State v. Lawrence

• Decision Date: 11 March 1886
• Citation: 19 Neb. 307,27 N.W. 126
• Parties: STATE v. LAWRENCE.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

19 Neb. 307

27 N.W. 126

STATE

v.LAWRENCE.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Filed March 11, 1886.

Exceptions from Platte county.

William Marshall, Dist. Atty., for the State.

McAllister Bros. and McFarland & Cowdery, contra.

REESE, J.

The defendant was indicted under section 204 of the Criminal Code for the crime of incest. The indictment contained two counts: the first charged the crime to have been committed on the first day of April, 1884; the second alleged the date of the cohabitation to be on the first day of April, 1882, and on divers other days and times between that day and the first day of April, 1884.

On the trial the court, on motion of the defendant, required the prosecutor to elect as to which count of the indictment he would proceed upon. This ruling was excepted to, and is assigned as error by the district attorney. At the close of the evidence on the part of the prosecution a motion was made by the defendant to dismiss the cause for the reason that the evidence did not sustain the charge made in the indictment. This motion was sustained by the court, and the cause dismissed without a verdict. To this the district attorney also excepted, and now brings the cause into this court on error, under the provisions of section 515 et seq. of the Criminal Code. We think it is quite true, as claimed by the plaintiff in error, that the first count in the indictment contains sufficient to charge a crime under the section above alluded to; for, as said in Desty, Amer. Crim. Law, § 88 b: “If the parties for a single day live together in adulterous intercourse, intending its continuance, the offense is complete.” It is equally true that the second count charges a crime, for the offense is a continuing one, and may be laid with a continuendo. State v. Way, 5 Neb. 283.

The objection to this indictment is that the date fixed by the first count, to-wit, the first day of April, 1884, is not included in the time stated in the second count, to-wit, on the first day of April, 1882, and on divers other days and times between that date and the first day of April, 1884; thus excluding the last date. It cannot, therefore, be said that the two counts charge the same offense, but in different forms, to meet the evidence, which is permissible in criminal practice, (1 Bish. Crim. Proc. § 420;) but the dates being different, and the first count not being included in the second as to time, it may be said that each count charges separate and distinct felonies, which should not be joined in the same indictment, and for that reason we cannot say the court erred in compelling the election. Especially is this true, since it is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court. Id. § 454, and cases cited in note; Bailey v. State, 4 Ohio St. 440; Moore, Crim. Law, § 800, and cases there cited.

The remaining question is one of much more importance, and in which, to the mind of the writer, there is much difficulty. It is a fundamental rule for the construction of statutes that the several parts of the law should be so construed as to give effect to the legislative intent, and to give some force and effect to every section and part of the law. With this rule before us, we must adopt the views of the plaintiff in error as to the construction of the section of the criminal law referred to, or ignore it entirely as an unmeaning section. We quote sections 202, 203, and 204 of the Criminal Code:

“Sec. 202. Marriages between parents and children, including grandparents and grandchildren of every degree, between brothers and sisters of the half, as well as the whole, blood, and between uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews, are declared to be incestuous and absolutely void. This section shall extend to illegitimate, as well as to legitimate, children and relations.

Sec. 203. Persons within the degrees of consanguinity within which marriages are declared by the preceding section to be incestuous and void, who shall intermarry with each other, or who shall commit adultery or fornication with each other, or who shall lewdly and lasciviously cohabit with each other, shall be liable to indictment, and upon conviction be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding ten years.

Sec. 204. If a father shall rudely and licentiously cohabit with his own daughter, the father shall, on conviction, be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding twenty years.”

The evidence introduced on the trial, together with the motion of the defendant to dismiss the cause, and the ruling of the court, are thus stated in the abstract:

“The prosecution gave in evidence the testimony of Cornelia Davis as follows: ‘On the thirty-first of March, 1885, my name was Cornelia Davis. I was a married lady at that time. My name before marriage was Cornelia Lawrence. My age is 19 years. I am acquainted with Peter J. Lawrence, the defendant. He is my father. I have lived in this state four years, with my father most of the time, as his daughter, and member of the family. He always claimed me for his daughter.’ Here, at this stage of the case, the defendant asks that the prosecution elect upon which of the two counts of the indictment he will prosecute. The motion was sustained by the court, and the district attorney excepts. ‘Between the first day of April, 1882, and the first day of April, 1884, I was living in this state at my father's house. My father was living there at the same time, together in one family, in Platte county, and state of Nebraska. My father was a married man, living with his wife, and she with him, and I was his daughter, living there at home, as daughters live with their parents. My father and mother occupied one room and I another room. Between April 1, 1882, and April 1, 1884, my father did something improper to me,--the same as to his wife. During that period my father had sexual intercourse with me, sometimes two or three times a week, and sometimes not for a month or two; and this continued in that way throughout the period between the first day of April, 1882, and the first day of April, 1884, at his own house, in Platte county, Nebraska. This sexual intercourse took place, sometimes one time of day and sometimes another; sometimes on the bed and sometimes on the floor. The way this sexual intercourse came about, he told me I should do it, and he should do as he had a mind to with me. He said I was his child, and the law gave him a right to do as he pleased with me. He said it was nobody's business but his own. He said other men do the same, but their girls didn't tell of it, and that I shouldn't. He would swear at me, and said I shouldn't tell of it.’ Cross-examination: ‘I don't think there was any time between the first day of April, 1882, and 1884, in which my father and mother were not living and cohabiting together in the same house. I was simply living at home because that was my home, and with my father and step-mother. I had a room to sleep in. I worked around the house the same as I always did. My room was just across the hall from my father's and mother's room. My step-mother was there most of the while. My father held her out to the community as his wife, and treated her as his wife. They slept together in the same bed.’ The district attorney announces that the further evidence in this case will be cumulative. The state and defendant both rest. The defendant moves to dismiss the case for the reason that the facts in evidence do not sustain the offense charged in the indictment. The motion is sustained, and the district attorney excepts. And thereupon the court rendered the following judgment: ‘And the trial proceeded, and the jury having heard the evidence on the part of the prosecution, the defendant thereupon moves the court to dismiss this cause on the ground that the facts given in evidence by the prosecution do not sustain the offense charged in the indictment; and the court, being fully advised in the premises, doth, on consideration thereof, sustain the same; to which ruling of the court the district attorney excepts, and gives notice that he will file in the supreme court a bill of exceptions in this case; and thereupon it is ordered that the case be and the same is hereby dismissed.’ ”

By the foregoing it will be seen that while the witness and daughter resided with the defendant it was not in any other capacity, so far as outward manifestations and representations were concerned, than as a member of his family, and not as his wife, he having a wife residing with him at that time. The contention of the defendant...