State v. Laudano

• Citation: 51 A. 860,74 Conn. 638
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 09 April 1902
• Parties: STATE v. LAUDANO.

51 A. 860

74 Conn. 638

STATE

v. LAUDANO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 9, 1902.

Appeal from superior court, New Haven county; Alberto T. Roraback, Judge.

Andrea Laudano was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Levi N. Blydenburgh, Sanford B. Martin, and Paul Russo, for appellant.

William H. Williams, State's Atty., and Alfred N. Wheeler, Asst. State's Atty., for the State.

TORRANCE, C. J. The accused was indicted for the murder of Hugh McKeon, a policeman of the city of New Haven. The evidence in the case on the part of the state tended to show that the deceased, with two other policemen, on the 31st day of July, 1901, went to the dwelling house of the accused, in New Haven, about midnight, for the purpose of arresting a woman there; that the three policemen gained peaceable admission to the hall of the house; and that while in there the accused shot McKeon with a pistol, thereby inflicting upon him certain mortal wounds, of which he died soon after. The accused claimed that he did not fire the fatal shots, and the evidence offered by him, including his own testimony, tended to support this claim. The accused was found guilty and sentenced to death, and from that judgment he brings to this court two appeals. One of them is from the action of the trial court in denying a motion for a new trial made by the accused, and the other is based-upon certain claimed errors of the trial court, alleged to have occurred in impaneling the jury and during the trial of the case. The appeal from the action of the trial court in denying the motion for a new trial will be first considered.

This motion is based upon two grounds: First, that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence in the cause; second, that the state's attorney, in his argument to the jury, had made certain improper remarks, prejudicial to the accused.

The first question is whether the verdict was against the evidence. Strictly speaking, in a case of this kind, and upon the point under consideration, we are dealing with the action of the judge with reference to the motion, rather than with the action of the jury with reference to the verdict; but the controlling question in such cases is, after all, whether or not the verdict is against the evidence. Lewis v. Healy, 73 Conn. 136, 137, 46 Atl. 869. The principles to be applied in such cases are the same whether the case is of a civil or a criminal nature, and those principles have been so fully and clearly stated in the following cases in this court as to make further discussion or statement of them superfluous: Johnson v. Norton, 64 Conn. 134, 29 Atl. 242; Brooks' Appeal, 68 Conn. 294, 36 Atl. 47; State v. Lee, 69 Conn. 186. 37 Atl. 75; Loomis v. Perkins, 70 Conn. 444, 39 Atl. 797; State v. Kaplan, 72 Conn. 637, 45 Atl. 1918; Howe v. Raymond, 74 Conn. 68, 49 Atl. 854. The evidence in the case at bar is quite voluminous, and it appears in full upon the record; but it would serve no useful purpose to analyze, weigh, and review that mass of evidence at length here, nor to give our reasons in detail for the conclusion reached upon the question now under consideration, nor is it customary in such cases to do so. State v. Coffee, 56 Conn. 399-418, 16 Atl. 151. It is enough to say that after a careful reading of that evidence in the light of the principles to be applied to it in determining the present question, and after giving to the claims of the accused with respect to that evidence the deliberate consideration that the importance of the case demands, we are of opinion that neither this court nor the trial court could rightfully hold that the verdict was against the evidence in the cause. We think the trial court committed no error in denying the motion for a new trial, so far as that motion was based on the claim that the verdict was against the evidence in the case.

The next question is whether the claimed improper remarks of the state's attorney entitled the accused to a new trial on his motion. To properly understand this claim, it will be necessary to quote at some length from the record. It appeared in evidence that the accused was born in Italy in 1867, and that in 1883 he came to this country, and to New Haven, where he has since resided. It also appeared in evidence "that the neighborhood of the defendant's home was largely comprised of his own countrymen, and that at the time of the shooting several of his neighbors had observed the policemen go to his door just prior to the shooting, subsequently heard the shots, and saw a policeman (McKeon) come out and fall upon the sidewalk. The defendant called a number of his countrymen (including several of the defendant's neighbors aforesaid) to testify to conversations had with the state's witness De Bello subsequent to the shooting, for the purpose of discrediting De Bello; and it appeared in evidence that De Bello, immediately after the shooting was heard, left De Maio's saloon, where he was at the time of the shooting, and went to the assistance of the police, and did all he could to assist them in their endeavor to catch the defendant. It also appeared from the evidence on the trial that none of the countrymen of the defendant, other than De Bello, rendered assistance to the police at the time aforesaid, although several of them were watching and observing the conduct of the officers following the shooting; and it also appeared in evidence that several of the countrymen of the defendant, who were called as witnesses in his behalf, including his brother, had attempted to dissuade De Bello from testifying for the state against the defendant, one of whom told him that he should 'help the living now.'" With respect to this matter the state's attorney, in his argument, made the following remarks: "No one sought to come to the rescue (and how many heard the deadly shots?) but De Bello. I stand him against the whole pack of them; and I say God bless him for his disposition, and his effort to bring to justice the murderer that night. Believe him or not; the case don't rest upon De Bello. Whatever you may think of him, believe Luigi Moresca, believe this Carlo, believe the others that you have seen here, and I can't do them justice in my description of them. Believe them, if you will, but give De Bello credit for his efforts that night to bring assistance, to give the alarm, and to hunt for the murderer. He made no friends among his countrymen by that conduct No, gentlemen of the jury, 'Help the living' is their motto. 'He is dead, help the living,' is the motto of those who believe in the Mafia." Whereupon one of the counsel for the accused said: "I object to that. There is no evidence of the Mafia, or anything of the kind. If you claim he believes in or belongs to the Mafia, I object to it The State's Attorney: Nobody says that he believes in or belongs to the Mafia, but I say that the spirit that dominates, encourages, and upholds the Mafia is just the kind of spirit to ennunciate the doctrine, 'Help the living," and— Counsel for the Accused: I take exception to these remarks, if your honor please. The Court: Exception noted. Go on with your argument, Mr. attorney. The State's Attorney: "Help the living, he is dead,' is their motto." Certain other remarks made by the state's attorney in argument upon which the motion for a new trial was based in the court below, were made under the following circumstances: The defense was, in substance, that the accused did not fire the fatal shot at all, and incidentally that McKeon was shot by Turbert, one of his fellow policemen, or by some one else, accidentally, while in the hallway of the house of the accused. In their arguments to the jury, counsel for the accused had severely criticised the conduct of the coroner as unfair and unjust to the accused, had attacked and severely criticised the conduct of the state's attorney, had impugned his motives, and charged that both he and the coroner had endeavored to procure and shape testimony to support certain theories founded by them in regard to the case, and "appealed to the jury to give the defendant a fair trial, and that he was entitled to as fair treatment at their hands as though he was the governor's son, or the son of the president of the United States." With reference to the foregoing defense set up by the accused, and the appeal made by his counsel to the jury for a fair trial and fair treatment, the state's attorney, in his argument, made the following remarks: "Now, what is the issue here? The issue is whether this man at the bar be guilty of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, or whether he be innocent. There is no middle ground. There is no manslaughter. There is no second degree. There is no self-defense. Either his story is time, or it is false. If it is true, he deserves at your hands an acquittal, that he may go forth from this court room free, vindicated and acquitted of any wrong. If it is not true, then the other conclusion follows,—inevitably follows. They say you must consider his testimony. I say so, too. They say, gentlemen of the jury,—as though it was necessary to say to you, an intelligent jury, in New Haven county, Connecticut—that every man, be he however so low, is entitled to a fair trial at your hands. Whether he be a governor's son, or of humble birth, says his counsel, he is entitled to a fair trial. Ah, yes; and though the victim of his malice be of humble birth, though he be but a mere police officer, or even if he occupy the highest official position in these United States, and they shoot him down regardless of his position, we will cry out: 'Hold! don't touch him, but give him a fair trial. Give the benefit of all the forms of law, of all the provisions of law which sacredly guard the innocent, and prevent the condemnation of any but the guilty. Don't harm him until he has been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt' Ah, gentlemen of the jury, they say. driven by the exigencies of...