State v. Lasson

Citation292 Mo. 155,238 S.W. 101
Decision Date18 February 1922
Docket NumberNo. 23026.,23026.
PartiesSTATE v. LASSON.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

Appeal from Criminal Court, Jackson County; E. E. Porterfield, Judge.

Lawrence Lasson was convicted of robbery in the first degree, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

On June 2, 1920, the prosecuting attorney of Jackson county, Mo., filed, in the criminal court of said county, a verified information, charging the defendant herein with robbery in the first degree. Defendant was duly arraigned, and entered a plea of not guilty. The trial of said cause was commenced on August 10, 1920, before a jury, and the latter returned into court, on August 11, 1920, the following verdict:

"We, the jury, find defendant, Lawrence Lasson, guilty of robbery in the first degree as charged in the information, and assess his punishment at ten years in the penitentiary.

                              "John W. Adams, Foreman."
                

The robbery is alleged to have occurred between 11 and 12 o'clock on the forenoon of May 22, 1920, directly in front of the office of the Carries Artificial Limb Company, at 904-906 East Twelfth street, in Kansas City, Mo. The office of above company was on the north side of Twelfth street, and fronts south it is one of the busy streets of said city.

The evidence of the state tends to show that John P. Prescott, president of above company, and Mrs. W. A. Huddleston, its cashier and bookkeeper, on the morning of said May 22, 1920, obtained, from the First National Bank of Kansas City, Mo., $2,063, with which to discharge the weekly pay roll of said company. The above money was placed in a leather bag and delivered to Mrs. Huddleston. She and Mr. Prescott were then driven to above office in Prescott's Reo sedan, by a negro chauffeur. They stopped at the edge of the sidewalk in front of said office, and about 10 feet from same. Mr. Prescott stepped out of said car on the sidewalk, followed by Mrs. Huddleston with the bag of money. The chauffeur opened the door of said car from the inside for them to get out, and remained therein during the robbery. As Mrs. Huddleston started into the office with the bag of money, two men appeared on the sidewalk near where she emerged from the car. Both were in plain view and in a foot or two of each other. One of these men, whom she afterwards positively identified as Louis Thompson, ordered her to give him the bag. Thompson grabbed at the bag, and she tried to hold it. He finally took hold of the handle and wrenched the bag from her arm with force. Mrs. Huddleston describes the situation at this juncture as follows:

"The bag dropped after he had gotten hold of it, and the man that was with him grabbed after it, and he grabbed the bag and ran behind the car, and Louis Thompson ran in front of the car."

She testified that after she got out of the Reo sedan another car appeared in the street, close to the one she left, and that these two men ran away in this car, which was headed west and turned south on Campbell street.

Mrs. Huddleston positively identified Louis Thompson as the man who wrenched the bag of money from her, but could not swear that defendant was the man who ran off with the money, although he resembled the man who did so. Prescott positively identified defendant as the man who grabbed the bag of money after it fell to the sidewalk, and as being the man who pushed him down and ran off, with the bag toward said car. He could not, however, identify Louis Thompson as the man who wrenched the bag from Mrs. Huddleston.

The colored chauffeur did not get out of the Reo sedan, did not render any assistance in stopping or identifying the robbers, was present at the trial, and was not sworn as a witness in the case.

The evidence of appellant tends to show that he was a small man; that no weapons of any kind were used during the robbery. He testified, at the trial, that he was not present at the time of the alleged robbery, and did not participate therein; that he was at home sick during the entire forenoon of May 22, 1920, and did not leave home before 4 o'clock in the afternoon of said day. In support of above testimony, appellant produced five or six witnesses, who claimed to have seen defendant at his home on the forenoon of above date, and that he was then sick.

A number of witnesses testified in behalf of the state that defendant's general reputation for morality was bad. Other witnesses testified that it was good. Prescott gave Policeman Dougherty a description of the men who committed the robbery, and recognized defendant as being the man who grabbed the bag and ran with the money, as soon as he saw him at the police station. Policeman McGuire testified that he had known defendant for about one year before the trial; that he was also acquainted with Louis Thompson; that he had seen Thompson at defendant's place of business nearly every time he passed for the last six months.

The instructions and rulings of the court will be considered in the opinion.

Defendant in due time filed motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. Both motions were overruled, and defendant duly appealed from the judgment rendered against him.

John T. Barker, of Kansas City, for appellant.

Jesse W. Barrett, Atty. Gen., and I. Henry Caruthers, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BAILEY, C. (after stating the facts as above).

1. It is insisted by appellant that—

"The evidence in this case is wholly insufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction."

We have carefully read the entire evidence the second time, and do not agree with counsel in respect to above matter. It was the peculiar province of the jury to pass upon the weight of the evidence. The jurors were the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony. We have set out a very fair and full statment of the general facts relating to the merits of the controversy. Mr. Prescott, the president of the company whose money was taken, stood before the jury unimpeached, and testified positively that defendant, Lasson, is the man who grabbed the bag containing $2,063, which was forcibly wrenched from the hands of Mrs. Huddleston by Thompson on the forenoon of May 22, 1920, in Kansas City, Jackson county, Mo. Mrs. Huddleston testified positively that Louis Thompson was on the sidewalk within 2 or 3 feet of defendant when he forcibly wrenched from her hands the bag of money aforesaid. She is equally as positive that the man who was with Thompson grabbed the bag of money which had fallen to the sidewalk, when wrenched from her hands, and that he and Thompson ran to and entered the automobile standing near Prescott's Reo sedan, which moved south, on Campbell street. It is undisputed that the automobile which carried the two robbers away was a stolen machine. It is likewise undisputed that Thompson had been around defendant's place of business frequently during the last six months preceding the trial. The jury had the right, in passing upon defendant's testimony and that of his witnesses, to consider the same in connection with all the facts and circumstances of the case. We are of the opinion that the record before us contains substantial evidence tending to show that defendant was guilty of the crime charged against him in information. State v. Brown (Mo. Sup.) S. W. 785, and fol.; State v. Cook (Mo. 201 S. W. loc. cit. 832; State v. Dinkelkamp (Mo. Sup.) 207 S. W. 770; State v. Underwood, 263 Mo. 677, 173 S. W. 1059; State v. De Groat, 259 Mo. 364, 168 S. W. 702.

2. It is further contended by appellant if any offense was committed, it was larceny and not robbery. Without repeating the evidence again, we are satisfied that, taking the case as a whole, there was substantial evidence produced by the state from which the jury had the legal right to draw the inference that defendant and Thompson were co-operating together at the time of the robbery, under a previous understanding, and that they were acting in concert in forcibly taking said money from Mrs. Huddleston, and fleeing together with same in the automobile, which was there ready for them by prearrangement. The evidence was sufficient to warrant the court in submitting to the jury the issue as to whether appellant was guilty of robbery in the first degree as charged in the information. Section 3307, R. S. 1919; State v. Bater (Mo. Sup.) 232 S. W. loc. cit 1014; State v. Spivey (Mo. Sup.) 204 S. W. loc. cit. 260, 261, 262; State v. Graves, 185 Mo. 713, 84 S. W. 904.

3. It appears from the record that at the conclusion of the testimony, counsel for defendant requested the court to instruct the jury on grand larceny, and the court refused to so instruct. As heretofore stated, there was substantial testimony before the which warranted the latter in finding defendant guilty of robbery in the first degree. On the other hand, if the jurors believed from the evidence that defendant was not acting in concert with Thompson, but solely on his own account, without any previous arrangement or understanding with Thompson, he was entitled to have the jury told that he was guilty of grand larceny, and not robbery, if he grabbed and fled with the money in controversy, as heretofore shown. We are of the opinion that reversible error was committed by the court in refusing to instruct the jury, as requested by defendant, on grand larceny. Section 3312, R. S. 1919; State v. Keeland, 90 Mo. loc. cit. 339, 340, 2 S. W. 442; State v. Parker, 262 Mo. loc. cit. 180, 170 S. W. 1121; L. R. A. 19150, 121; State v. Spivey (Mo. Sup.) 204 S. W. loc. cit. 261.

4. Appellant assigns as error the acquently of the trial court in permitting counsel for the state, over the repeated objections of defendant, to cross-examine the latter as to whether he had been engaged in bootlegging whisky; as to whether he had been running a gambling place; as to whether he had been shooting craps; as to whether he had been selling whisky without a license, etc. None...

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