State v. Larrabee

Decision Date20 May 1960
Citation161 A.2d 855,156 Me. 115
PartiesSTATE of Maine v. Edward LARRABEE.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Arthur Chapman, Jr., County Atty., Clement Richardson, Asst. County Atty., Portland, for the State.

Casper Tevanian, Portland, Richard H. Broderick, Lincoln, for Edward Larrabee.

Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, TAPLEY, SULLIVAN, DUBORD and SIDDALL, JJ.

DUBORD, Justice.

This case comes before us on report. By complaint dated March 23, 1957, Edward Larrabee was charged with operating a motor vehicle on a way in Falmouth in the County of Cumberland, on March 15, 1957, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of Section 150, Chapter 22, R.S.1954, as amended.

On the same day upon which the complaint was issued, the respondent was arraigned in Westbrook Municipal Court. Upon waiver of a hearing, a finding of guilty was entered, from which finding the respondent appealed to the next term of the Superior Court.

The case is submitted to this court upon an agreed statement of fact, in which it is admitted that the respondent operated a motor vehicle on a public way on the date alleged. It is further stipulated that shortly after his arrest, a sample of the respondent's blood was withdrawn from his arm with his consent; that as a result of a chemical test which is not questioned, it was found that there was 26/100% by weight of alcohol in his blood.

According to the agreed statement of facts, the State relies solely upon the weight to be given to the evidence of the result of the blood analysis to establish that the respondent was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

The State contends that by force of the provisions of the statute making a finding of 15/100%, or more, by weight of alcohol in a person's blood prima facie evidence such person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, that the respondent, not having rebutted the evidence of his blood alcoholic content, is to be found guilty.

The respondent takes the position that evidence of the blood analysis cannot be given prima facie weight.

The case is submitted to us upon the stipulation that if this court should find that the result of the blood analysis is to be given prima facie weight to the effect that the respondent was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, then judgment is to be entered for the State; and if this court finds that prima facie weight should not be given to the result of the blood analysis, then judgment should be entered for the respondent and the complaint quashed.

The agreed statement of facts concludes: 'The sole issue involved is whether or not prima facie weight is to be given to the evidence of blood analysis when the blood was drawn from the respondent's arm and not through a 'chemical analysis of his breath."

The statute involved is Section 150, Chapter 22, R.S.1954, as amended. The evolution of this section has been piecemeal.

By Chapter 94, P.L.1955 the following sentence appearing in the 1954 revision: 'Blood tests the expense for which has been paid for by, or charged to, the county or state may be admissible in evidence,' was repealed.

Section 150 was amended by Chapter 322, P.L.1955, whereby there was added after the second sentence the following:

'The court may admit evidence of the percentage by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood at the time alleged, as shown by a chemical analysis of his breath.'

To the sentence provided by Chapter 322, P.L.1955, were added the words 'blood or urine' by Section 10, Chapter 308, P.L. 1957.

At the time of the alleged offense, by the respondent, the pertinent portion of the statute read as follows:

'The court may admit evidence of the percentage by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood at the time alleged, as shown by a chemical analysis of his breath. Evidence that there was, at that time, 7/100%, or less, by weight of alcohol in his blood, is prima facie evidence that the defendant was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor within the meaning of this section. Evidence that there was, at that time, from 7/100% to 15/100% by weight of alcohol in his blood is relevant evidence but it is not to be given prima facie effect in indicating whether or not the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor within the meaning of this section. Evidence that there was, at the time, 15/100%, or more, by weight of alcohol in his blood, is prima facie evidence that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor within the meaning of this section. All such tests made to determine the weight of alcohol in the blood shall be paid for by the county wherein the violation of the provisions of this section was alleged to have occurred. The failure of a person accused of this offense to have tests made to determine the weight of alcohol in his blood shall not be admissible in evidence against him.'

It is contended by the respondent that because the sentence added by Chapter 322, P.L.1955 is limited to the admission of evidence of percentage by weight of alcohol as shown by a chemical analysis of the breath, the prima facie evidence provisions of the sentences next following do not apply to evidence of alcoholic content of the blood obtained, as was done in this case, by drawing blood from the respondent's arm.

To resolve the issue, it is necessary to construe the statute and the various amendments in the light of legislative intent.

However, before passing upon the question of legislative intent, we give consideration to the law relating to the admissibility of evidence of analytical tests for alcohol in a person's system.

In the first place, it is to be noted that there is no constitutional objection to a statute making one fact presumptive or prima facie evidence of another. Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Edition, Vol. I, § 91, Page 176.

'Although there is as yet a very limited amount of authority upon the question, so that a positive general rule cannot now be formulated, it may be said that the following decisions clearly indicate that where the prosecution seeks to establish the intoxication of an accused in a criminal case, evidence as to the taking of a specimen of a bodily fluid of the accused, of the alcoholic content of such specimen as determined by analysis, and expert opinion evidence as to intoxication based upon the presence of such alcohol in the accused's system, is admissible against the accused, if he voluntarily furnished the specimen of his blood, or urine or other bodily fluid, or submitted without objection to the taking of such specimen; provided, of course, that the identity of the specimen analyzed and the accuracy of the analysis are properly established.' 127 A.L.R. 1514.

'From the cases generally, it is apparent that, subject to compliance with conditions as to relevancy in point of time, tracing and identification of the specimen, accuracy of the analysis, and qualification of the witness as an expert in the field, there is rather general agreement that where the prosecution in a criminal case seeks to establish the intoxication of the accused, evidence as to the obtaining of a specimen of his body fluid at or...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • State v. Rand
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • June 8, 1981
    ...result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction and illogicality. State v. Larrabee, 156 Me. 115, 121, 161 A.2d 855, 857 (1960). Even though the judgment is vacated for error in jury instructions, certain claimed errors in rulings at pre-trial p......
  • State v. Hansen, 55248
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • December 20, 1972
    ...the defendant was then under the influence of intoxicating liquor. State v. Corsiglia, Mo.App., 435 S.W.2d 430 (1968); State v. Larrabee, 156 Me. 115, 161 A.2d 855 (1960). Our statute (section 321.281) makes the existence of more than ten hundredths of one percentum by weight of alcohol in ......
  • Ross v. Hanson
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • March 29, 1967
    ...does not always tell the story.' Steele v. Smalley, 141 Me. 355, 357, 44 A.2d 213, 214. Other illustrative cases are State v. Larrabee, 156 Me. 115, 161 A.2d 855; Camp Walden v. Johnson, 156 Me. 160, 163 A.2d 356; Collins v. State, 161 Me. 445, 213 A.2d We cannot say that the intent was to ......
  • State v. Fenderson
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • August 18, 1982
    ...prima facie status by an evidentiary statute is entitled to the weight necessary to support a verdict of guilty. State v. Larrabee, 156 Me. 115, 123, 161 A.2d 855, 860 (1960). Prima facie evidence does not require that the jury draw any inference from the fact presented, but only that it be......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT