State v. Laughlin
| Decision Date | 14 September 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80SC200,80SC200 |
| Citation | 634 P.2d 49 |
| Parties | STATE of Colorado and Alan N. Charnes, Director of Department of Revenue, Petitioners, v. Billy Ray LAUGHLIN, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Sol. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for petitioners.
Feuer, Flossic & Rich, Philip A. Cherner, Denver, for respondent.
We granted certiorari to review Laughlin v. State, Colo.App., 618 P.2d 689 (1980). We reverse the court of appeals and remand to the court of appeals with directions to affirm the judgment of the district court.
The facts are not in dispute. Prior to the revocation of his driver's license by the Department of Revenue, respondent Laughlin had accumulated a substantial number of traffic offense convictions. 1 On April 23, 1979, Laughlin appeared with counsel at a departmental revocation hearing and was found to be an habitual offender by the hearing officer. Section 42-2-202, C.R.S.1973 . 2 After a full hearing, Laughlin was barred from operating a motor vehicle for a period of five years. Section 42-2-203, C.R.S.1973.
At the revocation hearing, Laughlin offered evidence that his August 29, 1977 conviction for driving while impaired (section 42-4-1202(1)(b), C.R.S.1973), was improper because the requirements of Crim.P. 11(b) were not met at the time he entered his guilty plea in the county court. The hearing officer concluded that she had no authority to set aside the August 29, 1977 conviction on the basis of alleged errors at the providency hearing in the county court.
The issue before this court is whether a guilty plea before a trial court is subject to collateral attack on constitutional grounds in a license revocation hearing. The administrative proceeding to revoke the driver's license of an habitual offender is a civil proceeding. People v. McKnight, Colo., 617 P.2d 1178 (1980); People v. Able, Colo., 618 P.2d 1110 (1980). The only issue to be determined at the license revocation hearing is "whether the licensee has sustained the requisite number of convictions for specified traffic offenses within the prescribed period of time, all as established by statute." People v. McKnight, supra, at 1184. Section 42-2-123, C.R.S.1973. The hearing officer's determination is made by reference to the licensee's driving record, as reflected in the department's records. People v. McKnight, supra. See also, Gillespie v. Department of Revenue, 41 Colo.App. 561, 592 P.2d 418 (1978). At the administrative hearing, it is the licensee's responsibility to challenge alleged mistakes in the records of the department as to his driving history, but he may not relitigate the issue of guilt as to the offenses shown on his record. People v. McKnight, supra; Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Division, 183 Colo. 335, 516 P.2d 634 (1973). Thus, even if a licensee has a meritorious claim that an underlying conviction is not valid, the department hearing officer cannot ignore the conviction until it has been ruled invalid and set aside by a court.
The court of appeals improperly extended the rationale of People v. Heinz, 197 Colo. 102, 589 P.2d 931 (1979), to support the conclusion that a constitutional challenge of an underlying conviction may be raised at a license revocation hearing. Laughlin v. State, Colo.App., 618 P.2d 689 (1980). In a criminal proceeding instituted pursuant to section 42-2-206, C.R.S.1973, a defendant may attack the constitutionality of his conviction for a traffic offense which provides the basis for his habitual traffic offender status. People v. DeLeon, Colo., 625 P.2d 1010 (1981); People v. Roybal, Colo., 618 P.2d 1121 (1980) (Roybal I); People v. Able, supra; People v. Heinz, supra. His right to assert a constitutional defense exists because an unconstitutionally obtained conviction cannot be used in a later proceeding to support guilt or enhance punishment. People v. Roybal, supra. However...
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