State v. Laune
Decision Date | 15 April 2020 |
Docket Number | A163483 |
Citation | 303 Or.App. 541,464 P.3d 459 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Daryl Lee LAUNE, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Erin J. Snyder Severe, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Rebecca M. Auten, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before DeHoog, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for violating a stalking protective order. As part of defendant's sentence, the trial court ordered that defendant pay $330 in court-appointed attorney fees. On appeal, defendant argues that the court erred in imposing that obligation, because a court may order a defendant to pay attorney fees only when there is evidence in the record that the defendant is or may be able to pay them, and here the court erroneously relied on a security deposit paid by defendant's sister to find that he had that ability. According to defendant, under ORS 135.265(2), which governs the return of security deposits, a deposit made by a third party on a defendant's behalf is not considered the defendant's property for purposes of an ability-to-pay determination and therefore cannot serve as the basis for such a finding in regard to attorney fees. As we explain below, however, that argument is not preserved. Accordingly, we decline to address it on appeal, and we affirm.
The relevant facts are procedural and undisputed. Defendant was charged with violating a court's stalking protective order, and the trial court approved defendant's request for court-appointed counsel. Shortly thereafter, defendant's sister paid a $1,500 security deposit and signed a security agreement to secure defendant's release from jail. The agreement stated, in part:
(Uppercase and underscore in original.)
A jury found defendant guilty of the charged offense of violating a court's stalking protective order. At defendant's ensuing sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered defendant to pay, among other fines and fees, a $330 court-appointed attorney fee, to be taken from the $1,500 security deposit that defendant's sister had posted on his behalf.
Defendant correctly points out that a trial court errs when it imposes a court-appointed attorney fee absent a record that the defendant "is or may be able to pay" the fee, and that the burden is on the state to prove that ability to pay. ORS 151.505(3) ;1 ORS 161.665(4) ; State v. Crider , 291 Or. App. 23, 32, 418 P.3d 18 (2018). Defendant acknowledges that ORS 135.265(2)2 authorizes a trial court to retain portions of a security deposit at the conclusion of a criminal case. Defendant contends, however, that, when the legislature amended ORS 135.265(2) in 1979 to make security deposits refundable to the person making the deposit, rather than to the defendant, the legislature expressed its intention that third-party security deposits not be considered "available" for purposes of determining a defendant's ability to pay under ORS 151.505(3).
More specifically, defendant notes that, before ORS 135.265(2) was amended in 1979, a defendant was presumptively entitled to recover—less a processing fee—sums posted as security, as follows:
"When conditions of the release agreement have been performed and the defendant has been discharged from all obligations in the cause, the clerk of the court shall return to the accused , unless the court orders otherwise, 90 percent of the sum which has been deposited and shall retain as security release costs 10 percent of the amount deposited."
ORS 135.265(2) (1977), amended by Or. Laws 1979, ch. 878, § 1 (emphasis added). Defendant further observes that, in 1979, the legislature amended ORS 135.265(2) and specifically changed the person entitled to recover a security deposit from "the accused" to "the person shown by the receipt to have made the deposit." ORS 135.265(2) ; Or. Laws 1979, ch. 878, § 1. Defendant contends that, because of that amendment, ORS 135.265(2) should be interpreted as prohibiting trial courts from considering third-party security deposits when determining whether a defendant "is or may be able to pay." See ORS 151.503(3).
In making that argument, defendant acknowledges that our case law says otherwise. That is, both before and after the 1979 amendment to ORS 135.265(2), Oregon courts have recognized a legal presumption that cash bail posted on behalf of a defendant belongs to the defendant. Rosentreter v. Clackamas County , 127 Or. 531, 534, 273 P. 326 (1928) (); State v. Baker , 165 Or. App. 565, 570-71, 998 P.2d 700, rev. den. , 330 Or. 375, 6 P.3d 1105 (2000) (); State v. Davis , 116 Or. App. 607, 610, 843 P.2d 460 (1992) (); State v. Grant , 44 Or. App. 671, 674, 606 P.2d 1166 (1980) (). Defendant asks us to reconsider that legal presumption.3
We begin—and, as it turns out, conclude—by considering whether defendant preserved his argument for appeal.4 Defendant contends that he preserved that argument during his sentencing hearing, based on the following colloquy:
(Emphasis added.)
For its part, the state does not dispute defendant's contention that he adequately preserved his claim of error. Rather, the state responds on the merits and argues that it was not error for the trial court to rely on defendant's security deposit in determining that he had the ability to pay attorney fees. Specifically, the state points out that the plain language of ORS 135.265(2) contemplates that trial courts will withhold security deposits for appropriate purposes—which, the state contends, includes the payment of a defendant's financial obligations—as follows:
"[T]he clerk of the court shall return to the person shown by the receipt to have made the deposit, unless the court orders otherwise , 85 percent of the sum which has been deposited and shall retain as security release costs 15 percent, but not less than $5 nor more than $750, of the amount deposited."
ORS 135.265(2) (emphasis added). And, in the event that we do not read the plain language of the statute as the state does, the state also provides legislative history to support its proposition that courts have the authority to withhold security deposits as the trial court did in this case.5
This case however, does not provide us an opportunity to consider the parties’ statutory arguments, because defendant did not preserve his statutory argument for appeal. Though the state concedes defendant's preservation argument, that concession is not binding on this court. State v. Wyatt , 331 Or. 335, 346, 15 P.3d 22 (2000) (). We are obligated to make our own preservation inquiry in order to conclude whether "the policies underlying the [preservation] rule have been sufficiently served." State v. Parkins , 346 Or. 333, 341, 211 P.3d 262 (2009).
The primary purposes of the preservation rule are to allow the trial court to consider a contention and correct...
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