State v. Lasowski
Decision Date | 12 May 1926 |
Docket Number | No. 18.,18. |
Citation | 133 A. 415 |
Parties | STATE v. LASOWSKI. |
Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Error to Court of Quarter Sessions, Union County.
Clemens Lasowski was convicted under Crimes Act, § 115, for carnal abuse of a child under the age of 12 years, and he brings error. Affirmed.
Argued January term, 1926, before PARKER, MINTURN, and BLACK, JJ.
Louis J. Feit, of Elizabeth, for plaintiff in error.
Walter O. Tenney, Assistant Prosecutor of the Pleas, of Elizabeth (Abe J. David, of Elizabeth, prosecutor, on the brief), for the State.
Plaintiff in error was convicted upon an indictment based on section 115 of the Crimes Act (2 Comp. St. 1910, p. 1783), charging carnal abuse of a certain child under the age of 12 years, and brings this writ of error. The entire proceedings had at the trial are certified under section 136 of the Criminal Procedure Act (2 Comp. St. 1910, p. 1863), and 24 specifications for reversal are assigned and argued, identical with the same number of assignments of error.
No. 1. Refusal to quash the indictment for omitting to specify that defendant was a "male." The indictment followed the language of the statute ("Any person who shall," etc.), and as carnal abuse necessarily connotes debauchery of the female organs by the male organs, the male sex of defendant was necessarily implied in the charge. See State v. Hummer, 73 N. J. Law, 714, 719, 65 A. 249.
2, 3, 4. Questions put to the child by prosecutor, and allowed over objection, relating to maltreatment by defendant on former occasions. Such evidence in this class of cases is permitted. State v. Snover, 65 N. J. Law, 289, 47 A. 583; State v. Cannon, 72 N. J. Law, 46, 60 A. 177; State v. Faulks, 97 N. J. Law, 408, 117 A. 476. It is further argued that the questions or some of them were leading. The allowance of such questions is discretionary, and we And no abuse of that discretion working any "manifest wrong or injury" to defendant.
5 and 7. Allowing the child's mother to state conversations with defendant tending to indicate his guilt of the charge being tried, when such conversations included misconduct with another of her children. The proposition seems to be that because of this feature, the entire conversation was incompetent as involving evidence of other crimes. Such, we think, is not the rule. In Wigm. Ev. vol. 5, p. 209, the text indicates that when the statement contains mention of another crime committed by accused, if such mention is part of one entire statement, the allusion to the other crime will not vitiate the competency of the confession. This accords with the text of 16 C. J. 723, § 1481, which adds that if the part bearing on the other crime is separable, it should be excluded. The same idea appears also at page 635, § 1263. Conceding for present purposes the correctness of this qualification, an examination of the testimony given by the mother shows that the admission, or confession, included both children collectively and could not be subdivided. The judge took the proper course in admitting it, with a caution to the jury that, so far as it related to the other child, it was not evidential, and to disregard it in that aspect.
6. Admission of a question objected to as leading, because a specific date was included. This question had previously been put without including the date, and had been objected to on that ground. The inclusion of the date was the defendant's own doing, and he therefore cannot complain, Bahrey v. Poniatishin, 95 N. J. Law, 128, 112 A. 481, and cases cited.
8. The question to the mother on cross-examination, as to whether she went to a lawyer, was within the discretionary control of the court.
9. A question challenged as leading. We need add nothing to what has been said above in this particular.
10. Permitting repetition of a question in another form, after an unexpectedly adverse answer. This was also discretionary; and in cases where the state's witnesses exhibit unanticipated and surprising lapses of memory and changes in testimony, the interests of justice require that considerable latitude be given to counsel, so long as there is no improper intimidation.
11. Exclusion of a question to the father on cross-examination, as to whether his wife had told him of alleged improper advances made to her by defendant; she having...
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State v. Nagy
...did not invalidate the confession. The lone pertinent authority urged by the State for this strange theory is State v. Lasowski, 133 A. 415, 4 N.J.Misc. 489 (Sup.Ct.1926), but a careful examination of this case reveals a factual situation containing a difference between it and the case at b......
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State v. Steele
...cross-examination designed to establish that the intercourse was by consent and not forcible was allowed; and State v. Lasowski, 4 N.J.Misc. 489, 491, 133 A. 415 (Sup.Ct.1926), where it was held to be within the discretionary control of the court to permit cross-examination of the prosecutr......
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...defendant's age and the statement was but doubtfully connected with the issue in relation to which it was made. In State v. Lasowski, 133 A. 415, 4 N.J.Misc. 489 (Sup.Ct.1926), the court said "The state was required to prove, in order to make a case under the statute, that defendant was of ......