State v. Lawler

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: PRESTON, J.
• Citation: State v. Lawler, 2020 Ohio 849, 152 N.E.3d 962 (Ohio App. 2020)
• Decision Date: 09 March 2020
• Docket Number: NO. 14-19-25,14-19-25
• Parties: STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Erica S. LAWLER, Defendant-Appellee.

152 N.E.3d 962

2020 Ohio 849

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Erica S. LAWLER, Defendant-Appellee.

NO. 14-19-25

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Union County.

Date of Decision: March 9, 2020

Andrew M. Bigler for Appellant

Joshua A. Peistrup for Appellee

PRESTON, J.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals the July 18, 2019 judgment of the Union County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion to suppress evidence of defendant-appellee, Erica S. Lawler ("Lawler"). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

{¶2} This case arises from a January 16, 2018 traffic stop on US 33 near Marysville, Ohio. At approximately 5:15 p.m., Trooper Blake Prather ("Trooper Prather") of the Ohio State Highway Patrol was in his patrol vehicle monitoring westbound traffic. At that time, a Buick passed his patrol vehicle, and he noticed that the driver's arms were "locked out on the steering wheel" and that both the driver and the passenger "were sitting upright and rigid." (July 17, 2019 Tr. at 9-10). Based on these observations, Trooper Prather decided to follow the Buick, and at approximately 5:16 p.m., he stopped the Buick after witnessing the driver of the vehicle "move[ ] from the right lane to the left lane without the use of a turn signal to indicate their lane change." (Id. at 11).

{¶3} Trooper Prather identified Bradley Schidecker ("Schidecker") as the driver of the Buick. (Id. at 16). Lawler was identified as the passenger. (Id. ). After speaking with Lawler and Schidecker for a few moments, Trooper Prather learned that neither Lawler nor Schidecker was the registered owner of the Buick. (Id. ). Trooper Prather obtained the registered owner's contact information and returned to his patrol vehicle at approximately 5:21 p.m. (Id. at 16-17, 22); (State's Ex. 1). Once inside his patrol vehicle, Trooper Prather radioed his dispatcher and asked the dispatcher to establish contact with the registered owner. (July 17, 2019 Tr. at 17). Trooper Prather also requested the assistance of a canine unit "off of the behavior[s] [he] observed" prior to returning to his patrol vehicle. (Id. ).

{¶4} At approximately 5:24 p.m., Trooper Prather was informed by the dispatcher that although Lawler and Schidecker were allowed to use the Buick, Schidecker was not supposed to be driving. (Id. at 22-23). By that time, Trooper Prather had also discovered that Schidecker's license was suspended. (Id. at 26). However, after learning this information, Trooper Prather did not return to the Buick to speak to Lawler and Schidecker. Instead, Trooper Prather waited in his patrol vehicle for approximately 25 minutes until the canine unit arrived on scene at 5:49 p.m. (Id. at 24-25, 33). At 5:52 p.m., about 36 minutes after Trooper Prather first stopped the Buick, the drug-detection dog was led to the vehicle, and shortly thereafter, it alerted to the presence of drugs. (Id. at 41-42); (State's Ex. 1). A subsequent search of the vehicle yielded roughly 2 grams of suspected heroin, 23.6 grams of suspected methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, a small digital scale, and other items associated with drug trafficking.

{¶5} On September 11, 2018, the Union County Grand Jury indicted Lawler on five counts: Count One of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(1)(a), a fifth-degree felony; Count Two of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(1)(d), a second-degree felony; Count Three of possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(6)(b), a fourth-degree felony; Count Four of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(1)(c), a second-degree felony; and Count Five of illegal use or possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of R.C. 2925.14(C)(1), (F)(1), a fourth-degree misdemeanor. (Doc. No. 1). On April 22, 2019, Lawler appeared for arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the counts of the indictment. (Doc. No. 6).

{¶6} On June 26, 2019, Lawler filed a motion to suppress evidence. (Doc. No. 18). In her motion to suppress, Lawler argued that the evidence seized from the Buick during the traffic stop should be suppressed because Trooper Prather unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop while awaiting the arrival of the drug-detection dog. (Id. ).

{¶7} A hearing on Lawler's motion to suppress evidence was held on July 17, 2019. (Doc. No. 26); (July 17, 2019 Tr. at 1). On July 18, 2019, the trial court granted Lawler's suppression motion and ordered that the evidence obtained from the search of Buick be suppressed. (Doc. No. 26).

{¶8} On July 22, 2019, the State filed a notice of appeal and a certification pursuant to Crim.R. 12(K). (Doc. Nos. 32, 35). It raises one assignment of error for our review.

Assignment of Error

The trial court erred by finding the totality of the circumstances did not justify prolonging defendant's traffic stop to allow for a canine to arrive at the scene and conduct a sniff of the vehicle.

{¶9} In its assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting Lawler's motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, the State argues that the trial court erred by concluding that Trooper Prather did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify prolonging the traffic stop.

{¶10} "Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Burnside , 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. See State v. Carter , 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552, 651 N.E.2d 965 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, "an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence." Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. Fanning , 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). With respect to the trial court's conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id. , citing State v. McNamara , 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539 (4th Dist.1997).

{¶11} "The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Mays , 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 7, citing State v. Orr , 91 Ohio St.3d 389, 391, 745 N.E.2d 1036 (2001). "Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning" of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 809-810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), citing Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), United States v. Martinez-Fuerte , 428 U.S. 543, 556, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976), and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). The individuals "seized" during the stop of an automobile by law enforcement officers include persons riding in the automobile as passengers. Brendlin v. California , 551 U.S. 249, 251, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) ; State v. Clark , 6th Dist. Wood, 2018-Ohio-2029, 101 N.E.3d 758, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Carter , 69 Ohio St.3d 57, 63, 630 N.E.2d 355 (1994). Because an automobile stop involves the seizure of persons within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, "[a]n automobile stop is * * * subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances." Whren at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769. A traffic stop is reasonable, and therefore constitutionally permissible, if it is supported either by probable cause or by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, including a violation of the traffic laws. State v. Moiduddin , 3d Dist. Union, 2019-Ohio-3544, 142 N.E.3d 1206, ¶ 11. However, "[w]hen police stop a vehicle without either probable cause or a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the seizure is violative of constitutional rights and evidence derived from such a stop must be suppressed." Clark at ¶ 22, citing Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

{¶12} In her motion to suppress, Lawler did not challenge the constitutionality of the initial stop of the vehicle, and after reviewing the record, we are satisfied that Trooper Prather had probable cause to stop the vehicle after he observed Schidecker fail to signal a lane change in violation of R.C. 4511.39. State v. Matheney , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26876, 2016-Ohio-7690, 2016 WL 6672805, ¶ 16 ("[I]f a traffic stop is based on a traffic violation, such as one's failure to signal a turn, which occurred in the officer's presence, the officer possesses probable cause to stop the vehicle and the stop is constitutionally valid."), citing Dayton v. Erickson , 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). Instead, Lawler argued that the evidence seized from the vehicle should be suppressed because Trooper Prather unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop to await the arrival of the drug-detection dog.

{¶13} "[A] seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution." Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005), citing United States v. Jacobsen , 466 U.S. 109, 124, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). For example, "[a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a * * * ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission." Id.

{¶14} " ‘When an officer detains a motorist for a traffic violation, the stop should...