is determined by examining "the literal words of the statute . . . the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history." City of Idaho Falls v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 163 Idaho 579, 583, 416 P.3d 951, 955 (2018).
Statutory "[p]rovisions should not be read in isolation, but rather within the context of the entire document." Smalley, 164 Idaho at___, 435 P.3d at 1104. This Court must give effect to all the words in the statute so that none will be void or superfluous. Id. If the language of a statute is unambiguous, the intent of the legislative body as reflected by the statute's plain language must be given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory construction. Id.
In applying these criteria, we must also remember that "statutes which are in pari materia are to be taken together and construed as one system, and the object is to carry into effect the...
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