State v. Lasalle, 2001-1403.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
• Citation: 96 Ohio St.3d 178,2002 Ohio 4009,772 N.E.2d 1172
• Docket Number: No. 2001-1403.,2001-1403.
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. LaSALLE, Appellee.
• Decision Date: 21 August 2002

772 N.E.2d 1172 96 Ohio St.3d 178 2002 Ohio 4009 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant,
v.
LaSALLE, Appellee. No. 2001-1403. Supreme Court of Ohio. Submitted May 22, 2002. Decided August 21, 2002.

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Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard S. Kasay, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

Lawrence J. Whitney, Akron, for appellee.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, David M. Gormley, State Solicitor, and Kirk A. Lindsey, Associate Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Attorney General of Ohio.

DOUGLAS, J.

{¶ 1} On March 5, 1998, appellee, Robert A. LaSalle, was indicted by a Summit County Grand Jury on two counts. Count One of the indictment charged LaSalle with the offense of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). Count Two charged LaSalle with the offense of domestic violence pursuant to R.C. 2919.25(A).

{¶ 2} On April 8, 1998, in a proceeding before the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County, LaSalle pled guilty to the charge of domestic violence, a misdemeanor of the first degree. Presumably in exchange for the guilty plea, the trial court dismissed the charge of felonious assault. On May 15, 1998, the trial court sentenced LaSalle to a jail term of six months. LaSalle's sentence was suspended by the court, and he was placed on nonreporting probation for a period of six months.

{¶ 3} On November 22, 1999, pursuant to R.C. 2953.32(A)(1),¹ LaSalle filed an application with the trial court seeking an order to seal the record of his domestic violence conviction.² On April 21, 2000, the trial court granted LaSalle's application and ordered that the official record pertaining to his conviction be sealed.

{¶ 4} On December 13, 2000, nearly eight months after the trial court sealed the record of LaSalle's conviction, appellant, the state of Ohio, filed a motion to vacate the order sealing the record. The state based its motion on an amendment to R.C. 2953.36 — specifically, newly enacted subsection (C), which prohibits the sealing of records of first-degree misdemeanor convictions involving offenses of violence, including domestic violence. R.C. 2953.36(C) went into effect on March 23, 2000, approximately four months after LaSalle filed his application to seal and one month prior to the trial court's initial decision

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to seal the record of LaSalle's conviction. 1999 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 13. Applying R.C. 2953.36(C), on February 15, 2001, the trial court granted the state's motion and vacated its original order sealing the records pertaining to LaSalle's conviction.

{¶ 5} LaSalle appealed the trial court's order to the Summit County Court of Appeals. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, finding that the trial court had erred in applying R.C. 2953.36(C). Thereafter, on July 30, 2001, the court of appeals certified that its decision was in conflict with the decision of the Clermont County Court of Appeals in State v. Heaton (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 38, 669 N.E.2d 885. This cause is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists.

{¶ 6} The question certified for review by the court of appeals is "Where an application to seal a criminal conviction is filed before the effective date of an amendment to R.C. 2953.36, which amendment prohibits the sealing of the record of the type of conviction referenced in the application, and the trial court rules on the application after the effective date of the amendment, is the amendment to be applied retroactively to the application made prior to the effective date of the amendment?"

{¶ 7} The amendment to R.C. 2953.36 at issue in this matter provides:

{¶ 8} "Sections 2953.31 to 2953.35 of the Revised Code do not apply to any of the following:

{¶ 9} "* * *

{¶ 10} "(C) Convictions of an offense of violence when the offense is a misdemeanor of the first degree or a felony and when the offense is not a violation of section 2917.03 of the Revised Code and is not a violation of section 2903.13, 2917.01 or 2917.31 of the Revised Code that is a misdemeanor of the first degree."

{¶ 11} The state argues that the weight of authority in Ohio supports its assertion that amendments to R.C. 2953.36 are applicable to criminal convictions occurring prior to the effective date of the amended statute and that the date of filing of the application to seal is irrelevant. According to the state, application of R.C. 2953.36(C) to LaSalle's conviction does not violate the constitutional prohibition against retroactive legislation because the process of expungement is remedial in nature. Finally, the state contends that the version of R.C. 2953.36 in effect at the time of LaSalle's expungement hearing controls and suggests that such a result is arguably a prospective application of the statute. LaSalle, on the other hand, contends that application of R.C. 2953.36(C) to the request to seal the record of his conviction is an impermissible retroactive application of the statute.

{¶ 12} Despite the seemingly divergent views expressed in the foregoing arguments, our resolution of the certified question rests simply on whether the General Assembly set forth its intent to apply the amendments to R.C. 2953.36 retrospectively and, if so, whether retrospective application of the statute is constitutionally permissible. For the following reasons, we find that applying R.C. 2953.36(C) to LaSalle's application to seal the record of his conviction is not in accordance with law. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

{¶ 13}...