State v. Lawrence
| Decision Date | 21 September 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 96,104.,96,104. |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Kayle LAWRENCE, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Robert D. Hecht, district attorney, Amy M. Memmer, assistant district attorney, and Phill Kline, for appellant.
Malcolm L. Copeland, of Topeka, for appellee.
Before MALONE, P.J., BUSER and LEBEN, JJ.
The district court dismissed criminal charges against Kayle Lawrence because the trial setting was 313 days after arraignment and thus violated a statutory 180-day deadline. But delays that are "as a result of the application or fault of the defendant" do not count against the deadline under the statute. See K.S.A.2006 Supp. 22-3402(2). We must decide whether enough of those 313 days do not count so that the 180-day deadline had not been exceeded. The largest single delay, 131 days, was caused by the defendant waiting to ask for a jury trial until about a week before a non-jury trial was set to begin, causing the trial to be postponed. On our review, those 131 days and 75 others are attributable to the application or fault of the defendant under the speedy-trial statute and not counted against the deadline. Because only 107 of the allowable 180 days had been used and no other provision of the speedy-trial statute was violated, we find that the case should not have been dismissed.
Most of the Pretrial Delays Here Were Requested by or Caused by the Defense.
Lawrence was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol and another traffic infraction. He was arraigned on February 9, 2005; a court trial was set for March 29, 2005. Before that trial could proceed, Lawrence and his attorney had differences and the attorney moved to withdraw. That motion was granted on March 25, 2005, and the initial trial date was removed.
Lawrence made one appearance without counsel at a scheduling docket on April 13, 2005, and ultimately got a new attorney on board on May 10, 2005. His new attorney said that he needed about 30 days to review the case and asked for it to be continued. The court agreed to the continuance and — apparently unaware that an arraignment had already been held — set an arraignment for June 8, 2005.
At the June 8 hearing, the defendant waived arraignment, and the case was set for trial to the court on July 20. A week before trial, however, the defendant filed a jury-trial demand. Upon the filing of that demand, the July 20 trial setting was removed and a pretrial hearing was set for August 3. On July 29, 2005, defense counsel requested a 2-week continuance of the August 3 hearing. The defense motion for continuance was granted; the court set a new hearing date of September 14.
At the September 14 hearing, the case was set for jury trial on November 21, 2005. When that date arrived, however, the State asked for a continuance. The State's motion was granted and a new trial date of December 19, 2005, was set. On that date, the defendant asked to postpone the trial date so that he could present a written motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds. The court agreed to do so, and the defendant explicitly waived any time required to consider the motion forward from speedy-trial consideration.
For the convenience of the reader, the dates of key events and the number of days transpiring between each event are listed in the following table.
-----------------------------------------------------------
No
Date Event Days
-----------------------------------------------------------
February 9, 2005 Defendant arraigned
-----------------------------------------------------------
March 25, 2005 Defense counsel's motion
to withdraw granted. 44
-----------------------------------------------------------
March 29, 2005 Original trial date (postponed
when defense counsel
withdrew). 4
-----------------------------------------------------------
April 13, 2005 Defendant appears for
hearing but does not yet
have new attorney. 15
-----------------------------------------------------------
May 10, 2005 New defense attorney enters
appearance and asks
for continuance. 27
-----------------------------------------------------------
June 8, 2005 Hearing held. Trial set to
judge for July 20. 29
-----------------------------------------------------------
July 13, 2005 Defendant files jury demand
July 20 trial date
removed and pretrial
hearing set for August 3. 35
-----------------------------------------------------------
July 20, 2005 Second trial setting (postponed
when jury demand
filed). 7
-----------------------------------------------------------
July 29, 2005 Defense requests 2-week
continuance; court resets
pretrial hearing for
September 14. 9
-----------------------------------------------------------
August 3, 2005 Previously scheduled pretrial
hearing (continued at
defense request). 5
-----------------------------------------------------------
August 17, 2005 End of 2-week period defense
requested for
continuance. 14
-----------------------------------------------------------
September 14, 2005 Pretrial conference held
case set for jury trial
November 21. 28
-----------------------------------------------------------
November 21, 2005 State requests trial continuance
trial reset for
December 19. 68
-----------------------------------------------------------
December 19, 2005 Defense requests continuance
to present speedy-trial
motion. 28
-----------------------------------------------------------
Our Review Is Unlimited and Governed by the Speedy-Trial Statute.
When, as here, the relevant facts are not in dispute, a claimed violation of the right to a speedy trial presents an issue of law; thus this court has unlimited review. State v. Adams, 283 Kan. 365, 368, 153 P.3d 512 (2007). The case is determined by application of subsections (2) and (3) of K.S.A.2006 Supp. 22-3402 as amended in 2004:
The Trial Court Found a Violation of the Speedy-Trial Statute.
The trial court concluded that only the 42-day period from August 3, when a pretrial hearing was continued at the request of the defense, until September 14, when that pretrial was held and a trial date was set, should be counted against the defendant. The trial court did not charge any time against the defendant for events occurring before the scheduled July 20 trial date. The court instead granted the State an additional 90 days beyond the normal 180-day limit, citing K.S.A.2006 Supp. 22-3402(3); this provided a 270-day period following arraignment to bring the defendant to trial. Having granted that additional 90 days, the court said that delays caused by the defense after the July 20 trial date would extend the speedy-trial deadline, but delays occurring before that date would not be counted. The court concluded that the State's deadline to bring the defendant to trial had been December 18, 2005, or 312 days after arraignment, which was calculated by adding the 42 days to the 270-day limit. Because that was 1 day before the trial had been set to begin, the court granted the motion to dismiss.
There Is No Violation of the Standard 180-Day Speedy-Trial Limit Here.
We begin our analysis by reviewing the application of the standard 180-day limit of subsection (2) of K.S.A.2006 Supp. 22-3402 to the facts of our case. There are several disputes between the parties here as to whether the time period to be charged to the defense begins on the date a motion for continuance is granted or on a later date, such as when a trial had been scheduled to take place. The parties also dispute when the time charged to the defense ends, especially with respect to the lengthy continuance caused by the defendant's demand for jury trial.
The Supreme Court's recent opinion in State v. Brown, 283 Kan. 658, 157 P.3d 624 (2007), provides substantial guidance. Although the defendant in Brown was in custody and covered by the 90-day time limit of subsection (1) of the statute while Lawrence was out of custody and covered by 180-day time limit of subsection (2), the provisions of those subsections are identical for the purpose of all of our determinations. The court in Brown faced a trial continuance on defendant's motion to allow time to obtain an expert witness. As in our case, the date initially chosen as the new trial date when granting the defense continuance was later postponed at the State's request (in Brown due to illness of the prosecutor). Under...
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