State v. Laplante

• Citation: 148 S.W.3d 347
• Decision Date: 16 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 26043.,26043.
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Andrew T. LAPLANTE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

148 S.W.3d 347

STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Andrew T. LAPLANTE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 26043.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division One.

November 16, 2004.

Ronald F. Borgmann, Berg, Borgmann, Wilson & Wolk, LLC, Clayton, for appellant.

No respondent's brief filed.

NANCY STEFFEN RAHMEYER, Judge.

Andrew Laplante ("Appellant") appeals his conviction for Driving While Intoxicated on the grounds that the trial court erroneously construed the meaning of "motor vehicle" in the Driving While Intoxicated Statute to include motorized bicycles. We affirm.

On May 3, 2002, at approximately 2:11 a.m., Officer Brian Phillips of the Springfield Police Department observed two mini-bikes, operating without lights, traveling northbound on John Q. Hammons Parkway. One of the mini-bikes was a Honda mini-bike, and the other was what appeared to be a homemade model. When Phillips observed that the operators of the mini-bikes failed to stop at the stop sign at the four-way intersection with Elm Street, he stopped the drivers for committing the traffic violation. Appellant was driving one mini-bike, and his friend, Donnie Bunker, was driving the second one.

As Officer Phillips engaged in conversation with Appellant, he noticed that Appellant's eyes were bloodshot. Phillips asked Appellant if he had been consuming intoxicants and Appellant replied that he had. Meanwhile, Officer Sean Patton of the Springfield Police Department had arrived on the scene, and Phillips turned Appellant over to Patton to investigate whether he was impaired while driving his vehicle. Officer Patton administered several field sobriety tests on Appellant and concluded that Appellant was under the influence of intoxicants and that he could not safely operate a motor vehicle. Patton then arrested Appellant and transported him to the Greene County Jail. At the jail, Patton administered a breathalyzer test on Appellant, and the test results showed that Appellant had blood alcohol content of .102.

The state subsequently charged Appellant with the crimes of Driving While Intoxicated and Disobeying a Stop Sign. At the close of the state's case, Appellant moved for acquittal because the state had not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that he was driving a motor vehicle, as required by Missouri's Driving While Intoxicated Statute. Rather, Appellant argued, he was driving a motorized bicycle, a vehicle that is excluded from the definition of motor vehicle in section 302.010(9).¹ The court took the motion under advisement. Bunker, Appellant's driving companion, who is also a professional motocross racer, then testified on behalf of Appellant and explained that Appellant's mini-bike had an engine size of 49 cubic centimeters and a top speed of around 22-25 miles per hour. On January 27, 2003 the court overruled Appellant's motion for acquittal and found Appellant guilty on both counts.

Statutory construction is a question of law, not fact, and the lower court's ruling on a question of law is not a matter of judicial discretion. State v. Ruch, 926 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Mo.App. W.D.1996). Thus, appellate courts conduct an independent review of the lower court's statutory interpretation and afford no deference to its ruling. Harrison v. King, 7 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Mo.App. E.D.1999). Absent an erroneous declaration or application of the law, however, we will sustain the judgment of the trial court. Id.; Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).

The Driving While Intoxicated Statute, section 577.010, applies to any person who "operates a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged condition." Because chapter 577 does not explicitly define "motor vehicle," we must interpret the legislative intent of the statute to determine whether the mini-bike in this case should properly be considered a motor vehicle. We note that Respondent, by failing to file a brief, declined to aid in our construction of the statute. Although no penalty exists for such an omission, the failure requires this Court to adjudicate Appellant's claim of error without the benefit of Respondent's potential arguments. Jordan v. City of Centerville, 119 S.W.3d 214, 216 (Mo.App. S.D.2003). This imposition is particularly pronounced here because this appeal appears to center on a question of first impression.

The goal of statutory construction is "to ascertain the legislative intent from the language of the act, considering the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning, and to give effect to that intent whenever possible." Connor v. Monkem Co. Inc., 898 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Mo. banc.1995). If the statute is ambiguous, a court must construe the statute in a manner that is consistent with the legislative intent, "giving meaning to the words used within the broad context of the legislature's purpose in enacting the law." Id.

The DWI statute is a criminal statute, and the rule of strict construction requires courts to construe criminal statutes strictly against the state. State v. Hobokin, 768 S.W.2d 76, 77 (Mo. banc 1989). Strict construction does not require courts to ignore legislative intent, however, and our construction must also embrace common sense and evident statutory purpose. Id.; State v. Ballard, 294 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Mo.App.1956).

Appellant argues that the legislature did not intend for section 577.010 to apply to mini-bike operators. Absent a statutory definition of motor vehicle in chapter 577, Appellant contends, we should look to other statutes regulating vehicle operators, such as those contained in chapter 302, Drivers' and Commercial Drivers' Licenses, to find the legislative intent regarding the meaning of motor vehicle as used in the DWI statute. Section 302.010(9) defines motor vehicle as "any self-propelled vehicle not operated exclusively upon tracks except motorized bicycles, as defined in section 307.180, RSMo."² Section 307.180(2) subsequently defines "motorized bicycle" as a vehicle that is similar to Appellant's mini-bike:

The term "motorized bicycle" shall mean any two- or three-wheeled device having an automatic transmission and a motor with a cylinder capacity of not more than fifty cubic centimeters, which produces less than three gross brake horsepower, and is capable of propelling the device at a maximum speed of not more than thirty miles per hour on level ground. A motorized bicycle shall be considered a motor vehicle for purposes of any homeowners' or renters' insurance policy.

The evidence at trial clearly shows that Appellant's mini-bike was a motorized bicycle, Appellant asserts, and because motorized bicycles are specifically excluded from chapter 302's definition of motor vehicle, the legislature did not intend for section 577.010 to apply to the operation of motorized bicycles.

Although we agree with Appellant that the mini-bike in this case is appropriately classified as a motorized bicycle, we disagree with Appellant's conclusion...