State v. Lasley

• Decision Date: 28 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-1938.,03-1938.
• Citation: 705 N.W.2d 481
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Lester Tobias LASLEY, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

705 N.W.2d 481

STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Lester Tobias LASLEY, Appellee.

No. 03-1938.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

October 28, 2005.

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Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Donald D. Stanley, Jr., and Brian Meyer, Assistant Attorneys General, Brent D. Heeren, County Attorney, and Richard Vander Mey, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.

Steven F. Olson and Jeffrey S. Rasmussen of BlueDog, Olson & Small, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellee.

LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

This proceeding stems from a charge of an alleged sale of cigarettes to an underaged person by an individual on an Indian reservation in violation of Iowa Code section 453A.2(1) (Supp.2001). A magistrate dismissed the charge, concluding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of Indian sovereign immunity. The State sought discretionary review, which we granted. The Sac and Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa (Tribe), owner of the establishment where the offense allegedly took place, sought the dismissal. The State contends the magistrate had subject matter jurisdiction and the Tribe has no standing.

The Tribe contends the magistrate correctly determined the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. In addition, the Tribe contends discretionary review was inappropriate and for that reason we have no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. In the event we conclude there was subject matter jurisdiction for the magistrate to hear the case, the Tribe contends reinstatement and prosecution of the charge is barred.

We conclude we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal, there was subject matter jurisdiction for the magistrate to hear the case, and reinstatement and prosecution of the charge is not barred. Accordingly, we reverse the magistrate's dismissal order and remand for an order reinstating the charge and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background Facts.

On March 13, 2003, an officer with the Tama County Sheriff's department issued an Iowa Uniform Citation and Complaint against Lester Tobias Lasley, charging him with providing tobacco to an underaged person in violation of Iowa Code section 453A.2(1). The Tribe owned the Meskwaki Trading Post, in Tama County, where Lasley was employed and where he allegedly provided the tobacco to the underaged person. The Tribe is a federally recognized tribal entity. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 67 Fed.Reg. 46,328, 46,330 (July 12, 2002); see also Sac & Fox Tribe of the Miss. in Iowa v. Licklider, 576 F.2d 145, 147-50 (8th Cir.1978) (describing history of the Tribe dating back to the 1700s and concluding the land located in Tama County and occupied by the Tribe constitutes an Indian reservation).

Later, Brad S. Jolly, an attorney with a Minnesota law firm, applied for admission pro hac vice. In the application, Jolly represented that he was appearing as counsel for Lasley, "in his status as an employee" of the Tribe, and as counsel for the Tribe. The application further stated that Jolly's law firm had been retained to act as counsel for Lasley "in his status as an employee" of the Tribe and as counsel for the Tribe, including the Tribe's trading post.

Jolly also filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, alleging that the State of Iowa "lacks civil regulatory jurisdiction" over the Tribe and its reservation.

Following a hearing, Magistrate John J. Willett filed a decision in which the magistrate granted Jolly's application for admission pro hac vice and noted that Jolly was appearing on behalf of the Tribe. The court also noted in its ruling that Jolly argued that this was a civil/regulatory matter and for that reason the State lacked civil/regulatory jurisdiction within the boundaries of the tribal lands. The court further noted that the State argued that because the defendant was an individual in a criminal case, the State had authority to enforce its criminal statutes against him even though the criminal act allegedly took place on land owned by the Tribe. Framing the issue as "whether the lack of subject matter jurisdiction extends to an individual employee of the Tribe," the court dismissed the case for lack of such jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the statutes of Iowa regulating tobacco were in fact regulatory and therefore could not be enforced either against the Tribe or its employees.

The State filed a motion to reconsider and enlarge, asking the court to reconsider its decision that the criminal complaint was regulatory rather than criminal. The State also challenged the Tribe's standing to appear in a criminal case when the defendant in open court acknowledged that he did not ask Jolly to represent him. As to the standing issue, the State asked the court to add the following facts to its decision:

The Court's recitation of facts regarding the July 30, 2003, hearing fails to make any reference to statements made by the defendant, Lester Lasley, in open court, in the presence of the presiding magistrate and Brad Jolly, counsel for the Tribe, that he did not ask to have an attorney represent him, that attorney Jolly was not his attorney, that he had not asked attorney Jolly or attorney Jolly's law firm to represent him, and, further, that in fact he just wished to plead guilty.

In its ruling on the State's motion to reconsider and enlarge, the court noted that Lasley appeared pro se and wished to have the matter finalized on the date he appeared. However, the court also noted that "it is not that simple. [Lasley] was charged with an act allegedly occurring on tribal lands while [Lasley] was employed by the Tribe in a tribal business operated upon tribal land." The court refused to change its decision as to the jurisdictional question but did grant the State's motion to expand its findings by incorporating the above cited facts regarding Lasley's statements in open court.

The State sought discretionary review, maintaining the charge was criminal/prohibitory rather than civil/regulatory. The State also raised the standing issue it earlier raised before the magistrate. Later, the State filed a supplement to its application that included the expanded findings about Lasley's statements in open court. We granted the State's application over the Tribe's resistance.

II. Issues.

We consider the following issues: (1) whether the case is appropriately before us on discretionary review, (2) whether the Tribe has standing in the case, (3) whether subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, and (4) whether reversing the dismissal and reinstating the prosecution is the appropriate remedy.

III. Scope of Review.

Because the case raises an issue of statutory interpretation, our review is for correction of errors at law. State v. Wolford Corp., 689 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Iowa 2004). In addition, we review proceedings concerning subject matter jurisdiction at law. Tigges v. City of Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 512 (Iowa 1984).

IV. Appropriateness of Discretionary Review and Standing.

Because our resolution of both issues turns on the law concerning subject matter jurisdiction, we address them together.

The Tribe contends discretionary review of the State's appeal is inappropriate because the magistrate did not find the statute invalid. The Tribe relies on Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.73(1) which provides that in simple misdemeanor cases "[a]n appeal may be taken by the plaintiff only upon a finding of invalidity of an ordinance or statute." Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.73(1).

The State sought discretionary review pursuant to Iowa Code section 814.5(2) (2003) which allows the State to seek such review under limited circumstances. The ground the State relies on provides discretionary review may be available when the underlying case resulted in "[a] final judgment or order raising a question of law important to the judiciary and the profession." Iowa Code § 814.5(2)(d).

We need not concern ourselves with the obvious tension between rule 2.73(1) and section 814.5(2) because we are faced here with an issue of Indian sovereignty, which immediately calls into question subject matter jurisdiction. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 1702, 140 L.Ed.2d 981, 985 (1998) ("As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity."); see also State v. Bear, 452 N.W.2d 430, 432 (Iowa 1990) (recognizing that Indian sovereignty raises a question of subject matter jurisdiction). "Subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time." Bear, 452 N.W.2d at 432; Hyde v. Buckalew, 393 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Iowa 1986) ("The issue whether the legislature intended to waive its sovereign immunity with respect to a particular type of claim is a matter of [subject matter] jurisdiction, the power of the court to hear and adjudicate a particular class of cases, and the State may raise that issue by motion to dismiss at any stage of the proceeding."). In addition, this court may raise the issue sua sponte. State ex rel. Vega v. Medina, 549 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Iowa 1996).

In Lansky ex rel. Brill v. Lansky, we noted the importance of resolving jurisdictional issues first, especially those involving subject matter jurisdiction, no matter how the issue is presented:

The general theme of Iowa cases provides that, when a court is confronted with a question of its own authority to proceed, it should take charge of the proceedings affirmatively, regardless of the vehicle used to raise the issue. The court should utilize the most efficient method at its disposal to determine the true facts and then decide the issue promptly. When the court's power to proceed is at issue, the court has the power and duty to determine whether it has jurisdiction of the matter presented. Subject matter jurisdiction should be considered before the court looks at other...