State v. Lawhorn

• Decision Date: 05 April 2002
• Citation: 830 So.2d 720
• Parties: STATE of Alabama et al. v. Phillip J. LAWHORN.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

830 So.2d 720

STATE of Alabama et al. v. Phillip J. LAWHORN.

1002071.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 5, 2002.

Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Scott L. Rouse, asst. atty. gen., Constitutional Defense Division, for appellants.

John L. Bodie of Bodie & Warren, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.

HARWOOD, Justice.

The State of Alabama; Governor Don Siegelman; Attorney General Bill Pryor; Michael O'Dell, district attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit; and Cecil Reed, sheriff of DeKalb County (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the State"), appeal from an order granting a preliminary injunction to Phillip Lawhorn. That order is based on findings the trial court made in regard to the Community Notification Act, § 15-20-20 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). We dismiss the appeal.

On September 22, 2000, Phillip and Sheila Lawhorn sued the State of Alabama, Governor Siegelman, O'Dell, Roy Wynn (identified in the complaint as the sheriff of DeKalb County), and Shirley Gorham, director of the DeKalb County Department of Human Resources. The complaint stated, in pertinent part:

"3. Plaintiffs Sheila and Phillip [Lawhorn] were married to each other on or about November 7, 1997.

"4. At the time of said marriage, Sheila had, and currently has, two minor children that are, as a result of said marriage, Phillip's stepchildren.

"5. On or about March 9, 1998, Phillip was sentenced and placed on probation for two separate charges of sexual abuse in the second degree. Neither victim therein was Phillip's child.

"6. As a condition of said probation, Phillip was prohibited from residing with his wife Sheila and his stepchildren.

"7. On or about September 1, 1999, Alabama's Community Notification Act (hereinafter the `Act') became effective upon its approval on or about June 18, 1999, by Governor Don Siegelman, who is charged with the duty of the enforcement of the laws in the State of Alabama.

"8. On or about March 9, 2000, Phillip was released from said probation and the terms thereof."

The Lawhorns alleged that the Act was unconstitutional in its entirety, or as it applied to Phillip Lawhorn, in that it prohibited Phillip and Sheila from living together without fear of criminal prosecution.¹ As relief, the Lawhorns sought, in part, a declaration from the trial court that the Act was unconstitutional in its entirety, or at least as it applied to them, so that they could live together; the Lawhorns also requested that the trial court preliminarily enjoin the State from enforcing the Act against them, during the pendency of the action, and that it permanently enjoin the State from doing so thereafter.

Along with the complaint, the Lawhorns filed a motion for a restraining order against the State that the trial court denied on October 3, 2000, in consideration of the fact that it had set a hearing on their request for a preliminary injunction for October 31, 2000. On October 10, 2000, the Lawhorns amended their complaint to correct the caption to reflect that Cecil Reed was the sheriff of DeKalb County. Thereafter, a motion to dismiss was filed by Attorney General Pryor and O'Dell, and subsequently a similar motion was filed by Gorham. The Lawhorns filed oppositions to the motions to dismiss. On November 15, 2000, they filed an amendment to their amended complaint that struck and substituted a paragraph therein, along with a supporting brief. On November 29, 2000, the State filed a response in opposition to the Lawhorns' complaint as last amended, to which the Lawhorns filed a reply on December 11,2000. On January 25, 2001, the trial court entered an order granting a preliminary injunction to Phillip Lawhorn. On January 31, 2001, the State filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's judgment.² On February 5, 2001, the Lawhorns filed objections to the State's postjudgment motion. On February 6, 2001, Gorham filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate, similar to the motion filed by the State, to which the Lawhorns filed objections on February 7, 2001. The trial court held a hearing on the postjudgment motions on April 10, 2001, and denied them on May 1, 2001. On May 24, 2001, the State filed a motion for the trial court to make its January 25, 2001, order "final" pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., for purposes of appeal. That motion stated:

"COME NOW the Defendants ... and move this Honorable Court, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, to make final its judgment concerning the constitutionality of the Community Notification Act. In so doing, the State does not waive any objections to the basis of the Court's granting a permanent injunction to the Plaintiffs. Nonetheless, it is evident the Court's order of January 25, 2001, is dispositive of the Plaintiff's [sic] constitutional claims. Moreover, by denying the State's motion to alter, amend or vacate said order, it is equally evident that further trial-court proceedings will not produce a favorable result to the State. Thus, there is no reason to delay this Court's express direction for the entry of a final judgment against the State, from which an appeal will then be taken."

(Footnotes omitted; emphasis added.) Also, in a footnote to its motion, the State asserted that "[d]uring the April 10, 2001, hearing on the State's motion to alter, vacate or amend, all the parties agreed this Court's January 25, 2001, order was not final." On June 8, 2001, the trial court entered an order that stated:

"Upon motion of the State, IT IS ADJUDGED that the court's order of January 25, 2001, is made final concerning the issue of the constitutionality of that portion of the Community Notification Act that is the subject of the proceedings, the court finding there is no just reason for delay. Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff, Phillip Lawhorn, on such issue."

(Emphasis added.)

The statements by the trial court in its January 25, 2001, order concerning the constitutionality of the Act were made in the context of its consideration of whether the Lawhorns had a reasonable chance of prevailing on the merits, that being a required element of its preliminary-injunction analysis. See Perley v. Tapscan, Inc., 646 So.2d 585, 587 (Ala.1994)("In order for a trial court to enter a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must show all of the following: (1) that without the injunction the plaintiff would suffer immediate and irreparable injury; (2) that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law; (3) that the plaintiff has at least a reasonable chance of success on the ultimate merits of his case; and (4) that the hardship imposed on the defendant would not unreasonably outweigh the benefit accruing to the plaintiff." (emphasis on "all" original; other emphasis added) (citations omitted)). Specifically, the record shows that all of the trial court's comments concerning the Act appeared under a heading in the order entitled "Reasonable Chance of Prevailing on the Merits"; the trial court's comments under that heading concluded with the statement that "[t]he plaintiff, Phillip Lawhorn, has met the requirement of showing a reasonable chance of prevailing on the merits of his challenge to that provision of the Act here at issue." Further, the trial court's order stated, in pertinent part:

"The court having found that the plaintiff, Phillip Lawhorn, has satisfied each of the requirements for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, it is unnecessary to address challenges to the validity of the Act other than the ex post facto challenge. Although that challenge is not one Sheila Lawhorn can make and the court makes no finding on the other challenges asserted, it appears to the court that the relief herein granted to Phillip Lawhorn provides incidental relief to Sheila Lawhorn as well, and that it is unnecessary for the court to further address her claim for relief."

(Emphasis added.) The final statement in the order was that "[o]ther matters shall await further order of this court."

In this appeal, the State does not challenge the entry of the preliminary injunction in and of itself. Rather, the State challenges the trial court's findings concerning the constitutionality of the Act, which, as noted above, were expressed only in the context of determining whether the Lawhorns, as a prerequisite to their entitlement to a preliminary injunction, had shown that they had a reasonable chance of prevailing on the merits of their claims. If the State had sought to appeal the issuance of the preliminary injunction entered by the trial court's January 25, 2001, order, it would have had to file a notice of appeal within 14 days of that order, in the absence of the timely filing of a postjudgment motion. Rule 4(a), Ala. R.App. P., states, in pertinent part:

"(1) Except as otherwise provided herein, in all cases in which an appeal is permitted by law as of right to the supreme court or to a court of appeals, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 42 days (6 weeks) of the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from, or within the time allowed by an extension pursuant to Rule 77(d), Ala. R. Civ. P. In appeals from the following orders or judgments, the notice of appeal shall be filed within 14 days (2 weeks) of the date of the entry of the order or judgment appealed from: (A) any interlocutory order granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving an injunction, or refusing to dissolve or to modify an injunction; ....

"(3) The filing of a post-judgment motion pursuant to Rules 50, 52, 55 or 59 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure (ARCP) shall suspend the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal. In cases where post-judgment motions are filed, the full time fixed for filing a notice of appeal shall be computed from the date of the entry in the civil docket of an order granting or denying such motion...."

(Emphasis added.) By application of Rule 4...