State v. Lawrence
| Decision Date | 11 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | (AC 24716). |
| Citation | 863 A.2d 235,86 Conn. App. 784 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TARRANCE LAWRENCE |
Dranginis, McLachlan and Dupont, Js.
Donald D. Dakers, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Michele C. Lukban, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and John M. Waddock, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly rendered judgment dismissing the motion to correct an illegal sentence1 that was filed by the defendant, Tarrance Lawrence. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion. We hold that the court had jurisdiction to consider the claim, but that, as a matter of law, the sentence was not illegal. We therefore reverse the judgment, remand the case and direct the court to render judgment denying the motion.
The defendant was charged with one count each of murder, carrying a pistol without a permit and tampering with physical evidence in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a (a), 29-35 and 53a-155 (a) (1), respectively. The murder charge alleged that the defendant caused death by use of a firearm. The defendant invoked the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to the murder charge. The jury found the defendant guilty of carrying a pistol without a permit and tampering with physical evidence and not guilty by reason of extreme emotional disturbance as to the murder charge. The jury also found the defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under General Statutes § 53a-55a. In accord with the instructions to the jury, as requested by the defendant's counsel, the jury, after finding the defendant not guilty of murder because of extreme emotional disturbance, considered whether he was guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. The court sentenced the defendant to thirty-five years incarceration on the latter offense. He received concurrent sentences on the other two charges. The defendant appealed on grounds unrelated to the present claim of an illegal sentence, and this court affirmed the judgment. State v. Lawrence, 67 Conn. App. 284, 786 A.2d 1227 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 919, 791 A.2d 567 (2002). Subsequently, the defendant filed the motion to correct an illegal sentence that is the subject of this appeal.
This case presents an issue of first impression. The question is whether Practice Book § 43-22 is an appropriate device to challenge the propriety of a sentence that is imposed pursuant to a statute under which the defendant argues he could not, as a matter of law, have been convicted.2 The defendant claims that his sentence was illegal because it exceeded the maximum statutory limit of twenty years for the crime of manslaughter in the first degree, as provided in General Statutes § 53a-35a (5), which he claims is the crime for which he should have been sentenced. He argues that it was the only crime for which he could have been found guilty after he was found not guilty of murder by reason of extreme emotional disturbance, as provided in § 53a-54a. There is no dispute that this issue was not raised at trial, that it could have been raised as an unpreserved constitutional issue or as plain error on direct appeal and that it was not. There also is no dispute that the sentence the defendant received facially matched that permitted for the crime for which he was convicted, namely, manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, or that his counsel requested the very jury instruction that the court gave as to that crime. The determination of whether a sentence is legal is a question of law. State v. Barksdale, 79 Conn. App. 126, 138, 829 A.2d 911 (2003). Furthermore, such a claim may be raised for the first time on direct appeal; id., 139; or by way of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Cobham v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 30, 38, 779 A.2d 80 (2001).
We begin with a brief review of this court's and the Supreme Court's interpretation and application of Practice Book § 43-22. In State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, 443-44, 546 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809, 548 A.2d 441 (1988), this court defined an illegal sentence as "essentially one which either exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant's right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory." A sentence imposed in an illegal manner is one "within the relevant statutory limits but. . . imposed in a way which violates [the] defendant's right . . . to be addressed personally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment . . . or his right to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the record, or his right that the government keep its plea agreement promises. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 444.
The Supreme Court recently addressed the scope of Practice Book § 43-22 in Cobham v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 258 Conn. 30. In Cobham, the petitioner appealed from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he claimed that the sentence imposed was illegal. Id., 31. As in this case, the petitioner in Cobham neither objected to the sentence at trial nor raised the issue on direct appeal. Id., 39. Affirming the judgment of the habeas court, the Supreme Court held that the habeas court properly dismissed the petition because the petitioner had brought the petition for a writ of habeas corpus prematurely. Id., 31. In order for the petitioner to challenge the legality of the sentence imposed by the trial court, the Supreme Court held, he first had to appeal directly from the sentence or file a motion in the trial court to correct an illegal sentence under Practice Book § 43-22. Cobham v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 31-32. The Supreme Court, quoting McNellis, held that Practice Book § 43-22 provides the trial court with express authority to retain jurisdiction after a defendant's sentence has begun and may take action as to the sentence.3 Cobham v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 37-38. Cobham specifically addressed the scope of Practice Book § 43-22, stating that "a defendant may challenge his or her criminal sentence on the ground that it is illegal by raising the issue on direct appeal or by filing a motion pursuant to [Practice Book] § 43-22 with the judicial authority, namely, the trial court." (Emphasis added.) Cobham v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 38, citing Copeland v. Warden, 225 Conn. 46, 47 n.2, 621 A.2d 1311 (1993).
Following McNellis and Cobham, this court recently stated in State v. Pagan, 75 Conn. App. 423, 429-30, 816 A.2d 635, cert. denied, 265 Conn. 901, 829 A.2d 420 (2003),4 that a trial court has jurisdiction to correct a claimed illegal sentence under Practice Book § 43-22. See also State v. Raucci, 21 Conn. App. 557, 563, 575 A.2d 234 (), cert. denied, 215 Conn. 817, 576 A.2d 546 (1990).
A reason for granting jurisdiction to a trial court to review the issue of a claimed illegal sentence under Practice Book § 43-22 is that it is an expeditious way, if correction is needed, to reconstruct a sentence or to resentence a defendant if the original sentence was illegal. Cobham v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 258 Conn. 39. The trial court retains jurisdiction for resentencing, if required, either after a direct appeal has led to a remand or pursuant to a motion to correct an illegal sentence. State v. Raucci, supra, 21 Conn. App. 563.
The difference between a dismissal of a motion to correct an illegal sentence for lack of jurisdiction and a denial of relief sought is whether the claim could have been considered at all, as opposed to its being denied or granted after a consideration of it on the merits. A dismissal is mandatory if jurisdiction is lacking, whereas denial of the motion requires the court to address the merits of the claim. In this case, our review of recent appellate decisions leads us to conclude that the court did have jurisdiction and, therefore, that the merits of the defendant's claim must be reached.5
The most compelling reason for concluding that jurisdiction exists lies in the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court in Cobham v. Commissioner, supra, 258 Conn. 30. The court held that a habeas corpus action is premature and cannot be used to challenge the legality of a sentence unless the sentence previously has been the subject of a direct appeal or a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Id., 39. If we adhere to that holding, as we must, a defendant who did not on direct appeal challenge a sentence as being illegal would have no forum in which to do so because the remedy of a habeas corpus petition would not be available. If, subsequent to a direct appeal, a defendant wanted to challenge for the first time a sentence as being illegal, and a trial court has no jurisdiction to review such a claim pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22, a defendant could never obtain review of that claim. Under the holding in Cobham, a defendant would be precluded from raising that claim by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and a finding of no jurisdiction in the trial court would preclude any other review. Such a defendant would be left without any remedy in the event that his sentence was illegal or "imposed in an illegal manner" or constituted "any other disposition made in an illegal manner."6 Practice Book § 43-22.
This case presents an issue that is similar to that in a case this court recently decided in which we held that a sentence that failed to conform to the legally operative statute was an illegal sentence. See ...
To continue reading
Request your trial