State v. Lawless
| Decision Date | 17 June 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2008-237-C.A.,2008-237-C.A. |
| Citation | 996 A.2d 166 |
| Parties | STATEv.Gordon LAWLESS. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Lauren S. Zurier, Department of Attorney General.
C. Daniel Schrock, Esq.
This case came before the Supreme Court on May 6, 2010, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. The defendant, Gordon Lawless (defendant or Lawless), appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of second-degree sexual assault.1 The defendant was sentenced to fifteen years in the Adult Correctional Institutions, with three years to serve, twelve years suspended and twelve years of probation. After reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties and hearing counsel's arguments, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and, thus, the appeal may be decided at this time.
The defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, defendant contends that the trial justice abused his discretion by not granting an oral motion for continuance so defendant could obtain new counsel. Second, he alleges that the trial justice erred by not granting defendant's request for a hearing on whether the composition of the jury resulted in a systematic and deliberate exclusion of men.
The facts giving rise to these issues are straightforward. On February 28, 2006, the first day of trial, before jury selection, defendant's court-appointed counsel told the court that Lawless wanted a new attorney because the aforementioned counsel had “highly recommended” that Lawless consider a plea offer from the state. The defendant indicated that although he had inquired about hiring a new attorney, monetary constraints prevented him from doing so; he suggested to the trial justice that he would try again or that the court could appoint a new lawyer. The trial justice then confirmed that defendant had known about the plea offer since January 9, 2006-approximately seven weeks before trial. The trial justice also noted that the jurors were present for voir dire and that counsel and the witnesses were ready to proceed. The trial justice therefore refused to continue the matter so that defendant could seek a new lawyer.
With regard to the second issue on appeal, defendant avers that on the first day of trial he moved to pass the case and continue the matter until the jury panel reflected a “better mix” of men and women. The jury list contained forty-eight names and, defense counsel argued, that there were only five men. 2 The defendant stated that he had “no intention of challenging the system” with regard to the jury selection and instead stated that he wanted a new panel and asked the court to take a “close look.” The trial justice denied the request for a hearing on the jury panel because “the defendant [was] not articulating a particular act of discrimination that he says the Jury Commissioner's Office has engaged in.”
At the close of the state's case-in-chief, defendant stated that “I specifically would like the record to indicate that I am not making a Rule 29 motion” for judgment of acquittal or motion to dismiss.3 After the jury returned its verdict of guilty, defendant indicated that he would not be filing a motion for a new trial. This subsequent appeal followed, raising the issues concerning defendant's request for new counsel and the jury-selection process.
We review a trial justice's decision to deny a continuance for a party to retain new counsel under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Tapia, 673 A.2d 54, 55 (R.I.1996) ( ); State v. Bleau, 668 A.2d 642, 645 (R.I.1995) (). Accordingly, we will review for an abuse of discretion, defendant's assertion that he should have been provided with a new attorney.
The defendant contends that his motion to obtain new counsel should have been granted because there were exceptional circumstances to justify the motion, including that he had informed his lawyer he was innocent and wanted a jury trial. The state, conversely, asserts that it was a proper exercise of the trial justice's discretion to deny defendant's request, in light of its timing and the fact that there was no alternate counsel available to try the case, which had been called ready for trial.
Given our well established standard of review, we deem defendant's argument without merit. The record before us discloses that Lawless knew of the state's plea offer for approximately seven weeks before the trial date. His request for a continuance appears to be nothing more than an eleventh-hour attempt to delay the trial in the hope that the outcome would change. It also is important to note that defendant's appointed counsel in this case, while recommending the plea deal, advised the trial justice that he was prepared for trial. There is nothing in the record before us that demonstrates that the trial justice abused his discretion when he refused to delay the trial. The trial justice's decision to deny defendant's request was based on the fact that defendant was aware of the plea offer for seven weeks and had that entire time to seek new counsel. Cf. State v. Farman, 600 A.2d 726, 728 (R.I.1992) ().
The second issue raised by defendant is whether the trial justice erred by refusing his request for a hearing on whether the jury selection process resulted in a systematic and deliberate exclusion of men. The defendant avers that the trial justice's refusal to grant a hearing and allow defendant the opportunity to “hire experts” so he could develop his contention that the jury selection in this case resulted in a “systematic and deliberate exclusion of a particular gender.” The state, on the other hand,...
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State v. Gonzalez
...defendants have a right under the Sixth Amendment to select a petit jury from a fair cross-section of the community. See State v. Lawless , 996 A.2d 166, 168 (R.I. 2010) (mem.); State v. Sosa , 839 A.2d 519, 528 (R.I. 2003) ; State v. Raymond , 446 A.2d 743, 745 (R.I. 1982) ; see also Taylo......