State v. LARRY DEAN McCLUNEY, 3742.
Decision Date | 02 February 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 3742.,3742. |
Citation | 593 S.E.2d 509,357 S.C. 560 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. LARRY DEAN McCLUNEY, Appellant. |
Jack B. Swerling, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson and Assistant Attorney General David Spencer, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Harold W. Gowdy, III, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.
Larry Dean McCluney was convicted of trafficking in "more than 400 grams of cocaine." The trial judge sentenced McCluney to twenty-five years imprisonment and a $200,000 fine. McCluney appeals. We reverse.
In February of 1999, Glenn Hadden, a drug dealer, had a conversation with Scott Simmons "about transferring a large quantity of cocaine" to Simmons. Shannon Randolph, Hadden's friend to whom he sold drugs, introduced Hadden to Simmons. Hadden advised Simmons that he could sell him two or three kilograms of cocaine. The two men reached an agreement whereby Hadden would sell "two kilos of cocaine" to Simmons for $40,000.
Hadden contacted Lieutenant David Oglesby, with the Cherokee County Sheriff's Department, and informed him of the drug deal with Simmons. Hadden agreed to work as a confidential informant in this drug transaction. The police then tape recorded Hadden's next phone call to Simmons. During the phone conversation, Simmons stated that someone from Shelby, North Carolina would be arriving in a black Lexus with the money for the transaction. At trial, Simmons testified the person he was referring to was McCluney.
Hadden arranged to meet with Simmons at a secluded location. Hadden was accompanied by an undercover police officer carrying two blocks of imitation cocaine. Immediately prior to the transaction, Simmons met McCluney and another individual at Brown's Store, a local gas station. McCluney, a native of Shelby, North Carolina, was driving a black Lexus. Police arrested McCluney at Brown's Store after Simmons and Hadden completed the drug transaction.
At trial, defense counsel cross-examined Hadden about the circumstances of the drug transaction. Specifically, counsel asked Hadden whether Shannon Randolph "said that Simmons was looking for two kilos of cocaine." Hadden responded: "Something to that effect." At that point, the following exchange occurred:
At the close of the State's case, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict arguing that, as the substance in this case was imitation cocaine, the State failed to prove the criminal offense of trafficking cocaine. Defense counsel contended that our Supreme Court, in Murdock v. State, 311 S.C. 16, 426 S.E.2d 740 (1992), held "it is not illegal ... to possess imitation drugs with intent to distribute." The trial judge denied the motion for a directed verdict, finding that (1) Murdock was based on a narrow set of facts and (2) the trafficking statute was very broadly written.
ISSUES
McCluney contends the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because, as the substance involved was imitation cocaine, the State was unable to present evidence of trafficking in cocaine. We agree.
On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict in a criminal case, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Walker, 349 S.C. 49, 562 S.E.2d 313 (2002); State v. Al-Amin, 353 S.C. 405, 578 S.E.2d 32 (Ct.App.2003); State v. Morgan, 352 S.C. 359, 574 S.E.2d 203 (Ct.App.2002). When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight. State v. Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 564 S.E.2d 87 (2002); State v. Wilds, 355 S.C. 269, 584 S.E.2d 138 (Ct.App.2003); State v. McLauren, 349 S.C. 488, 563 S.E.2d 346 (Ct.App.2002). If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, this Court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury. State v. Harris, 351 S.C. 643, 572 S.E.2d 267 (2002); State v. Condrey, 349 S.C. 184, 562 S.E.2d 320 (Ct.App.2002). On the other hand, a defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the State fails to produce evidence of the offense charged. State v. McKnight, 352 S.C. 635, 576 S.E.2d 168 (2003); State v. McHoney, 344 S.C. 85, 544 S.E.2d 30 (2001); State v. Padgett, 354 S.C. 268, 580 S.E.2d 159 (Ct.App.2003).
An "imitation controlled substance" is defined as a "noncontrolled substance which is represented to be a controlled substance and is packaged in a manner normally used for the distribution or delivery of an illegal controlled substance." S.C.Code Ann. § 44-53-110 (2002). In contrast, a "counterfeit substance" is defined as:
Lieutenant Oglesby testified the substance used in the drug transaction was imitation cocaine. Specifically, Oglesby stated the substance was "fake cocaine." That is, the substance was primarily "ground up" salt and flour mixed with other substances such as caffeine, lidocaine, and benzocaine. However, McCluney was indicted under the trafficking statute, S.C.Code Ann. § 44-53-370 (2002 & Supp.2003), which refers to only the trafficking of controlled or counterfeit substances. Imitation controlled substances, such as the imitation cocaine used in the present case, are not mentioned in § 44-53-370. In fact, the only indictable offense applicable to imitation cocaine would be under S.C.Code Ann. § 44-53-390(a)(6) (2002), the statute prohibiting the delivery or distribution of imitation controlled substances. Section 44-53-390(a)(6)(A) provides: "It is unlawful for a person knowingly or intentionally to ... distribute or deliver ... an imitation controlled substance with the expressed or implied representation that the substance is a narcotic ... controlled substance...." Section 44-53-390(a)(6) differs from the general trafficking statute in that the offense of distribution or delivery of imitation controlled substances is not keyed to weight, whereas the trafficking statute is dependent upon it. Unlike the mandatory sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment for trafficking in controlled or counterfeit substances, the maximum sentence for delivery or distribution of imitation controlled substances is five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. S.C.Code Ann. § 44-53-390(b) (2002).
The Supreme Court explained the difference between imitation and...
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